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ABSTRACT: 
There are an enormous number of competing interpretations of South Africa's 
apartheid era policies both in the region and towards Angola. With South Africa's role 
in the Angolan civil war as its case study, this paper evaluates the relative utility of 
certain selected approaches to international relations theory. 
This paper evaluates the relative utility of system level versus unit level theories 
to explain the nature of South African involvement in the Angolan conflict. These two 
categories are represented by nee-realist structural theory and, secondly, by a variety 
of unit level theories typically concerned with South Africa's domestic environment. 
This dissertation demonstrates, through the actual events, the utility of these two 
distinct theoretical approaches. 
Given the above approach and objectives, the methodology consists firstly of a 
critical conceptual review and analysis of each paradigm as a useful explanation of 
South African foreign relations. It consists secondly, of a more "empirical" ass~ssment 
of their value in accounting for or illuminating significant aspects of the internal and 
external sources of motivation for South Africa's military intervention. 
The empirical evidence is examined according to four stages: firstly; a review 
of the related literature, secondly; South Africa's initial intervention and the presence 
of US aid in 1975, thirdly; the widening of the conflict post 1978 under P. W. Botha, and 
fourthly; the departure of all the major foreign influences and final resolution of the 
Angolan conflict. This exercise extends until 1988 which, in December of that year, 
witnessed the cessation of all external intervention. The conclusion recommends 
further research in the form of empirical case studies which consider both the 




TABLE OF CONTENTS: 
ABSTRACT ..................................................... vii 
LIST OF EXHIBITS .............................................. xv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ....................................... xvii 
ACRONYMS ...................... -.............................. xix 
APPENDICES ................................................... xv 
1. CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY 
.................................................. · ................. 1 
1 .1 General Comments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 
1.2 Identification of Problem and Methodology ....................... 3 
1.3 Levels-of-Analysis .......................................... 4 
1.4 Sectors ................................................... 5 
1.5 Overview of the Chapter by Chapter Outline ...................... 8 
1.5.1 Chapter Two: Review of the Related Literature ............. 9 
1.5.1.1 The First Body of Literature ..................... 9 
1 .5.1.2 The Second Body of Literature .................. 9 
1.5.2 Chapter Three ...................................... 9 
1.5.3 Chapter Four ...................................... 11 
1.5.4 Chapter Five ...................................... 13 
1.5.5 Chapter Six ....................................... 15 
1.6 Endnotes for Chapter One ................................... 16 
2. CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE 
......................... · ........................................ 20 
\ 
2.1 General Comments ........................................ 20 
~2.2 Review of Classical Realism ................................. 20 
42.3 The Central Importance of Kenneth Waltz ....................... 22 
i 2.4 Review of the Modern Nee-Realist Literature .................... 22 
2.4.1 Kenneth Waltz's Theory of Politics .................... 23 
2.4.2 Systems Level vs Unit Level .......................... 23 
2.4.3 Three Features of Waltzian Structure ................... 24 
2.4.3.1 Ordering Principles ........................... 25 
2.4.3.2 Character of the Units ........................ 25 
2.4.3.3 Distribution of Capabilities ........ · ............. 26 
2.4.4 Critical Weaknesses of Waltz's Theory .................. 27 
2.4.4.1 Waltz's Evolution ............................. 29 
2.4.5 A Modified Theory of Waltz ........................... 30 
2.4.5.1 Gilpin's Notion of Hegemonic War ............... 31 
2.4.6 Structural Realism .................................. 31 
2.4.6.1 New Theoretical Horizons ..................... 32 
2.5 Review of Unit Level Literature ............................... 33 
2.5.1 A View from the Left ................................. 33 
2.5.1.1 Robert Davies .......... , .................... 33 
2.5.1.1.1 SA's Escalating Destabilization .......... 34 
2.5.1.1.2 SA's Sudden De-escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 
2.5.1.2 Joseph Hanlon ........................ 36 
~ 2.5.2 The Militarization of SA Politics ........................ 37 
2.5.2.1 Relationship Between SADF and Leadership ...... 38 
-;':> 2.5.2.2 Cultural Notions of Security and Survival .......... 38 
-:>2.5.2.3 Security Establishment ...................... · .. 39 
2.5.2.3 Bureaucratic Rivalry .......................... 39 
2.5.2.5 Personalities and Bureaucracies ................ 40 
VJ- 2.5.3 Internal Decision-Making of the SA State ................ 41 
2.5.3.1 Three Factors of Strategic Policy Formulation ...... 42 
-> 2.5.3.2 Internal and External Security Concerns .......... 42 
2.5.3 .. 3 Leadership Personalities ...................... 43 
2.5.4 SA's Civil-Military Relations .................. · ......... 44 
2.5.4.1 Boer Tradition of A Citizen Army ................ 44 
2.5.4.2 Bureaucratic Rivalry .......................... 45 
2.5.4.3 Leadership Personalities ...................... 46 
2. 7 Endnotes for Chapter Two ................................... 47 
3. CHAPTER Ill: 
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA'S INITIAL INTERVENTION IN 
THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT (1975-1977) 
............. · .................................................... 54 
3.1 The Global Context: ........................................ 54 
3.2 Prelude to Civil War, 1961 - 1975 ............................. 55 
3.3 The Nationalist Factions .................................... 56 
3.3.1 MPLA ........... -................................. 57 
3.3.2 UNITA ........................................... 58 
3.3.3 FNLA ............................................ 59 
3.4 Factional Fighting, Early to Mid 1975 .......................... 60 
3.4.1 Portuguese Colonial Policies .......................... 60 
3.4.2 Factional Character of Conflict ......................... 60 
3.4.3 The Fight for Control of Luanda ........................ 61 
3.4.4 Alvor Agreement in Disarray .......................... 62 
3.4.5 Nakuru Agreement .................................. 62 
3.4.6 Transitional Government Evacuated .................... 63 
3.5 Period Immediately Preceding Independence ................... 64 
3.5.1 Withdrawal° of Portuguese ............................ 64 
3.5.2 FNLA's March on Luanda ............................ 65 
3.5.3 SA Direct Military Intervention ......................... 66 
~ 3.6 American Involvement ...................................... 66 
3.6.1 Ford Approves $14 Million ............................ 67 
3.6.2 Congressional Opposition ............................ 68 · 
3.6.2.1 Resignation of Assistant Secretary .............. 69 
3.6.3 Clark Amendment ................................... 70 
3.6.3.1 Congress Prefers Diplomacy ................... 71 
3.6.3.2 Two Lines of Argument ........................ 71 
3.6.3.3 Timing of Clark Amendment .................... 72 
3.6.3.4 Clark Amendment Gives Green Light ............. 72 
3.6.4 Direct Naval and Aerial Involvement .................... 73 
3. 7 South Africa's Initial Involvement .............................. 73 
3.7.1 Which Faction Would SA Support ...................... 74 
3.7.2 When Did SA Actually Intervene ....................... 74 
3.7.3 Protection of Ruacana Falls ........................... 75 
~ 3.7.4 Strategic Reasons for Intervention ...................... 76 
3.7.5 OAU Indecision .................................... 77 
3.7.6 Soviet and Cuban Involvement ........................ 78 
3.7.7 Military Gains by MPLA, Early 1976 ..................... 79 
3.7.8 Repercussions of SA Intervention ...................... 80 
3.7.8.1 Liability of SA as an Ally ....................... 80 
3.8 Soviet Involvement .......................... ' ............... 81 
3.8.1 Superpower Collision ................................ 81 
3.8.2 Soviet Arms Shipments .............................. 82 
3.8.3 Turns the Tide in Favour of the MPLA ................... 83 
3. 9 The Cuban Role ........................................... 84 
3.9.1 Cuba's Ideological Motivations ........................ 85 
3.9.2 Cuban Military Support .............................. 86 
3.9.2.1 Attack on Cuban Training Camp ................ 87 
3.9.2.2 Cuban Air Conveys Re-Commence .............. 88 
3.10 The Importance of South Africa's Domestic Milieux ............... 89 
3.10.1 Introduction ...................................... 89 
3.10.2 The Importance of Bureaucratic Rivalry ................. 89 
"3.11 The Importance of the Global Order .......................... 90 
3.12 Endnotes for Chapter Three ......... , ...................... 93 
4. CHAPTER IV: 
THE WIDENING SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE 
ANGOLAN CONFLICT UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF P.W. 
BOTHA (1978-1986) ... .................................... 101 
4.1 Conditions Post-Independence .............................. 101 
4.1.1 Agricultural Production . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 
4.1.2 Disruption of the Transport System: .................... 101 
4.1.3 Retail Distribution .................................. 102 
4.1.4 Shortage of Administrators ........................... 102 
4.1.5 MPLA's Ideological Programme ....................... 103 
4.2 The Coup d'etat, 1977 ..................................... 103 
4.3 The Continuing Downward Spiral ............................ 104 
4.3.1 Rural Rebellion ................................... 104 
4.3.2 Destruction of Ovimbundu Highlands ................... 105 
4.3.3 American and South African Points of View .............. 105 
4.4 South Africa's War of Destabilization ......................... 106 
4.4.1 Operation Reindeer, May 1978 .. ·. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 
4.5 P.W. Botha and the TNS ................................... 108 
4.6 SA's War Against SWAPO, 1979 Onward ...................... 109 
4.6.1 The 32 Battalion ................................ · ... 109 
4.6.2 Operation Sceptic/Smokeshell, 1980 ................... 110 
4. 7 SWAPO, Soviet and Cuban Military Integration ................. 111 
4.7.1 Operation Carnation, July 1981 ....................... 112 
4.7.2 Operation Protea, August 1981 ....................... 112 
4.7.3 Operation Daisy, November 1981 ..................... 113 
4.7.4 Operations Super, Meebos and Phoenix ................ 114 
4.8 The Era of the Lusaka Peace Accord ......................... 115 
4.8.1 Operation Askari, Dec 1983 - Jan 1984 ................. 115 
4.8.2 Provisions of the Accord ............................ 116 
4.8.2.1 SA Withdrawal Behind Schedule ............... 116 
4.8.3 Operation Boswilger, June 1985 ...................... 117 
4.9 FAPLA's Assault on UNITA's Main Base ....................... 118 
4.9.1 South Africa's Commitment to UNITA .................. 118 
4.9.2 SADF Intervention on UNITA's Behalf .................. 118 
4.9.2.1 Operations Magneto and Wallpaper ........... 119 
4.9.2.2 South Africa's Increasing Costs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 
4.10 Escalation of Soviet Commitment, 1986 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120 
4.11 Enhanced Angolan Military Capacity ......................... 121 
4.12 The Importance of South Africa's Domestic Milieux .............. 122 
4.12.1 Introduction ..................................... 122 
4.12.2 P.W. Botha and the Militarization of the State ........... 123 
4.13 The Importance of the Global Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125 
4.14 Endnotes for Chapter Four ................................ 127 
5. CHAPTER V: 
THE FINAL PERIOD; THE PROCESS AND DEPARTURE OF 
ALL MAJOR FOREIGN INFLUENCES FROM THE ANGOLAN 
CONFLICT AND SA'S WITHDRAWAL (1987-1988) .... 136 
5.1 Strategic and Tactical Dimension, 
The Battle of Lomba River, 1987 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136 
5.1.1 Further SADF-UNITA Mopping Up Operations ........... 138 
5.2 Political and Diplomatic Dimension, 
The Cuban Offering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 
5.2.1 Cuban Dissatisfaction with Allies ...................... 140 
5.3 Political and Diplomatic Dimension, 
Engaging the South Africans, Early 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 
5.4 Political and Diplomatic Dimension, 
Engaging the USSR and Cuba ........................... 141 
5.5 Strategic and Tactical Dimension, 
Dramatic Cuban Escalation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144 
5.6 Political and Diplomatic Dimension, 
Cuba's Pivotal Role; Castro's Gamble ...................... 145 
5. 7 Strategic and Tactical Dimension, 
Battle of Cuito Cuanavale ................................ 147 
5.7.1 Who Won the Battle ....................... , ....... 149 
5.8 Political and Diplomatic Dimension, 
International Negotiations, Early 1988 ...................... 151 
5.9 Strategic and Tactical Dimension, 
The Last Battles, April - June 1988 ......................... 154 
5. 9.1 The Final Battle ................................... 155 
5.9.2 The Air Attack on Calueque .......................... 157 
5.10 Political and Diplomatic Dimension, 
International Negotiations; May - Dec 1988 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157 
5.11 The Importance of South Africa's Domestic Milieux .............. 159 
5.11.1 Introduction ................................. .- . . . 159 
5.11.2 Arguments in Favour of Unit Level Causation ........... 159 
5.11 .1 Causation Within South Africa ............ · . . . . . 159 
5.11 .2 Causation Within Cuba and the USSR . . . . . . . . . . . 160 
5.12 The Importance of the Global Order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162 
5.12.1 Introduction ..................................... 162 
5.12.2 Arguments in Favour of System Level Causation ........ 162 
5.13 Endnotes for Chapter Five . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 165 
6. CHAPTER VI: 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FUTURE RESEARCH ..................................... 173 
6.1 Concluding Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173 
6.2 Recommendations for Future Research ....................... 17 4 
6.2.1 Nee-realist Structural Theory Research Agenda .......... 17 4 
6.2.2 South African-Angolan Military Research Agenda ......... 175 
7. BIBLIOGRAPHY AND SUGGESTED READING ................ 176 
LIST OF EXHIBITS 
1. Exhibit 1.A. Sectoral Analysis .................................... 7 
2. Exhibit 5.A. Overview of the Losses in Fighting ..................... 151 
3. Exhibit 5.B. Overview of the Angolan Peace Negotiations ............ 158 
APPENDICES 
· 1. Appendix 1 Text of the Alvor Agreement ........................ A01 
2. Appendix 2 Text of the Geneva Protocol ......................... A 10 
3. Appendix 3 Text of the Brazzaville Protocol ...................... A 12 
4. Appendix 4 Text of the Bilateral Agreement ...................... A 16 
5. Appendix 5 Text of the Tripartite Agreement ...................... A 19 
6. Appendix 6 Map, Overall Military Situation, 1975 .................. A20 
7. Appendix 7 Map, FAPLA Offensive, Lomba ....................... A21 
8. Appendix 8 Map, FAPLA Offensives, SE Angola, 1987 .............. A22 
9. Appendix 9 Map, SA Operational Sector ......................... A23 
10. Appendix 10 Map, Operation Modular, 1987 ....................... A24 
11. Appendix 11 Map, Operation Hooper, Dec 1987 - .................. A25 
12. Appendix 12 Map, Operation Packer, 1988 ........................ A26 
13. Appendix 13 Map, Operation Displace, 1988 ...................... A27 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS: 
This work is the result of a lengthy sojourn in the Republic of South Africa during 
which time I have engaged in countless hours of enjoyable research and writing. I am, 
however, greatly indebted to the following persons without whom this project could not 
have been successfully completed: 
To Dr. Robert Schrire, of the Department of Political Studies of the University of Cape 
Town, from whom I have learnt to work in isolation. 
To Dr. Philip Nel, of the Department of Political Science at Stellenbosch University, for 
taking the time to write a very detailed and theoretically thorough external examiner's 
report which was of great practical benefit. 
To Dr. Peter Vale, of the Department of Political Science of the University of the 
Western Cape, for his spiritual food for thought, unpredictable antics and 
encouragement. 
To Dr. Alistair Edgar, previously of Queen's University at Kingston, Canada for his 
immeasurable support and unflagging dedication to my academic progress. 
To Cyril Prisman, valuable mentor and wise counsellor, whose erudition has guided me 
both personally and professionally. 
Finally, to all the staff of the Department of Inter Library Loans of Jagger Library at the 
University of Cape Town from whom I have learnt the art of research in South Africa 
























African National Congress 
Angolan Press Agency 
Armoured Personnel Carrier 
Armoured Recovery Vehicle 
Bureau of State Security 
Central Intelligence Agency 
Central Intelligence Organisation 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance 
Conferencia Organizacoes Nationalistas das Colonias 
Portuguesas 
Conservative Party 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
Department of Foreign Affairs 
Direcao de lnformacao a Seguranca de Angola 
Demilitarized Zone 
Democratic Popular Republic of Angola (FNLA and UNITA) 
· Democratic Turnhalle Alliance 
European Community 
Angolan National Liberation Army (FNLA Armed Forces) 
Armed Forces for the Liberation of Angola (UNITA Armed 
Forces) 
FAPLA Forcas Armadas Libertacao de Angola (MPLA Armed Forces) 
FICO Front for Independence and Continuity with the West 
FLEC Frente para a Liberatacao do Enclave de Cabinda 
FNLA Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola 
FRELIMO Frente de Libertacao de Mocambique 
FSU Former Soviet Union 
GDP Gross Domestic Product 
GRAE Governo Revolucionario de Angola no Exilio 
ICV Infantry Combat Vehicle 
JMC Joint Monitoring Commission (to· oversee cease-fire 
agreements) 
JMPLA MPLA Youth 
MPC Multi Party Conference 
MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola 
MPLA-PT MPLA-Partido do Trabalho 
MRL Multiple Rocket Launcher 
NAM Non-Aligned Movement 
NSMS National Security Management System 
OAU Organisation for African Unity 
OMA Organisation for Angolan Women 
PAIGC Partido Africano da lndependencia da Guine e Caba Verde 
PCA Partido Communista de Angola 
PIDE Policia Internationale de Defesa do Estado 
PLUA Partido da Luta does Africanos de Angola 
( 
PRA People's Republic of Angola 
PRC People's Republic of China 
RENAMO Resistencia Nacional Mocambique 
SMF South African Air Force 
SACP South African Communist Party 
SADCC Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference 
SADF South African Defence Force 
SAi South African Infantry Battalion 
















South West African National Union 
South West African People's Organisation 
South West African Territory Forces 
Tanzanian-Zambia Railway 
Theory of lntenational Politics (1979) by Kenneth Waltz 
Total National Strategy 
Uniao Nacional Para a lndependencia Total de Angola 
United Nations Security Council 
National Union of Angolan Workers 
United Nations Transitional Assistance Group 
Uniao des Populacoes de Angola 
Uniao des Populacoes do Norte de Angola 
Zimbabwe African National Liberation Army 
Zimbabwe African National Union 
Zimbabwe African People's Union 
CHAPTER I: 
INTRODUCTION AND METHODOLOGY: 
1.1 General Comments: 
This dissertation seeks to evaluate the relative utility of certain selected 
approaches to international relations theory with, as a specific case study, the Republic 
of South Africa's role in the Angolan civil war throughout the period 1975 -1988. 
The research strategy employed is inductive logic rather than hypothetical 
deductive due to the large amount of historical and factual detail involved in this work. 
Therefore, the data is analysed according to the "research-then-theory" strategy. Since 
the framework of enquiry in inductive logic, hypothesis are stated later in the thesis at 
the end of each chapter, after having evaluated the paradigms chosen against the quite 
considerable historical and factual detail. 
Delineating a time period for such an analysis is always to some extent arbitrary. 
Nonetheless, there are valid reasons for choosing 1975 as a commencement point as 
it represents a watershed of sorts in South African foreign policy. The year 1975 
witnessed the departure of Portugal's colonial presence from Angola and Mozambique. 
The latter nation acquired independence under Samora Machel, a self-declared Marxist 
who immediately allowed Rhodesian guerillas sanctuary from which they could carry 
on their attacks against the Smith regime. 
In Angola, Portugal's armed forces which had seized power in Lisbon finally had 
their morale broken after fourteen years of anti-colonial warfare. Eighteen months later, 
in November 1975, Portuguese officials hastily departed from Angola leaving in their 
wake a chaotic civil war between three rival liberation movements which each had the 
backing of one or more outside states. Angolan independence was achieved and the 
majority of the local Portuguese population, numbering 340 000, fled. By mid 1975 
ripples from the chaos and civil war in Angola had spread to the border of 
SWA/Namibia which had implications for South African interests in the region (1 ). 
Angola was representative of the death throes of colonialism but possessed 
even greater symbolic significance as an integral aspect of Portugal's African empire 
and, as such, was the last bastion of colonialism remaining on the continent. It was 
also representative of the escalating struggle for indigenous control of Southern Africa 
and constituted the first decisive battle charting the evolution of political developments 
across the region. 
For South Africa's Vorster Government, Angola represented an ominous step 
forward in the communist drive seeking to dominate Southern Africa and, for the 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU), it served as a sad testament to African 
ineffectiveness and disunity in either preventing the conflict or reconciling the warring 
parties as well as the OAU's subordination to the interventionist designs of external 
powers. The nature of foreign intervention in what had become a "tempestuous 
teapot," and the constellation of forces in the region, ensured that before independence 
was achieved the South African Defence Force (SADF) had penetrated Angola in a 
campaign to prevent victory by the Soviet and Cuban backed MPLA (Klinghoffer, 
1980:2). 
The reasons for choosing 1988 as the end period for this study are perhaps 
more apparent than the reasons for having chosen 1975 as its point of commencement. 
The year 1988 marked a certain decisive shift both internationally and in the Southern 
African region. The first round of American-sponsored peace negotiations, in London 
;1~Jtlr It ;§gg ~ 
at the beginning of May, was the beginning of an eight month marathon of intense 
negotiations between the external powers involved in Angola. The twelve 
Angolan/South African/Cuban meetings subsequent to the initial meeting in London 
culminated in the historic signing of The Bilateral Agreement between Angola and Cuba 
and the Tripartite Agreement between Angola, Cuba and South Africa at the end of 
1988. With these diplomatic triumphs, South African and Cuban intervention in Angola 
came to a dramatic end. 
1.2 Identification of Problem and Methodology: 
In terms of methodology, the problem to evaluate is the relative utility of system 
level versus unit level theories to cogently and convincingly explain the nature of South 
African involvement in the Angolan conflict over the period 1975-1988. These two 
categories, which adhere to a different level-of-analysis, are represented by nee-realist 
structural theory and, secondly, by a variety of unit level theories typically concerned 
with South Africa's domestic environment. This dissertation demonstrates, through the 
actual events, the utility of these two distinct theoretical approaches. 
Given the above approach and objectives, the methodology consists firstly of a 
critical conceptual review and analysis of each paradigm as a useful explanation of 
South African foreign policy formulation. The methodology consists secondly, of a 
more "empirical" assessment, in Chapters Three to Five, of their value in accounting 
for or illuminating significant aspects of the internal and external sources of motivation 
for South African actions in Angola. 
Through a careful and detailed empirical assessment of the actual 
political/diplomatic (both domestic and international) and strategic/tactical events, this 
dissertation presents the totality of the Angolan conflict, and South African 
o:liititl 8 lifii ~ 
intervention, in all its dimensions (2). In this manner, the first paradigm considered 
moves beyond Waltz's sole emphasis on the political and beyond Suzan by 
considering, in addition to his strategic sector, a tactical military dimension as~ The 
latter dimension becomes espedally evident in the military developments of 1987-1988 
considered in Chapter Five. 
A considerable body of literature exists that may be used to inform the 
discussion of the theoretical strengths and weaknesses or ambiguities of either of the 
two chosen paradigms (or bodies of literature). The research methodology for this part 
of the thesis therefore consists of a careful critical evaluation of the main theoretical 
texts or arguments, in addition to a thorough appraisal of the comments made in the 
associated secondary literature. 
1.3 Levels-of-Analysis: 
In any area of scholarly inquiry there are always several ways in which the 
components of a study may be sorted and arranged for the purpose of understanding 
and predicting the phenomenon under consideration. Indeed, the level-of-analysis 
upon which any theory of international relations is based is a matter of methodological 
importance (3). David Singer asserted that the level-of-analysis at which a theorist 
views the world was important both conceptually and methodologically. More 
specifically, he argued that there are both advantages and disadvantages regardless 
of which level-of-analysis is selected by the theorist (4). The problem also involved the 
question of whether the theorist should focus upon the parts or upon the whole (upon 
the components or upon the system) (5). In Singer's essay scholars were conveyed 
as concentrating on either the whole - the international system - or as specialising in 
the parts - the foreign policy of nation states (6) (Singer, 1961 :77-92, Yalem, 
1977:306). 1 
The utilisation of theory derived from more than one level-of-analysis should 
provide a deeper understanding of international events than that which can be obtained 
where only one level has been employed. According to Yalem, the prevailing tendency 
of international relations theorists is to confine themselves to one level-of-analysis (7). 
However, greater insights and a more complete picture of events can be derived from 
the application of another level-of-analysis. This dissertation therefore evaluates two 
bodies of literature each of which is primarily based on a different level-of-analysis 
(Singer, 1961 :77-92, Yalem, 1977:322-326). 
Singer recommended that, while the case for one or another level-of-analysis . 
cannot be made with any certainty, one must nonetheless maintain a constant 
awareness of their usage (8). Indeed, this awareness of levels-of-analysis is necessary 
within the context of this dissertation in discerning between the two main bodies of 
literature. However, it is necessary to move beyond mere awareness and make some 
attempt at theoretical integration of the various levels-of-analysis or at least to 
interrelate them (9). 
1.4 Sectors: 
Barry Buzan's notion of sectors assists in filling this methodological gap which 
has not been filled by Singer's discussion of levels-of-analysis. The idea of levels-of-
analysis, like sectors, is an abstract construct. However, the use of sectors has the 
advantage of highlighting certain qualities of whatever it is which is under 
consideration. According to Buzan, "Sectors are a way of unpacking the confusion of 
the whole." They furthermore confine the scope of inquiry to more manageable 
proportions by reducing the number of variables at play (Suzan, 1993:30-34). 
Suzan poses the question, whether a viable theory can be constructed within a 
sector or whether to do so inevitably confuses the sector with the whole (10). He 
argues it is difficult to disentangle the economic, political, societal and strategic threads 
that make up the whole. Suzan's sectors necessarily overlap as each sector is a partial 
view of the whole. Sectors are not separated by clear boundaries like those between 
levels-of-analysis. Indeed, the whole metaphor of separation and boundaries is simply 
inappropriate. This is because the distinction between sectoral boundaries is to be 
found as much in the observer as the thing that is being observed. In contrast, 
boundaries between levels-of-analysis are more wholly within the thing being observed 
and serve to identify distinct elements of causality (11) (Suzan, 1993:32). 
According to Suzan, following the sectoral path to theory means assuming that 
sectors can be made distinct. Generally the definition of system in terms of units, 
structures and interactions illustrate the validity of levels of analysis extending across 
all sectors. However, while the categories of levels may extend across all the sectors 
their contents may differ. Suzan therefore suggests constructing the relationship 
between sectoral subdivisions and levels-of-analysis on the assumption that levels-of-
analysis refer to horizontal subdivisions of the "field" of the international system while 
sectors refer to vertical "subdivisions" of the same field (see Exhibit 1.A.). This scheme 
enables the viewer to consider levels-of-analysis either in terms of the international 
system as a whole (by collapsing the sectoral divisions) or in terms of specific sectoral 
subdivisions (by defining the levels in terms that are bounded by one or more sectoral 
subdivisions) (12) (Suzan, 1993:32-33). 
Buzan's sectoral approach, coupled with levels-of-analysis, is especially 
valuable as it enables this dissertation to exi:,and the nee-realist persi:,ective by 
transcending the limitations of Waltz's Theory of International Politics. This hybrid 
approach renders the nee-realist perspective more appropriate for the study of internal 
and external motivations for South African actions in Angola. In contrast, an exclusive 
reliance on the Waltzian version of the nee-realist paradigm would have been both 
limited and less useful in applying this paradigm to the study under consideration. 
Exhibit 1.A. 
Conceptual Subdivisions of the International System 
(adapted from Suzan, et al., The Logic of Anarchy, 1993) 
1.5 Overview of the Chapter by Chapter Outline: 
The empirical evidence of the Angolan conflict is examined according to four 
stages: firstl~; a review of the related literature, secondly; South Africa's initial 
intervention and the presence of US aid in 1975, thirdly; the widening of the conflict 
post 1978 under P. W. Botha, and fourthly; the departure of all the major foreign 
influences and final resolution of the Angolan conflict. This exercise extends until 1988 
which, in December of that year, witnessed the passing of the Brazzaville Accord, The 
Bilateral Agreement between Angola and Cuba for the Termination of the Cuban 
Military Contingent, and the Tripartite Agreement between Angola, Cuba, and South 
Africa (see Appendices Three, Four, and Five for text of agreements). The final 
chapter consists of the conclusion as well as recommendations for future research. 
In terms of Section 1.2 - Identification of Problem and Methodology - one recalls 
that this dissertation seeks to evaluate the relative utility of system level and unit level 
theories to cogently and convincingly explain the nature of South African involvement 
in the Angolan conflict. The following methodological considerations therefore become 
evident in Sections 1.5.2, 1.5.3 and 1.5.4 below: 
1• 1 
!) In Chapter Three (1975-1977); system level nee-realist structural theory is most useful 
e,,,,w6, 11 1 \ ·due to the overwhelming degree of international involvement of the major powers and 
\ their proxy states during this unique period in twentieth century cold war history. 
In Chapter Four (1978-1986); sub-national or unit level theory focusing on South 
~ i I Africa's domestic environmental variables offers by far the best explanation in light of 
J .. the nature of South Africa's leadership, their personalities, the rise of the security state 
I and the militarization of South African society. 
In Chapter Five (1987-1988); in this end period, which is more complex and less readily 
definable than the previous time periods of Chapters Three and Four, the two 
theoretical paradigms (or bodies of literature) are deemed to be of equal usefulness in 
explaining the end of South African involvement and the departure of all the major 
external actors from Angola. 
1.5.1 Chapter Two: Review of the Related Literature: 
This chapter traces the historical development, and engages in a modest 
survey, of the various schools of thought of international relations theory (13). Critical 
comparative analysis differentiates the various theoretical approaches. 
1.5.1.1 The First Body of Literature: 
The first body of literature, concerned with system level nee-realist structural 
theory, considers the work and/or secondary comments of the following authors: 
Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, Barry Buzan et al., Robert Keohane, Joseph Nye, John 
Lewis Gaddis, and Henry Kissinger. 
1.5.1.2 The Second Body of Literature: 
The second body of literature, concerned with predominantly unit or sub-national 
level theory (14) and specifically with South Africa's domestic environment, considers 
the work of the following authors in detail: Rob Davies, Joseph Hanlon, Kenneth 
Grundy, ~on Geldenhu'l§_and Hennie Kotze and Philip Frankel (15). 
1.5.2 Chapter Three: The Republic of South Africa's Initial Intervention in the Angolan 
Conflict (1975 - 1977): 
This chapter may have more appropriately been called the "Multiplicity of 
Intervention by External Actors" as South Africa's intervention was only one part of the 
larger whole in the 1975-1976 period. It is however crucial to portray the totality of 
international intervention in this chapter so as to more fully understand South Africa's 
specific role. 
Angola, a seemingly insignificant nation without strategic value prior to 197 4, 
~ssentiallY- became a microcosm of Cold War conflict lending credence to Rosenau's 
observation that major powers "test each other's strength and contest each other's 
influence through involvement in the internal wars of small neutral nations" because the 
destructiveness of nuclear weapons has minimised the likelihood of total war. Indeed, 
Angola became an arena for determining the parameters of the Soviet-American 
detente relationship and was accompanied by polemics reminiscent of the height of the 
Cold War (Klinghoffer, 1980:2). 
It would appear to a state such as South Africa, trying to ensure the survival of 
white minority rule in a hostile and increasingly threatening environment at home and 
abroad, that intervention in Angola was essential to South Africa's national security 
interests and continued survival. Furthermore, South African perceptions and actions 
in this period must be seen in light of the Clark Amendment which ensured that South 
Africa and UNITA were facing the Soviet and Cuban backed MPLA without crucial 
American support (16). The end of American aid rendered the threat of Soviet and 
Cuban influence all the more ominous and influenced South Africa's behaviour 
accordingly. 
This chapter se~ks to_Ld.eJJ.tify and address the_J;_auses and motivations which 
compeJLed the Vorster Government to militarily intervene in Angola as an opportunity 
to influence political developments there. At his time in history the causes and 
motivations at play in the region and the broader international system lend themselves 
\~~well to a~-
I 
Kenneth Waltz, a nee-realist, adhering to a purely structural systemic theory of 
international relations draws a clear distinction between analytic (reductionist) as 
opposed to systemic theory. The former, which he dismisses as inadequate, accounts 
for causation at the individual or national level (17). By contrast Waltz's systemic 
theory, in which the internal characteristics of states are deemed irrelevant, is a macro 
level theory but is nonetheless of some utility in assisting to explain South African 
involvement in Angola at the h~ight of the various internationalist interventions in 1975-
1976 if not later in the conflict. 
The nee-realist concern that systemic wars between the great powers are the 
. : only threat to structural stability, although limited in an important number of respects, 
i nonetheless lends itself to the task of accounting for South African actions in light of 
j 
f the cold war scenario confronting that nation in the mid 1970s: the balance of regional 
i 
forces apparently tipped in the Soviet's favour coupled with the USA's inability to 
continue crucial support due to a Congressionally imposed ban. 
1.5.3 Chapter Four: The Widening South African Involvement in the Angolan Conflict 
Under the Leadership of P.W. Botha (1978-1986): 
In the 1980s the regional balance of power as it had existed, prior to the massive 
superpower intervention of 1975-1976, gradually began to reassert itself. This 
evolution usefully illustrates the discontinuities between global versus regional orders. 
South Africa, as a regional giant, could anticipate having a great deal of 
manoeuvrability and autonomy within the region under regular circumstances (18). 
During the period of greatest superpower penetration in the region, however, South 
Africa was unable to capitalize on its hegemonic dominance due to the overwhelming 
international constraints operating at the international system level. 
South Africa, in global terms, is a small and insignificant nation (19). As the 
presence of the superpowers receded, and the trend toward superpower retrenchment 
became clear, the normal regional power balance gradually began to reassert itself. 
This was accompanied by renewed pressure on the states to the north to resume 
normal relations with South Africa through, for example, the Nkomati Accord of March 
1984 which confirmed the regional subsystems autonomy in South Africa's favour. 
While the internationalisation of the region put South Africa on the defensive, the 
regionalisation of the region reaffirmed South Africa's status as hegemon. 
The second body of literature, predominantly unit level or sub-national in nature 
and concerned with South Africa's domestic environment, is as useful in Chapter Four 
as the first body of system level literature was in Chapter Three (20). Throughout this 
time period the policy of destabilization became the defining feature of regional policy. 
As argued by Deon Geldenhuys and Hennie Kotze, the concept of Total National 
Strategy (TNS), and by implication South Africa's militaristic policies towards its 
neighbours, were the product of P.W. Botha's assumption of power in September 
1978. The policy of destabilization was logical result of P.W. Botha's inclinations 
brought about by his personality type and past professional background as Minister of 
Defence for the previous twelve years. 
As Joseph Hanlon and Robert Davies demonstrate, there were two primary 
aspects of South Africa's regional policy of destabilization. They were firstly; the 
commitment to strike against the ANC and SWAPO which was done without regard for 
national borders, and secondly; the implementation of coercive economic measures so 
as to deepen the dependency of the front line states on South Africa. 
According to Philip Frankel, the policy of regional destabilization, in Angola and 
other front line nations, was the direct and natural result of military penetration into the 
foreign policy arena of the South African state. In Frankel's view, the appearance of 
military chiefs at top decision-making structures lent a distinct strategic colouration to 
the South African decision-making process. To the extent that military personnel 
succeeded in imposing their narrow and strategic world view on their civilian 
counterparts, public policy very much became a matter of direct security calculations. 
Kenneth Grundy likewise concentrates on the role of the SADF in domestic 
politics attributing the influence of the military, as a force in South African politics, 
largely due to their close personal relationship with the head of state. The security 
establishment positioned itself at the centre of power and became an active participant 
in decision-making. Accordingly, those associated with a military perspective "have 
gained the ascendant" not only in military matters but in wider security issues, both 
domestic and external. Grundy and Frankel's notions furthermore reinforce the 
importance attached to P.W. Botha's assumption of power in September 1978. 
1.5.4 Chapter Five: The Final Period; The Process and Departure of all Major Foreign 
Influences from the Angolan Conflict and South African Withdrawal (1987-1988): 
This final end period (1987-1988) is both more complex and less clearly 
definable than the previous time periods addressed in Chapters Three and Four. 
Ultimately, the two theoretical paradigms (or bodies of literature) are deemed to be of 
equal usefulness in explaining the end of South African involvement and the departure 
of all the major external actors from Angola. 
As stated by Rob Davies, in the first quarter of 1988 there was a sudden de-
escalation by South Africa accompanied by their cooperation in the American 
sponsored negotiations based upon the principle of linkage. The beginning of the 
second quarter of 1988 marked a decisive turning point and watershed in the regional 
struggle. Suddenly, at this time, South Africa appeared to be placing greater emphasis 
on diplomacy and economic action through which to advance regional policy objectives. 
According to Davies this decisive shift was attributable to a variety of domestic and 
regional considerations factors including the SADF's (presumed) defeat at Cuito 
Cuanavale. 
By contrast, Chester Crocker (a realist) regards South Africa's departure from 
Angola as the logical result of the end of Soviet aid and the departure of Cuba's military 
presence. Therefore, once the vital strategic interests for which South Africa intervened 
were removed, South Africa likewise responded. This axiomatic re'sponsiveness is in 
keeping with the nee-realist view that the foreign policy of a relatively small state is of 
little significance on the international stage and is therefore defensive and responsive 
in nature. There is certainly some truth in the argument of vital security interests as is 
evidenced in comments made by P. W. Botha, Magnus Malan and General Jannie 
Geldenhuys. And, indeed, the convergence of Soviet and American interests for the 
first time since the Second World War undoubtedly had a role to play in the resolution 
of regional conflicts around the world (as is discussed in greater detail in Chapter Five). 
This neo-realist point of view does not, however, reflect the full story. Why, for 
example, is South Africa not involved in Angola now? In one sense at least, that 
question is not answerable unless one considers the sub-national level-of-analysis by 
taking into account internal government considerations. The new government of 
Nelson Mandela, the product of a lengthy liberation struggle, would not engage in a 
militaristic campaign against their former allies which sheltered the ANC during the 
apartheid era at great risk to themselves. Regardless of whether this somewhat 
whimsical notion is valid or not, there are certainly other non system level causes which 
are of importance in explaining South Africa's participation in American sponsored 
negotiations and eventual departure from Angola. 
Therefore, one must not entirely accept Chester Cracker's bias because he 
wrote the definitive book on the subject. In light of the empirical evidence, this 
dissertation also considers the theoretical possibilities put forth by the second paradigm 
(or body of literature). This involves not only taking account of important domestic 
influences in South Africa but also those of the Soviet Union, Cuba and, to a lesser 
extent, the United States. The Soviet Union's unbundling of its ideologically-aligned 
empire, for example, cannot be fully explained without considering Gorbachev's unique 
personality, that country's dramatic internal decline, and its state of economic crisis. 
Their failure to consider sub-national factors is one of perhaps many reasons why neo-
realist American theorists failed to predict the sudden collapse of the Soviet Union. 
Indeed, many foreign policy observers appeared to be caught by surprise by the 
momentous events of 1989 and 1990. 
1.5.5 Chapter Six: Conclusion and Recommendations for Future Research: 
This chapter consists of a very brief and concise conclusion highlighting the 
major theoretical conclusions of the dissertation. Chapter Six also introduces 
recommendations for future research along two lines of argument: firstly; nee-realist 
structural theory, and secondly; Angolan military events. The second paradigm, 
concerned with South Africa's domestic political environment and other forms of internal 
causation, is not addressed to any extent as the theories discussed are deemed 
adequately insightful and appropriate for understanding the internal structure of the 
South African state (21 ). 
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER ONE: 
(1) According to Robert Jaster and Robin Hallett, by mid 1975 there were strategic 
developments within Angola which were perceived to portend an adverse influence in 
terms of South African interests in the region. Firstly, under the terms of the Alvor 
Agreement of 15 January 1975, the Marxist oriented MPLA established an office less 
than 50 kilometres north of the border. This created the fear that radical sentiments 
would spread among the Ovambo population which, in turn, would swell SWAPO's 
base of support. Secondly, in July the commander of South African forces in 
SWA/Namibia warned that SWAPO was taking advantage of the increasing chaos 
resulting from the collapse of Portuguese authority to consolidate its position in Cunene 
Province, bordering SWA/Namibia. Indeed, emboldened SWAPO guerrillas had 
already attacked SADF convoys inside SWA/Namibia throughout the month of July. 
All the while, a serious refugee problem developed due to the southward movement of 
fighting between rival factions: Alarmed at the destabilizing effect of the sudden arrival 
of 11 000 refugees in bordering SWA/Namibia, South Africa established two refugee 
camps on the Angolan side of their common border. Fourthly, Vorster was concerned 
about a joint South African-Portuguese project, consisting of two major dams on the 
Cunene River just inside the Angolan border, that were to provide an important source 
of hydro electricity and water in northern SWA/Namibia. 
i) 
(2) Of Buzan's four sectors (economic, political, societal and strategic) the economic \5; .• rz·r,., /I 




Grundy, Frankel, and Geldenhuys and Kotze amQIY demonstrate, is closely interlinked .· 
with domestic politics in South Africa which,_prior to the 1994 election, reflected the,,· ··~ti_ 
,Afrikaner ethnic and cultural identity. 
'\, . 
r I •· .•. ·· 
(3) Many theorists, and especially those concerned with global change, argue that the irl, ... ·.,,~L.,J. 
notion of levels-of-analysis is an archaic and outdated approach which should be 
abandoned. Levels-of-analysis are, however, deemed applicable in the context of this 
dissertation as the two bodies of literature under consideration operate at notably 
different levels of analysis. Nee-realist theory_QQerates at the level of the international 
.§Y-Stem and the literature concerned with South Africa's internal decision-making 
milieux operates at the level of the national sub-system (the unit level). In this 
particular dissertation both bodies of literature are considered to be of some utility in 
explaining Angolan events throughout the period under study. 
David Singer, in an article published in 1961, first analysed the problem of levels-of-
analysis. 
(4) Singer did not advocate either of his approaches stating: "For a staggering variety 
of reasons the scholar may be more interested in one level than another at any given 
time and will undoubtedly shift his orientation according to his research needs" (Singer, 
1961 :90). 
(5) While the selection of either level.-of-analysis is ostensibly a mere matter of 
methodological or conceptual convenience the choice, however, often turns out to be 
quite difficult and may become a central issue within the discipline concerned. 
(6) P.A. Reynolds' terminology regarding levels-of-analysis is slightly different. What 
he labels as the macro level of international relations is distinct from the micro level-of-
analysis. The micro level-of-analysis is typically concerned with the domestic decision-
making environment. It focuses on the behaviour of relevant individuals, groups and 
organisations as the means by which to explain international relations. In contrast, the 
macro level-of-analysis focuses on nation-states within the system of states, the nature 
of their interactions and inter-relationships, and how and why and in what sense they 
change or remain stable (Reynolds, 1990:7 and 185). 
In the micro level-of-analysis, he considers a variety of mechanisms within the internal 
or domestic environment which influence foreign policy decision-making. According to 
P.A. Reynolds, foreign policy actions are constrained by the perceived circumstances 
of the state on behalf of which individual decision-makers are acting. The domestic 
environment of decision-makers encompass a variety of factors, including: a nation's 
geography, economy, demography, political structure, culture and traditions, as well as 
the military-strategic situation of that nation. The domestic political context is further 
constrained by various groups which may claim to represent the national interest. 
However, in all nations the domestic political context, to some degree, constrains 
foreign policy decision-makers. This constraint may derive from the actual events, or 
from the aspirations of politically significant individuals/groups or from social 
convention or other traditions (Reynolds, 1990:80). 
(7) Ronald Yalem nonetheless acknowledges the cogency of Singer's argument that 
propositions drawn from different levels-of-analysis which may be theoretically valid 
may not be combinable because they are deduced from different frameworks (Yalem, 
1977:324).-
(8) On this subject Singer states: "We may utilize one level here and another there, but 
we cannot afford to shift our orientation in the midst of a study. And when we do in fact 
make an original selection or replace one with another at appropriate times, we must 
do so with a full awareness of the descriptive, explanatory, and predictive implications 
of such a choice" (Singer, 1961 :90-91 ). 
(9) Singer's contribution on this point is disappointing. He argues that the different 
levels of analysis "defy theoretical integration" and that "they are ·not immediately 
combinable" (Singer, 1961 :91 ). 
(10) Suzan warns, the obvious danger in this method, is that the observer may. begin 
to confuse the partial reality of the sector with the total reality of the whole (Suzan, 
1993:31 ). Waltz, for example, confines his theory to the political sector only. 
(11) This will later become more evident and will be illustrated in greater detail in 
Chapter Two. 
(12) Suzan believes the four sectors listed - economic, political, societal and strategic -
cover the main preoccupations of international relations theorists. Waltz's theory, as 
the title of his 1979 publication suggests, is an attempt to define levels-of-analysis· 
exclusively within the political sector. Suzan considers this confinement to be both a 
source of strength and a limitation of nee-realism (Suzan, 1993:33). 
(13) The author of this dissertation does not consider the entire spectrum of 
international relations theory in historical perspective as some have suggested. It is 
neither the purpose of this dissertation nor would it significantly inform the events under' 
consideration. 
( 14) The author of this dissertation has no intention of making the 'same error as 
Kenneth Waltz does in labelling everything which is not explicitly systemic as "units." 
As discussed in Section 2.4.4 of Chapter Two, by defining a system simply in terms of 
a structure and interacting units Waltz could not avoid pushing a vast array of causes 
and effects down to the unit level. As Barry Suzan (1993) states: "Many acknowledge 
the analytical centrality of his ideas on structure, but few are comfortable with his 
conclusion that all else is thereby relegated to the unit level." Therefore, a more 
appropriate term to describe the level-of-analysis of the second body of literature may 
perhaps be "sub-national" or, alternatively, "units" but certainly not in the same rigid 
manner as that which Waltz employs. 
(15) This survey is by no means comprehensive. In addition to those whose theories 
are discussed in detail in Chapter Two, the following are considered within the context 
of this work. They are (in no particular order): Robert Jaster, Willem Steenkamp, 
James Barber and John Barratt, Colin Legum, John Marcum, Tony Hodges, David 
Birmingham, Willem Steenkamp, Fred Bridgland, Jannie Geldenhuys, Rajan Menon, 
Hasu Patel, Thomas Ohlson, Chester Crocker, Bruce Porter, Neil MacFarlane, A.J. 
Klinghoffer, Helmoed-Romer Heitman as well as others. As is evident from this list not 
all are of a theoretical orientation but are nonetheless deemed to be in some way 
informative. 
(16) The Clark Amendment, officially recorded as the Tunney Amendment, was a ban 
on U.S. military aid to any Angolan party. Originally adopted for one year in December 
1975, the ban was extended in 1976 and efforts to repeal it failed in 1977-1978. 
(17) With an analytic (reductionist) approach the whole is understood by knowing the 
attributes and interactions of its parts. Waltz's choice of the adjective "reductionist" to 
sweepingly describe anything other than the systemic level-of-analysis is unfortunate. 
According to Suzan, Waltz's "concern to develop a structural theory led him into a 
terminologically unfortunate distinction between reductionist theories (those at unit 
level), and systemic ones (those about structure). By this route, his usage of terms 
such as "systems theory" and "systems level" makes the term system effectively a 
synonym for structure. In confusing system and structure in this way, Waltz made his 
theory unnecessarily provocative, helping the case of those who wish to dismiss him 
as a structural determinist" (Suzan, 1993:28). 
(18) South Africa was the unrivalled superpower in the region both in economic and 
military terms. Transportation facilities, the principal lines of which had been 
established by the 1930s, constituted the umbilical cord determining the conduct of 
inter-state trade. The land-locked nature of Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Botswana, 
Lesotho and Swaziland virtually dictated their continued dependence upon railroads 
and ports under South African control. The vital necessity of access to ports and 
railroads compounded the economic dependency of neighbouring nations upon South 
Africa. Hence, the economic patterns that emerge cannot help but be asymmetrical 
and the political ramifications equally distorted. 
South Africa, with the greatest level of industrialization and infra structural 
development, was the undisputed economic powerhouse in the region. The most 
imposing structural characteristic of Southern African affairs was the virtually 
unchallenged economic domination of South Africa. In 1976 the GDP per capita was 
(in US dollars) $170 in Lesotho, $170 in Mozambique, $330 in Angola and a 
comparatively enormous $1 340 in South Africa (World Development Report, 1978). 
The GDP figures for 1983 reflect little change in the disparity of income between South 
Africa and her neighbours. 
(19) While it is not the intention of this dissertation to argue that the Republic of South 
Africa, the dominant hegemon in the region, is a small and less significant nation in the 
global balance this theme would nonetheless constitute an interesting area of future 
research. The following literature pursues the subject of foreign policy formulation by 
small states to varying degrees: 
Aron, Raymond, Peace and War 
Baker Fox, Annette, The Power of Small States 
Handel, Michael, Weak States in the International System 
Spence, J.E., Republic Under Pressure; A Study of South African Foreign Policy 
Vital, David, The Inequality of States 
Vital, David, The Survival of States 
(20) Please refer to Endnote Fourteen regarding the question of terminology. 
(21) This is a humble personal value judgement given that the author of this 
dissertation is an outsider of sorts. 
CHAPTER II: 
REVIEW OF THE RELATED LITERATURE: 
2.1 General Comments: 
Chapter Two, Review of the Related Literature, is informed by the previous 
discussion, in Chapter One, of methodology, levels-of-analysis and sectors. The 
inadequacy of ~enneth Waltz's purely structural systemic theory of international 
relations results in the necessity of having had to consider Barry Buzan's sectors in 
Chapter One. The critical weaknesses of Waltz's theory are dealt with in greater detail 
in this chapter in Section 2.4.4. This chapter essentially engages in a review of the 
related literature according to two general categories. As stated, the first body of 
literature is concerned with causation at the system level and the second with causation 
predominantly at the unit level. 
2.2 Review of Classical Realism: 
Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War was written in an attempt to 
explain the causes of the great war of the Fifth Century B.C. between the coalition led 
by Athens and its adversaries, led by Sparta. In this ancient work, the three most 
fundamental realist assumptions are evident: firstly; that the most important actors in 
world politics are territorially organised entities (city states or modern states - realism 
is state-centric), secondly; that state behaviour can be explained rationally, and thirdly; 
that states seek power and calculate their interests in terms of power relative to the 
nature of the international system in which they operate (1) (Keohane, 1986:7). 
In post-medieval Western Europe, it is not difficult to understand the appeal of 
realism in a competitive state system and why it came to be regarded as plausible (2). 
Critics of power politics, such as Immanuel Kant in Perpetual Peace (1795), did not 
exercise decisive influence over those in power. By contrast, in the UK and even more 
so in the USA, there was a greater tendency to envisage alternatives to power politics 
and to question the premises of political realism. The arbitration movement, 
Woodrow's Wilson's stance throughout the First World War (3), and the Kellogg-Briand 
Pact of 1927 to "outlaw war," all are representative of the legalistic and moralistic 
approach to international relations (4) (Keohane, 1986:8). 
However, by the late 1930s, these idealistic theories were in decline in the 
nations where, historically, they had been well regarded (5). On the eve of the Second 
World War, E.H. Carr published The Twenty Years' Crisis: 1919-39 "at a time when war 
was already casting its shadow on the world, but when all hope of averting it was not 
yet lost." Carr's publication represents a classic attack on the concepts of harmony of 
interest and of morality unrelated to power in world politics. Carr states, in no uncertain 
terms, that "the exposure, by realist criticism, of the hollowness of the utopian edifice 
is the most urgent task of the moment in international thought" (Carr, 1939: 113). 
The Second World War elevated political realism to prominent status in Anglo-
American thinking on international affairs. Hence, it is not surprising that the period 
surrounding the Second World War witnessed the revival of power politics in the USA 
with John Herz, George F. Kennan, Walter Lippmann and Hans J. Morgenthau 
articulating political realism in contrast to the utopianism, moralism, and legalism 
associated with the liberal writers of an earlier era (Newnham and Evans, 1992:339-
341 ). 
Hans J. Morgenthau has been called the pope of foreign policy realism (6). 
Morgenthau's Politics Among Nations, originally published in 1948 and like Carr's 1939 
publication, represents a declaration of war on the legalistic and morali~tic tradition that 
had previously prevailed in American foreign policy. What Morgenthau offered as an 
alternative was called "political realism." The most integral principle of realism is its 
understanding of politics as interest defined in terms of power (7). This concept 
delineates politics as an autonomous sphere of action apart from other spheres. 
Morgenthau maintains that leaders, both past and present, think and act in terms of 
interest defined as power. Morgenthau regards this feature as the enduring essence 
of politics (8) (The Atlantic Monthly, November 1985: 131, Morgenthau, 1948: 8). 
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2.3 The Central Importance of Waltz: 
According to Barry Suzan, since the 1979 publication of Kenneth Waltz's Theory 
of International Politics, neo-realism has become the dominant school of thought in 
international relations theory (9). Accordingly, Theory of International Politics (TIP) 
shaped much of the theoretical debate in the 1980s and reactions to it still reverberate 
in the literature of the 1990s. By developing the idea of a structural explanation of 
power politics Waltz revived the previously flagging fortunes of political realism. Since 
its publication TIP has inspired a critical literature and has also given rise to a number 
of attempts at application ( 10) (Suzan, 1993: 1, Evans and Newnham, 1992:339-341, 
Keohane, 1986:4 ). 
Suzan's 1993 publication, The Logic of Anarchy, pays Waltz's TIP the highest 
compliment by taking it as its starting point. Perhaps most important reason involves 
Waltz's insight into structure and TIP's provision of an intellectual framework which has 
become part of the standard equipment of the profession. According to Suzan, for 
more than a decade "TIP has been shot at, embellished, misunderstood, and 
caricatured but never quite displaced" (11 ). Furthermore, since a disproportionate 
amount of the contemporary debate revolves around the assertions of Waltz there is 
good reason to take his brand of neo-realism as the basis for the first of two bodies of 
literature considered in the context of this dissertation (Suzan, 1993:5-6, Evans and 
Newnham, 1992:339-341, Keohane, 1986:4). 
2.4 Review of the Modern Neo-Realist Literature: 
In his 1959 publication, Man, the State and War, Kenneth Waltz deals explicitly 
with three distinct levels or "images" of international relations. Waltz, engaging in a 
survey of the three levels, identifies the international system in which nation states 
operate as the level-of-analysis to be pursued in international relations. He cites 
Rousseau who finds the major causes of war "neither in men nor in states" but in the 
state system itself (12). The study of politics is distinguished from other aspects of the 
social sciences by its concentration on the institutions and processes of government 
(Waltz, 1959:1-16). 
The study of international politics, on the other hand, is characterised by the 
absence of truly governmental institutions (13). Possible answers to the more 
complicated task of international relations may fall into three categories: within man, 
within the structure of separate states or within the state system. These images of 
international relations, numbered in the order given, are defined according to where 
one locates the nexus of important causes. In other words, the first image identifies the 
locus of causation in human behaviour, the second in the internal structure of states 
and the third in the international system (14). In his 1959 publication Waltz dismisses 
the first two levels-of-analysis in favour of the latter. Two decades later, in his 1979 
publication, Waltz builds upon his assumption that causation occurs at the international 
system level (15) (Waltz, 1959:1-16). 
2.4.1 Kenneth Waltz - Theory of International Politics (1979) 
In Theory of International Politics (1979), Waltz draws a very clear distinction 
between analytic (reductionist) as opposed to systemic theory. The former, which he 
dismisses as inadequate, accounts for causation at the individual or national level. 
With a reductionist approach, the whole is understood by knowing the attributes and 
interactions of its parts. For example, the effort to explain international politics by 
studying national bureaucrats and bureaucracies, is reductionist. In contrast, the latter 
theory, which Waltz adopts, conceives of causes operating at the international level. 
Waltz maintains that reductionist theory will only be sufficient where systems-level 
effects are absent or are weak enough to be ignored. Under these circumstances 
Waltz would regard reductionist theory as inadequate (Waltz, 1979:80). 
2.4.2 Systems Level, or Structure, Versus the Level of Interacting Units: 
A system is composed of a structure and a set of interacting units. On one level, 
a system consists of a structure and the structure is the systems-level component that 
makes it possible to think of the units as forming a set distinct from a mere collection. 
At the other level, the system consists of interacting units. The aim of systems theory 
is to show how the two levels operate and interact and that requires delineating one 
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from the other. According to Waltz any approach or theory termed "systemic" must 
show how the systems level, or structure·, is distinct from the level of interacting units. 
Definitions of structure must omit the attributes and the relations of units. Only by 
doing so can one distinguish changes of structure from changes that take place within 
it. According to Waltz, the level of interacting units or process level is irrelevant and 
must be separated from the systems level in seeking to explain systemic change. 
Hence, in Waltz's view, the distinction between the two levels must not be confused 
(16). 
2.4.3 Three Features of Waltzian Structure: 
Three propositions follow. Firstly; structures may endure while, personalities 
and interactions may vary widely. Structure is sharply distinguished from the level of 
actions and interactions. Secondly; a structural definition applies to widely divergent 
realms so long as the arrangement of parts is similar and, thirdly; because this is the 
case theories developed for one realm may, with some modification, be applicable to 
other realms as well. Waltz states, "Since structure is an abstraction, it cannot be 
defined by enumerating material characteristics of tne system. It must instead be 
defined by the arrangement of the system's parts and by the principle of that 
arrangement" (Waltz, 1979:80). 
Waltz first seeks to define domestic political structures which are centralised and 
hierarchically ordered. A domestic political structure is defined according to, firstly; the 
principle by which it is ordered, secondly; by specification of the functions of formally 
differentiated units and, thirdly; by the distribution of capabilities across units. Waltz's 
three-part definition of structure includes only what is required to show how the units 
of the system are positioned or arranged .. Everything else is omitted in order to analyse 
the expected effects of structure on process and of process on structure. This can only 
be accomplished if structure and process are distinctly defined. Waltz then applies his 
three-tiered definition to international politics. (Waltz, 1979:88-92) 
2.4.3.1 Ordering Principles: 
Firstly, in terms of the ordering principles, each part of the international political 
system is the equal of the others. None is entitled to command and none is required 
to obey. Whereas domestic systems are centralised and hierarchically ordered, 
international systems are decentralised and anarchic. Domestic political structures 
have a concreteness in government institutions and offices. International politics, in 
contrast, has been called "politics in the absence of government" (17). International 
political structures are defined in terms of the primary political units be they city-states, 
in ancient Greece, or nation-states in modern times. Structures emerge from the 
coexistence of states. No state intends to participate in the formation of a structure by 
which it will be constrained. International political systems, like economic markets, are 
individualist in origin, spontaneously generated, and unintended. In both systems, 
structures are formed by their units. Whether those units prosper or die depends on 
their own efforts. Both systems are formed and maintained according to the principle 
of self-help (18). Beyond the survival motive, the aims of states can be endlessly 
varied. However, survival is a prerequisite to achieving any goals that states may have 
other than the goal of promoting their own disappearance as political entities (Waltz, 
1979:91-92). 
2.4.3.2 Character of the Units: 
In terms of the second aspect of Waltz's definition of structure, the character of 
the units, hierarchy in domestic political structures entails relations of super- and sub-
ordination among a system's parts and that implies their differentiation. In defining 
domestic political structures the first aspect of the definition, like the second and third, 
is needed because each term points to a possible source of structural variation. In 
contrast, states which are the units of international p_olitical systems are not formally 
differentiated by the functions they perform. Anarchy entails relations of coordination 
and that implies sameness. Hence, the second aspect is unnecessary in defining 
international political structures because, so long as anarchy endures, states remain 
like units. International structures vary only through a change of organising principle 
or, alternatively, through variations in the capabilities of units. While Waltz concedes 
that states have never been the only international actors, he maintains that structures 
are not defined by all the actors that flourish within them but only by the major ones. 
So long as the major states are the major actors, the structure of international politics 
is defined by them (Waltz, 1979:93-94). 
2.4.3.3 Distribution of Capabilities - A System Wide Concept: 
In terms of the third and final aspect of Waltz's definition of structure, the 
distribution of capabilities, the parts of a hierarchic system are related to one another 
in ways which are determined both by their functional differentiation and by the extent 
of their capabilities. The units of an anarchic system are functionally undifferentiated. 
The units of such an order are then distinguished primarily by their greater or lesser 
capabilities for performing similar tasks. However, Waltz identifies two problems. 
Firstly; capability does tell us something about units. Defining structure partly in terms 
of the distribution of capabilities seems to violate Waltz's argument to keep unit 
attributes out of structural definitions. States are differently placed by their power. 
Waltz states "yet one may wonder why only capability is included in the third part of the 
definition, and not such characteristics as ideology, form of government, peacefulness, 
bellicosity, or whatever." Waltz's answer is that power is estimated by comparing the 
capabilities of a number of units. Although capabilities are attributes of units, the 
distribution of capabilities across units is not. The distribution of capabilities is not a 
unit attribute, but a system wide concept. Hence, a variation in structure is realised, 
not through the differences in the character and function of units, but only through 
distinctions made among them according to their capabilities (19) (Waltz, 1979:98). 
2.4.4 Critical Weaknesses of Waltz's Theory of International Politics: 
Common criticisms of Waltz, among others, are that his theory is narrow, static, 
deterministic, suffers from an exclusively political perspective and cannot deal with 
change. On one count, that he is narrow and static, it seems readily apparent that 
Waltz is ahistorical and ignores both history and human subjectivity (20). On the next 
count, the charge of structural determinism, Waltz's critics may not be entirely fair. As 
noted in Chapter One, Waltz's terminology may be unnecessarily provocative (21 ). 
Nonetheless, according to Buzan, there is little reason to criticise Waltz's 
decision to focus on system structure. The relative simplicity of structure in comparison 
with the unit level made the clear identification of structure the means by which to 
define the boundary between the two levels. Furthermore, Waltz was fully aware that 
a structural theory would by definition focus mainly on the continuities in . the 
international system. Waltz was also fully aware structural causes could never offer 
more than a partial explanation of international outcomes: "one must ask how and to 
what extent the units account for outcomes." Waltz further states "structure operates 
as a cause but it is not the only cause in play" (Waltz 1979:,78,87, Buzan, 1993:22-23) . 
. Nonetheless, to Waltz's discredit, he seemed insensitive to the difficulties 
created by his very tight definition of system structure for other systems analysis 
approaches to international relations. He defined a system simply as composed of a 
structure and interacting units and therein created difficulty. Using this method Waltz 
could not avoid pushing a vast array of causes and effects down to the unit level. Since 
his primary purpose in establishing the unit-system boundary was to elaborate theory 
at the system level, Waltz naturally paid little attention to unit factors once they had 
been banished beyond the realm of his structural definition (22) (Buzan, 1993:24). 
The result is that Waltz's definition effectively appropriated the whole content of 
the system level for his own narrow definition of structure. In the process, he forced 
down to the unit level all other attempts to conceptualise the international system in 
general terms. According to Buzan, "Many acknowledge the analytical centrality of his 
ideas on structure, but few are comfortable with his conclusion that all else is thereby 
relegated to the unit level" (Suzan, 1993:25). 
Similarly, Keohane and Nye maintain "making the unit level the dumping ground 
for all unexplained variance is an impediment to the development of theory." They 
argue even if one understands both states preferences and system structure, one will 
nonetheless often still be unable to account adequately for state behaviour unless other 
attributes of the system are understood such as the character of international and 
transnational interactions as well as the nature of international institutions. Examining 
these systemic processes leads one to look more carefully at the interactions between 
system and unit characteristics or, in other words, how the preferences of actors are 
affected by the constraints and opportunities in their environments and vice versa 
(Keohane and Nye, 1987:745-746). 
lh terms of the criticism that Waltz suffers from an exclusively political 
perspective this is indeed true. His exclusive focus on the political sector is implied by 
the title of his 1979 publication. His purports to be a theory of international politics 
only. Suzan substantially improves upon this limitation by introducing the notion of 
sectors. The four sectors identified by Suzan are economic, political, societal and 
strategic. As earlier stated, Suzan's sectoral approach coupled with levels-of-analysis 
is especially valuable as it enables this dissertation to expand the neo-realist 
perspective by transcending the limitations of Waltz's TIP. This is discussed in greater 
detail in Section 1.4 of Chapter One and, for further elaboration of Buzan's research 
agenda, refer to Sections 2.4.6 and 2.4.6.1 of this chapter. 
Waltz, in pursuing a purely structural systemic explanation of international 
relations, does not adequately account for change (23). A Waltzian systemic analysis 
would see significant change as having occurred once (in 1945) and would be unlikely 
to identify important changes since that time. Waltz's systems theory does not 
investigate how the order it analyses came about in the first place nor does it consider 
the relations of production or a whole host of other factors upon which that order 
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·depends. As John Lewis Gaddis states, international systems are not immortal. They 
exist in time as well as in space which suggests the need to be sensitive to their 
evolution and prospects as to their structure (Gaddis, 1992: 179). 
2.4.4.1 Waltz's Evolution Towards the Less Deterministic: 
In the final chapter of Neorealism and its Critics (1986), entitled "Reflections on 
Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," Waltz states: "I, like 
Durkheim, think of unit-level processes as a source both of changes in systems and of 
possible changes of systems, hard though it is to imagine the latter. Neither structure 
' 
nor units determine outcomes. Each affects the other" (Keohane, 1986:328). 
In this same chapter, of Neorealism and its Critics, Waltz further states: 
"Structures never tell us all we want to know. Instead they tell us a small number of big 
and important things. They focus our attention on those components and forces that 
usually continue for long period~ (24 ). Clean and simple definitions of structure save 
us from the pernicious practice of summoning new systems into being in response to 
every salient change within a system. They direct our attention to the units and to unit-
level forces when the particularity of outcomes leads us to search for more idiosyncratic 
causes than are found in structures" (Keohane, 1986:329). 
Finally, Waltz himself in a 1990 article in the Journal of International Affairs 
admits how the unit level, or domestic politics, affects international structure and vice 
versa. Waltz states: "Neorealism reconceives the causal link between interacting units 
and international outcomes. Neorealist theory shows that causes run not in one 
direction, from interacting units to outcomes produced, but rather in two directions. 
One must believe that some causes of international outcomes are located at the level 
of the interacting units. Since variations in unit-level causes do not correspond to 
variations in observed outcomes, one has to believe that some causes are located at 
the structural level of international politics as well" (Waltz, 1990:34). In this final 
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comment in particular it appears that Waltz, since his 1979 publication, has evolved 
and become less determini~tic over time. 
2.4.5 A Modified Theory of Waltz's Structural Realism: 
Robert Gilpin, whose work is an effort to address change from a structural realist 
perspective, has a modified theory of Waltz's structural realism. In War and Change 
in World Politics, Gilpin does not seek to provide a theory of international relations but 
to provide a framework for explaining war and change. He wants to explain how middle 
powers can rise and challenge hegemonic powers at their apex. Gilpin does not focus 
on "static" entities such as balance of power or alliances but wishes to study change 
in a broader and more general framework. 
However, a difficulty with using structural theories, such as bipola·rity and 
hegemonic stability, to account for the post World War II peace is their static quality. 
Change within systems (in technology, weaponry, alliances) explains the outcomes of 
international relations. A "hegemonic stability" theorist, by definition, would be more 
concerned with what holds a system together than with how it came into being or how 
it might come apart. They shed little light on the forces that made stability in the first 
place and even less on those that may sooner or later undermine it (Gaddis, 1992: 179). 
Nonetheless, of some utility to the task as hand, are the five assumptions in 
Gilpin's analysis: the international system is stable, states will attempt to change the 
system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs; states will seek to change 
the system through expansion until the marginal costs exceed the marginal benefits; 
once an equilibrium for change has been achieved by a hegemonic/dominant power, 
the political costs rise faster than the ability of the state to pay these costs, and finally; 
if the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be 
changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be 
established. On the basis of these assumptions, Gilpin's conceptualisation of 
international political change seeks to comprehend a continuing historical process in 
contrast to Waltz whose theory is regarded as ahistorical (Gilpin, 1981: 10-11 ). 
2.4.5.1 Gilpin's Notion of Hegemonic War: 
Gilpin defines hegemonic war as that which determines which states will govern 
the system. From Gilpin's point of view hegemonic war is the dynamic of change. 
Power is defined according to the military, economic and technical ability of states. 
Calling upon Radar's definition that "a power equilibrium represents a stable political 
configuration provided there are no changes in returns to conquest," Gilpin views 
equilibrium as a dynamic concept which is in flux due to incremental and revolutionary 
change. This encompasses environmental, domestic and economic change as well as 
the three primary types of change (systems change, systemic change, and interactive 
change). Gilpin explains rather than predicts and therefore does not present a theory 
per se. Gilpin does not make predictions in the way Waltz does. There are patterns 
which are evident but the outcomes of these patterns depend upon a wide range of 
factors. 
2.4.6 A New Theory of International Relations: 
In The Logic of Anarchy, published in 1993, Barry Suzan et al., seek to construct 
a theory of international relations which they call Structural Realism (25). With Waltz's 
TIP as their foundation they identify the useful core of nee-realist theory on which to 
construct a more solid and wider-ranging structural realism. There are a number of 
characteristics which mark their theory of structural realism as a continuation of the 
realist tradition and a similar number of elements which constitute a departure from the 
realist tradition. 
The three elements which mark Buzan's structural realism as a continuation of 
the realist tradition are firstly; that the anarchic political structure of the international 
system is still regarded as necessary. Secondly; the state remains the most important 
defining unit of the international system. Suzan, however, emphasises that this focus 
on the state neither closes the theory to other units nor constitutes a privileging of the 
political. Thirdly, the reformulated structural realism accepts Waltz's basic definitional 
framework for international structure albeit with significant alterations (Suzan, 1993: 10-12). 
The three most important elements which constitute structural realism's 
departure from the realist tradition are firstly; that structural realism employs a much 
more open definition of structure which can be applied well beyond the confines of the 
political sector. Secondly; structure is not regarded as the only systemic level factor 
in play. Important aspects of interaction also have a systemic quality which radically 
affects the development and consequence of structure. Thirdly; structural realism does 
not rely on the positivist analogy with microeconomics that informs Waltz's theory 
(Suzan, 1993: 10-12). 
2.4.6.1 New Theoretical Horizons: 
The combined impact of these similarities and differences give Suzan's structural 
realism a unique character. Four possibilities are consequently realised. They are 
firstly; that structure becomes a way of addressing history and not something detached 
from it. Secondly; there is an explicit linkage of units and structure through the logic 
of structure. This redefinition of deep structure leads to the third possibility. This 
consists of breaking away from the narrow logic of political interaction that dominates 
nee-realism and to loqk at a whole range of interactions (economic, societal, · 
environmental as well as military and political) that shape both the units and 
the structures of the international system. The fourth possibility involves the facilitation 
of a clearer understanding of the relationship between the study and practice of 
international relations (Suzan, 1993:10-12). 
2.5 Review of the Foreign Relations Literature Considering South Africa's Internal 
Milieux: Decision-Making Structures, Personalities and Organisations: 
2.5.1 A View from the Left: 
Rob Davies and Joseph Hanlon make an important contribution to the foreign 
affairs literature of South Africa during the apartheid era. Both are concerned with the 
enormously destructive role played by the apartheid regime among neighbouring 
nations which became known as the policy of destabilization. Joseph Hanlon is 
particularly interested in the economic destruction wrought by destabilization and the 
question of dependency. He sympathetically outlines the reasons for the formation of 
the Southern African Development Coordination Conference (SADCC) as a means by 
which the front line states sought to lessen their dependence on South Africa. Although 
largely non-systemic in orientation, both conduct their analysis from a regionalist 
perspective. The point of view of the region and the region as level-of-analysis (a 
theoretically undeveloped notion) is especially applicable in Chapter Four during which 
time destabilization became the defining feature of South Africa's regional relations 
under P.W. Botha (26). 
2.5.1.1 Robert Davies: 
Robert Davies' work of greatest relevance to the project at hand is firstly; the 
1987 article, "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African Regional 
Policy since 1978" (1985), written in association with Dan O'Meara and, secondly; 
Davies' 1989 article, "South African Regional Policy Before and After Cuito Cuanavale" 
(27) .. 
Davies and O'Meara chronical what they call the accord phase of regional 
relations which extends from 1984 until mid 1985. The Nkomati Accord, signed with 
Mozambique in March 1984, was more far reaching than the previous Lusaka Accord 
which was a limited cease-fire agreement only. The former was a comprehensive non-
aggression pact which sought to re-negotiate aspects of economic relations between 
the two states. According to Davies, Mozambique saw Nkomati as defining a new 
pattern of regional relations based upon principles of international law. 
According to Davies and O'Meara South Africa , by contrast, saw Nkomati in a 
wholly different light. P.W. Botha regarded Nkomati as a tactic and a device by which 
to remould regional relations in accordance with Pretoria's stalled "constellation of 
states" initiative. This involved generating a common approach on the economic and 
security fronts. With Nkomati as the vehicle they envisaged that South Africa would re-
emerge as the dominant regional power whose internal status quo all interested parties 
would be compelled to accept. 
Regionally, South Africa envisaged Nkomati leading other nations to enter into 
similar security arrangements which would immediately reduce support for the liberation 
struggle in the region. Over the longer term, Pretoria imagined Nkomati would promote 
acceptance of South Africa's hegemony by the nations to the north who would 
increasingly join South Africa in presenting a united front to the outside world. 
Internationally, South Africa envisaged Nkomati as the means bywhich to end 
international isolation and be recognised on the world stage as the de facto regional 
power in Southern Africa. Pretoria believed foreign investors would regard the country 
as the regional power through which to channel investment to neighbouring nations. 
Foreign investment, it was thought, would substantially boost South Africa's crisis 
ridden economy as well as guarantee local firms a profitable stake in ventures 
elsewhere in the region (Davies, 1987:343-346). 
2.5.1.1.1 South Africa's Escalating Destabilization of Its Neighbours: 
By mid-1985 neither Mozambique nor South Africa had achieved the objectives 
they had sought from the Nkomati Accord. The accord phase of regional relations 
(1984 to mid 1985) was followed by a phase of escalating aggression and 
destabilization against neighbouring states. Pretoria seems to have concluded it could 
not hope to break out of international isolation by presenting a facade of good 
neighbourliness. Therefore, Pretoria judged it had little to lose by being seen to act 
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more aggressively in the region. Destabilization, never abandoned despite the signing 
of formal non-aggression treaties, escalated and became the main feature of South 
African regional policy (Davies, 1989: 169). 
At this point in time, South African defined two priorities of regional policy. The 
first regarded the commitment to strike decisively at the ANC and SWAPO presence 
in the region. SADF raids were launched against Botswana, Zimbabwe and Zambia. 
After the May 1986 raids against Gaborone, Harare and Lusaka, P.W. Botha stated: 
We will continue to strike against ANC base facilities in foreign countries 
in accordance with our legal right. We have only delivered the first 
instalment. We will certainly not be deterred by fanciful arguments that 
are being advanced here and abroad. South Africa has the capacity and 
the will to break the ANC. I give fair warning that we fully intend doing it 
(Davies, 1987:351 ). 
By mid-1986, death and kidnap squads were being deployed against alleged 
ANC members in Swaziland and Lesotho. South Africa's second priority of regional 
policy, at this time, concerned the ability to respond to sanctions with coercive 
economic measures of its own against the nations to the north. South African counter-
sanctions were intended to pressure regional states into withdrawing their support for 
sanctions as well as giving their tacit support for Pretoria's campaign. This strategy 
was intended to sustain South Africa's assertion that sanctions against it would only 
serve to victimise black South Africans and neighbouring states (Davies, 1987:351-
353). 
The militaristic aggression and destabilization which characterised 1987 and the 
first quarter of 1988 was a continuation of the cycle which had begun in mid-1985 
(Davies, 1989: 169). In 1987 General Geldenhuys reiterated the reason why South 
Africa desired to prevent UNITA's defeat by asserting that if the "Russian and Cuban 
supported Angolan forces" were to gain control over the area now "dominated by 
UNITA," then SWAPO would be able to "activate" Namibia's Caprivi and Kavango 
areas and the ANC would have greater freedom to infiltrate South Africa (Jaster, 
1988: 101 ). 
2.5.1.1.2 South Africa's Sudden De-escalation, 1988: 
Throughout February 1988 senior South African officials appeared to be 
signalling their intention to escalate their assault on the region even further. Speaking 
at the scene of a rocket attack near Messina, Pik Botha t9ld the press "We will no 
longer urge or encourage [neighbouring states] to attend regional peace conferences. 
They can go their own way ... the South African government has had enough. We 
reserve the right to act as we see fit." Speaking at the same time and place as Pik 
Botha, Defence Minister Magnus Malan ominously stated "Wherever the ANC is, we 
will eliminate it. If the Zimbabweans find themselves in between, I feel very sorry for 
them" (Davies, 1989: 167). 
However, within a few short months of these ominous statements promising 
South African escalation, there was notable de-escalation and sudden cooperation in 
the American sponsored negotiations (28). The beginning of the second quarter of 
1988 marked a decisive turning point and watershed in the regional struggle (29). At 
this time, South Africa appeared to be placing greater emphasis on diplomacy and 
economic action through which to advance regional policy objectives. According to 
Davies, this decisive shift in South Africa's regional policy was not the product of the 
subjective intentions of decision-makers but the product of the objective conditions 
under which decisions are made. In other words, Pretoria retreated from escalating 
regional aggression because setbacks were suffered in the region, at Cuito Cuanavale 
for instance, making this militaristic course too costly an option to pursue (30) (Davies, 
1989: 172-179). 
2.5.1.2 Joseph Hanlon: (31) 
Prior to 1975, South African attempts at maintaining regional hegemony involved 
economic dominance and a political and military cordon sanitaire of white-ruled states. 
However, with the end of Portuguese colonisation and the increasing indigenisation of 
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Southern Africa, South Africa's security "arrangement" in the region was steadfastly 
unravelling. Majority rule in Zimbabwe came with the victory of Robert Mugabe's 
Zimbabwean African National Union (ZANU) in 1980 and directly affected Pretoria's 
dominance. With the ZANU victory there were nine newly created majority-ruled 
African nations which formed the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC). South Africa's net profit on all dealings with the SADCC nations 
totalled approximately R1 500 million per year. SADCC, established in 1981, was an 
effort to reduce the economic dependence of its member nations on South Africa 
(Hanlon, 1987:332-333). 
Indeed, wherever possible, South Africa sought to maintain economic dominance 
in the region. l:his economic ~ewer often translated into military and political power 
with quite considerable overlap between the three. Militarily, South Africa sought to 
ensure the nations to the north were not sheltering the ANC and SWAPO. In general, 
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however, South African milita[Y power was used to enforce pol.i!i.caLaiicLe_c_onomic 
goals. The more dependent the nations to the north were on South Africa, the more 
vulnerable they were to South African pressure. Transport was one of the most vital 
aspects of dependency .• South African destabilization or the threat of it deepened this 
dependency. For example, goods were transported through South Africa because 
alternative routes in neighbouring nations were disrupted or destroyed (32) (Hanlon, 
1987:335). 
2.5.2 The Militarization of South African Politics: 
Kenneth W. Grundy's, The Militarization of South African Politics (1986) was the 
first comprehensive study of its kind. It examines the various institutional organs of 
security intelligence, both historical and contemporary, and argues that personalities 
have a great deal to do with the relative importance of these bureaucracies over time. 
Of cardinal importance to the process of decision-making, domestically and in the 
region, is the influence of personalities and the impact of competing bureaucracies 
I 
(Selfe, 1986:14). 
2.5.2.1 Close Relationship Between the SADF and the Political Leadership: 
In this study, h,e illustrates the militarization of white South African society and 
cites specific examples of how this has facilitated the growth of the SADF as a power 
in domestic politics. He disqusses the role the SADF has assumed in regional politics 
and in the campaign of destabilization among the frontline states. Grundy concentrates 
on the role of the SADF in domestic politics attributing the influence of the SADF 
generals, as a force in South African politics, largely to their close personal relationship 
with the head of state (33). Their influence, domestically and in foreign policy decision-, 
making across the region, will grow or wane in accordance with the nature of their 
relationship with those personalities in positions of leadership. 
The security establishment positioned itself at the centre of power and became 
an active participant in policy-making. Those associated with a military perspective 
"have gained the ascendant" not only in military matters but in wider security issues, 
both domestic and external, and even in matters concerning economic and foreign 
policy. The rise of the security establishment was evidenced by the growth in size and 
importance of public and private institutions and agencies concerned with security and 
defence. Security institutions increasingly demanded a greater voice and role in policy 
issues not normally associated with defence and security (Grundy, 1986:1-2). 
2.5.2.2 Cultural Notions of Security and Survival: 
\ According to Grundy, of preeminent importance in explaining their virtually 
~_,t,viJ\\ ' 
+1nrestrained assertion of control are the ideologically laden Afrikaner cultural notions 
bi security and survival (34). The Afrikaner ranks, largely represented by the National 
Party, had its locus of power in the cabinet. Cabinet power rested on the support of the 
caucus and information provided by the bureaucracy; Although each leader had 
variations in his leadership style, "by and large, each has had to conform to the 
demands of party structure and Afrikaner expectations." As challenges to Afrikaner 
power became more threatening, throughout the 1970s and 80s, professional experts 
in security and coercion joined traditional elements of Afrikaner power. According to 
Grundy, "because of their expertise and substantive role in defence of the status quo, 
and because of the relatively clear consensus in the National Party on the efficacy of 
a coercive maintenance of order, the centrality of the security establishment is made 
palpably evident" (Grundy, 1986:5). 
2.5.2.3 Security Establishment: 
Grundy defines the security establishment thus: "The security establishment 
includes all those individuals and institutions, whether a formal part of the governmental 
and administrative apparatus of the state or attached to private and parastatal 
organisations, that are chiefly concerned with the maintenance of the South African 
state primarily by developing and employing the coercive instruments of the state or by 
weakening by various means the coercive arms of hostile states and movements" 
(Grundy, 1986:5-6). 
The security establishment consisted of the SADF, the Department of Defence, 
and the South African Police (SAP). Various branches of the intelligence community, 
encompassing private and quasi-official think tanks, were also recruited into the ranks 
of the security establishment. Some .governmental parastatal corporations, such as 
Armscor, were heavily defence oriented and were brought into the fold as were dozens 
of private firms which did Armscor work on subcontract. The State Security Council 
(SSC) and its secretariat, in the form of the Joint Management Centres (JMC), 
coordinated the participation of the various components of the security establishment 
(Grundy, 1986:5-6). 
2.5.2.3 Bureaucratic Rivalry: 
With direct implications in terms of SADF intervention in Angola, Grundy 
identifies the eclipsing of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) by other 
governmental departments and agencies even on decisions directly related to foreign 
policy. This displacement began under the leadership of B.J. Vorster with the rise of 
the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and the Department of Information with the 
associated personalities of General van den Bergh and Connie Mulder, respectively. 
The OF A, in terms of bureaucratic manipulation, was outmanoeuvred and later 
outflanked even further by elements of the defence establishment. According to 
Grundy, it came as no surprise as the Angolan civil war unfolded that Hilgard Muller, 
then Foreign Minister, would take a back seat while more forceful personalities would 
contest the wheel. 
Grundy characterises South African decision-making on Angola as essentially 
bureaucratic in nature: South Africa's original decision to intervene involved a battle 
between the Department of Defence in opposition to BOSS and DFA with the 
Department of Information assuming a supporting role. Likewise, the military hierarchy 
wanted to continue to aid the FNLA and UNITA while BOSS and DFA argued that the 
SADF's intervention was being used against South Africa as well as alienating many 
African and Western Governments that were not previously sympathetic to the MPLA 
or a Cuban presence in Africa (Grundy, 1986:90). 
The South African leadership did, however, appreciate that little could be gained 
by committing more South African troops without more tangible Western support. 
When the South African leadership realised that Western assistance would not be 
forthcoming (presumably in reference to the Clark Amendment passed in the US 
Senate banning aid to any Angolan party) SADF leaders were willing, perhaps 
reluctantly, to pull back to more defensive positions. Also cited as contributing to this 
decision is the realisation that what had been a bush war had become more like a 
qonventional war requiring a similar!~ costly commitment (Grundy, 1986:88-90). 
2.5.2.5 Personalities and Bureaucracies: 
Grundy paints a portrait of personalities and bureaucracies, and their 
competition, as being of central significance in the course of South African foreign 
policy decision-making. For example, it was BOSS which argued for SADF withdrawal 
and ultimately prevailed early in 1976. The climate of competition and distrust at the 
pinnacle of South African decision-making structures was further illustrated by major 
confrontations between P. W. Botha, then Minister of Defence, and General van den 
Bergh, of BOSS. 
For example, after the FRELIMO Government seized power in Mozambique, B.J. 
Vorster, in notable contrast to his posture in the Angolan conflict, took a conciliatory 
line. P. W. Botha took an opposing position and sought to support counterrevolutionary 
guerrillas in their attempt to unseat Samora Machel. While Vorster agreed to assist 
with the repair of Mozambique's railways and. harbours, simultaneously, Botha had 
secretly ordered the supply of extensive quantities of arms and ammunition to guerrillas 
operating from a base near Komatipoort. Adding to the intrigue, upon learning of 
Botha's orders, van den Bergh sent military personnel to Nelspruit and Komatipoort to 
immobilize the equipment being transported to Mozambique (Grundy, 1986:91 ). 
Grundy, characteristic of the theorists included in this second body of literature, 
predominantly adheres to a sub-national or unit level analysis. According to Grundy, 
South African foreign policy decision-making is overwhelmingly presumed to be the 
result of causation occurring at the level of interactions or units (such as the Afrikaner 
power structure, rise of the security establishment, militarization of white society). 
2.5.3 Internal Decision-Making of the South African State: 
Perhaps the piece most relevant to the analysis at hand is "Asgects of Political 
/ 
Decision-Making in South Africa" (1983)_ written by Deon Geldenhuys in association 
with Hennie Kotze (35): They maintain the analysis of decision-making should "begin 
with an understanding of the structures of the decision-makers involved." The decision-
makers consist of an individual or group. Accordingly, they maintain the best way to 
identify the locus of power in a decision-making system is by "institutional or structural 
analysis" which highlights the role of the different actors allowing one to establish which 
individuals, groups and agencies within the government machinery feature in the power 
configuration (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1983:33). 
They embark on such an analysis of the central decision-making structures with 
specific reference to the place of the State Security Council (SSC), and the other 
components of the Security Management System (NSMS), within these structures. 
Together, these factors are judged to be responsible for the configuration of 
"government structures for top-level decision-making" which, in turn, are portended to 
be the primary source of causation in South African decision-making and foreign policy 
formulation. According to Geldenhuys and Kotze, instrumental to the genesis of the 
National Security Management System (NSMS) are three factors. 
2.5.3.1 Three Factors of Strategic Policy Formulation: 
1) Firstly, they cite South African involvement in the Angolan civil war (1975-76) in 
terms of the internal response required by the South African state apparatus so as to 
improve the channels for decision-making. Magnus Malan, described South African 
involvement in Angola as a venture which "focused the attention on the urgent 
necessity for the State ~ecurity Council to play a much _fuller role in the national 
securitY- of the Republic than hitherto." Malan's observation underlined the need at top 
government levels for a more regularised and formalised process of decision-making. 
Although established in 1972, the SSC had met only sporadically when an 
interdepartmental committee was appointed to urgently consider "the formulation of 
strategy at the national level" and the organisational structures required for that 
purpose. The end product of this investigation was the establishment of the central 
components of the NSMS (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1983:35). 
2.5.3.2 Internal and External Security Concerns: 
i) The second factor cited as instrumental to the genesis of the NSMS, and not 
unrelated to the first, was a concern with the internal and external security of the 
Republic. Commencing in the 1970s, this found expression in the reciprocal concepts 
of the total communist onslaught threatening South Africa's survival and the total 
national strategy as the reguisite remedy. According to Defence Minister Magnus 
Malan, "The total onslaught is.an j.deologically motivated struggle and the aim is the 
implacable and unconditional imposition of the aggressor's will on the target state." 
Magnus Malan maintains the aim of the communist inspired onslaught is "the overthrow 
--·--·-·--------------
of the present constitutional order and its replacement bY.._ a communist-oriented blac_k 
,government." Necessary for combatting this threat was a total national strategy as 
defined in the 1977 White Paper on Defence and "specific policies" described in P.W. 
Botha's Twelve Point Plan (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1983:35). 
~~ i ( The planned utilisation of the state's resources in this manner involved "the 
management of South Africa's four power bases (the political, economic, 
social/psychological and security bases) as an integrated whole." This was to be 
achieved by means of the overhauled decision-making structures of the NSMS with the 
SSC as its core. In this formulation, a combination of both internal and external factors 
produce particular policies and bureaucratic structures within the state (Geldenhuys 
and Kotze, 1983:35). 
2.5.3.3 Leadership Personalities: 
1'1 The third factor cited by Geldenhuys and Kotze, as responsible for shaping 
decision-making structures, is the influence of a leader's personality with specific 
reference to P.W. Botha's assumption of power in September 1978. His profession 
background and personal inclinations, during his previous twelve years as Minister of 
Defence, are used as relevant explanations of his proclivity for the concept of total 
nati_onal strategy. While Minister of Defence, P.W. Botha acquired a reputation as a 
competent administrator and, once elected, one of his first tasks was the overhaul of 
the official machinery for making and implementing decisions. The first phase of a 
comprehensive "rationalisation" programme was launched in March 1980 and aimed 
at the pinnacle of the power structure. The Office of the Prime Minister was, for 
example, greatly strengthened. The second phase of rationalisation commenced, in 
April 1980, when 39 existing government departments were consolidated into 22. The 
final phase, concerning finance, was implemented more gradually. This reorganisation 
of government structures, integral to the total national strategy, was presented as an 
outgrowth of Botha's new style of leadership, in keeping with his past professional 
experience (Geldenhuys and Kotze, 1983:35-36). 
2.5.4 South Africa's Civil-Military Relations: 
Philip H. Frankel, in Pretoria's Praetorians (1984) explores civil-military relations 
so as to understand the nature of the modern South African state and its approach to 
decision-making. Frankel traces the development of the Union Defence Force (UDF), 
later the SADF, and analyses its place within the South African body politic. He argues 
that the SADF had been subjected to two important traditions, firstly; the British tradition 
emphasising the liberal view that a clear distinction needs to be maintained between 
the "professional" soldiers who are nominalry neutral and the "amateur" political 
controllers of such soldiers. 
2.5.4.1 Boer Tradition of A Citizen Army: 
The second is the Boer tradition which emphasises the ethos of a citizen army · 
whose role is essentially synonymous with, and a microcosm of, the state. Over time 
South African society has become increasingly militarized which has served to tip the 
s.cales in favour of the Boer tradition which, in turn, has led to an absorption of military 
chiefs into top decision-making structures. According to Frankel, "this dynamic, 
described as a dialectic between 'liberal' and 'kommando' conceptions of civil-military 
authority, sets the tone for .· .. the current militarization of South African society, the 
growth of the garrison state with its accompanying siege culture and the emergence of 
so-called total strategy representing a basic reinvigoration of the kommando ethic in 
the traditional heartland of Afrikaner political culture" (36) (Frankel, 1984:xxii). 
Saliently, according to Frankel, the appearance of soldiers at the pinnacle of the 
policy-making hierarchy lends a distinctive strategic colouration to the decision-making 
process. Soldiers operating in this context relegate the non-military, political and 
economic, variables to the side-lines. To the extent that military personnel succeed in 
imposing their narrow and strategic world view on their civilian counterparts, public 
policy becomes very much a matter of direct security calculations. Frankel states: "in 
South Africa this is particularly the case in the foreign policy-making realm where the 
appearance of soldiers in the highest institutions of state has contributed to the down-
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grading of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) in the network of key institutions 
developed to formulate policy under the Botha Government." Frankel cites Grundy in 
noting that the Department of Foreign Affairs and Information (DFAI) has "fallen on hard 
times" (Frankel, 1984: 149). 
2.5.4.2 Bureaucratic Rivalry: 
Militarization has had the effect of creating bureaucratic competition on foreign 
policy issues. Frankel characterises South African foreign policy decision-making in 
the region as essentially the product of a bureaucratic rivalry: the military, armed with 
their strategic military perspective on regional and international issues, vies with the 
bureaucrats of the DFA as each strive to set the foreign policy agenda. In Frankel's 
view South Africa's policy of regional destabilization, in Angola and other front-line 
nations, is a direct and natural result of military penetration into the foreign policy arena 
of the South African state. 
This bureaucratic dialectic between the military approach, versus the DFA'.s 
political approach, to foreign policy decisions has proved critical in shaping South 
Africa's responses and policy towards Angola and Namibia. Frankel argues, in both 
cases, military leaders with access to central decision-making institutions have gained 
the ascendant in contrast to the DFA and its greater appreciation of inherent political 
considerations. The notable exception to the military's dominance of the South Africa 
state's decision-making apparatus was the decision to withdraw from the Angolan 
conflict in January 1976. In this specific instance, BOSS and DFA were able to impose 
the view on B.J. Vorster that a continued South African presence north of the Cunene 
would do incalculable harm to the Republic's image and interests in the West (Frankel, 
1984:150). 
2.5.4.3 Leadership Personalities: 
The ability of the SADF to project its particular interpretation of regional 
developments onto the foreign policy-making realm is also derived from certain 
inclinations brought about by P.W. Botha's personality-type. These include P.W. 
Botha's inherent receptiveness to military views, his impatience with the civilian-
oriented DFA as an inefficient and uncoordinated institution, and finally, his preference 
for relying upon military inteliigence as the basis for his policy-decisions. 
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER TWO: 
(1) The three most fundamental assumptions of realism as identified by Robert Gilpin 
are slightly distinct from those identified by Robert Keohane. They are firstly; the 
nature of international affairs is essentially conflictual, secondly; the essence of social 
reality is the group rather than the individual, and particularly the conflict group, 
whether tribe, city-state, kingdom, empire or nation-state, and thirdly; the prime human 
motivation in all political life is power and security (Keohane, 1986:304-305). 
(2) Graham Evans and Jeffrey Newnham point out that the nation-state is a 
comparatively recent phenomenon. It developed in Europe between the sixteenth and 
nineteenth centuries after the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire with the emergence 
of the centralised state claiming exclusive authority within a defined territorial area. 
Keohane further argues that after the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, with its legitimation 
of the state system, political realism became generally accepted and especially so in 
continental Europe (Keohane, 1986:8, Evans and Newnham, 1992:258). 
(3) For Americans of this era the dichotomy between their philosophy and that of the 
Europeans underscored the merit of American beliefs which disdained the concept of 
the balance of power and considered the practice of Realpolitik immoral. Proclaiming 
a fundamental departure from the precepts and experiences of the Old World, 
Woodrow Wilson's idea of world order derived from the faith of Americans in the 
essentially peaceful nature of humankind and an underlying harmony of the world. It 
followed that democratic nations were, by definition, peaceful. Therefore, once people 
were granted self-determination they would no longer have reason to go to war or to 
oppress others. 
European diplomacy, in contrast, was predicated not on the peace loving nature of 
states but on their propensity for war. Wilson entirely rejected this approach as it was 
not self-determination which caused wars but the lack of it; not the absence of a 
balance of power that produced instability but the pursuit of it. Wilson proposed to 
found peace on the principle of collective security. In his view the security of the world 
called for, not the defence of the national interest, but of peace as a legal concept. The 
judgement on whether a breach of peace had in fact been committed required an 
international organization which Wilson defined as the League of Nations (Kissinger, 
1994:221-222). 
(4) Henry Kissinger argues the Kellogg-Briand Pact became another example 
of America's tendency to treat principles as self-implementing as the Pact was not 
combined with mechanisms, on the part of the international community, by which to 
identify and punish aggressors. Although the American leadership had enthusiastically 
proclaimed the historic nature of the treaty as sixty-two nations had renounced war as 
an instrument of national policy, they adamantly refused to endorse any machinery for 
applying it much less for enforcing it (Kissinger, 1994:37 4-375). 
(5) The idealists maintain that if humls have moral obligations to one another then so 
too must states. This view is premised on absolute moral values such as universal 
justice, human rights and self-determination which are considered to transcend 
parochial concerns such as national self-interest. Underlying idealism in international 
relations, is the belief in a common humanity consisting of a collective set of rights, 
duties and obligations. There is a corresponding belief in the necessity of global unity 
and cooperation so as to resolve moral issues of peace, security, harmony and 
environmental well-being. 
Realism, on the other hand, considers states to create their own morality with the 
highest morality of all being the national interest. International anarchy dictates that 
self-help and self-interest are of preeminent importance in decision-making. Realism 
regards it as irrational not to recognise the centrality of national survival and 
international order. The pursuit o~ order and the balance of power take priority over 
the pursuit of justice, equality, human rights or freedom (Evans and Newnham, 
1992:189-190). 
(6) So fundamental a basis was laid by Hans J. Morgenthau's original 1948 publication 
that Robert 0. Keohane maintains "neither Kenneth N. Waltz's Theory of International 
Politics ... nor the responses of Waltz's critics can be fully understood without some 
comprehension of Morgenthau's attempt to construct a theory of international politics" 
(Keohane, 1986: 10). 
(7) For Morgenthau the notion of national interest defined in terms of power is a central 
feature of state behaviour. Morgenthau's conception of national interest is rooted in the 
principles of national security and survival. According to Evans and Newnham, it is 
presumed that all other policy preferences are subordinate to the defence of the 
homeland and the preservation of territorial integrity. The issues at stake are viewed 
of such fundamental importance that the term "vital interest" is often used in this regard 
(Evans and Newnham, 1992:258-259). 
(8) Due to Morgenthau's almost exclusive emphasis on military and economic factors, 
to the exclusion of others, the concept of interest defined in terms of power is regarded 
as outdated and has been largely superseded. According to David Singer, " ... all such 
gross models suffer from the same fatal weakness as the utilitarian's "pleasure-pain" 
principle. Just as individuals differ widely in what they deem to be pleasure and pain, 
or gain and loss, nations may differ widely in what they consider to be the national 
interest, and we end up having to break down and refine the larger category" (Evans 
and Newnham, 1992:258-259, Singer, 1961 :81 ). 
(9) According to Robert Keohane, "Whatever on~'s conclusion about the value of. 
contemporary neorealism for the analysis of world politics in our time, it is important to 
understand realism and neorealism because of their widespread acceptance in 
contemporary scholarship and in policy circles. Political realism is deeply imbedded 
in Western thought" (Keohane, 1986:4). 
(10) In The Logic of Anarchy Buzan et all list the following: 
Critical Literature: 
I) Robert Keohane (Ed.), Neorealism and its Critics (1986) 
ii) Spegele, "Three Forms of Political Realism" (1987) 
iii) R.B.J. Walker, "Realism, Change and International Political Theory" (1987) 
iv) Alexander Wendt, "The Agent-Structure problem in International Relations 
Theory" (1987) 
Attempts at Application: 
I) Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics (1981) 
ii) Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (1987) 
iii) Michael Mandelbaum, The Fate of Nations (1988) 
iv) Barry Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine (1984) 
v) Christensen and Snyder, "Chain Gangs and Passed Bucks: Predicting Alliance 
Patterns in Multi Polarity" (1990) 
(11) The critical weaknesses of Waltz's theory are discussed in greater depth in 
Section 2.4.4 of this chapter. 
(12) Realism, taking its cue from the Machiavellian and Hobbesian models, argues 
international politics is essentially amoral and that notions such as justice, equality and 
freedom can only have application within the state (Evans and Newnham, 1992: 189). 
Waltz expounds: "implicit in Thucydides and Alexander Hamilton, made explicit by 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Rousseau, is at once a generalised explanation of states 
behaviour and a critical point d'appui against those who look to the internal structure 
of states to explain their external behaviour" (Waltz, 1959:7). 
(13) According to Evans and Newnham the crucial concept of anarchy literally means 
the absence of government but is often incorrectly used as a synonym for disorder and 
chaos. Hedley Bull believes an account of the history of Western thinking about 
international relations can be given in terms of anarchy. For further elaboration on this 
point please refer to Hedley Bull's 1977 publication, The Anarchical Society: A Study 
of Order in World Politics (Evans and Newnham, 1992:14-15). 
(14) These three levels roughly coincide with the two levels-of-analysis described by 
David Singer in his seminal article of 1961. 
(15) The differences between classical realism and its modern counterpart, neo-
realism, are quite significant. Therefore, the student of international affairs must not 
equate Waltz's structural neo"7realism with the classical realist tradition from which it is 
derived. 
On this subject, Barry Buzan states: "Although Waltz undoubtedly rekindled interest in 
realism, he intended in TIP [Theory of International Politics] to distance himself from 
the older traditions of classical realism. For this reason he was happy to identify 
himself as a neo-realist" (Buzan, 1993:2). 
\ 
(16) As stated, Waltz considers it essential to contrive a definition of structure free of 
the attributes and interactions of units. Definitions of structure must abstract from the 
characteristics of units, their behaviour, and interactions. These must be excluded in 
order to distinguish between variables at the level of units and variables at the level of 
the system. Abstracting from the attribut_es of units means leaving aside questions of 
political leaders, national institutions, and the ideological inclinations of states. 
Furthermore, this involves leaving aside questions about the cultural, economic, 
political, and military interactions of states. According to Waltz what is left is "relation" 
after omitting attributes and interactions. 
"Relations" is used to mean both the interaction of units and the positions they 
occupy vis-a-vis each other. Defining a structure requires ignoring how units interact 
and instead concentrating on how they are arranged or positioned and how they stand 
in relation to one another. Interactions, according to Waltz, take place at the level of 
units. How units stand in relation to one another, how they are arranged or positioned, 
is not a property _of the units. Rather, the arrangement of units is a property of the 
system. Hence, by leaving aside the. personality of actors and their behaviour, one 
arrives at a purely positional picture (Waltz, 1979:80). 
(17) Please refer to earlier Endnote Thirteen regarding Graham Evans and Jeffrey 
Newnham's brief definition of anarchy and what it is not. 
(18) On this subject, Evans and Newnham state: "For the realist the notion of self-help 
is a logical consequence of the anarchical structure of the international states-system. 
For the idealist it is the cause of it. Either way, self-help is endemic in international 
politics. Given that states are independent political units that are primarily concerned 
with their own survival and advancement but are not subordinate to a central authority, 
the idea of self-reliance is a compelling one. The search for security in a system of 
politics without government means that self-help is a necessary function of self-
preservation" (Evans and Newnham, 1992:365). 
(19) The final problem, regarding the distribution of capabilities in Waltz's definition of 
structure, concerns relations defined in terms of interactions being excluded from 
structural definitions, although relations defined in terms of groupings of states do seem 
to tell us something about how states are placed in the system. Hence, why not specify 
how states stand in relation to one another by considering the alliances they form? 
Nationally or internationally, structural definitions deal with the relation of agents and 
agencies in terms of the organization of realms and not in terms of the accommodations 
and conflicts that may occur within the,m or the groupings that may be formed. By the 
same logic, an international political system in which three or more great powers have 
split into two alliances remains a multipolar system, a system in which no third power 
is able to challenge the top two. While market structure is defined by counting firms, 
international political structure is defined by counting states. In the counting, 
distinctions are made only according to capabilities (Waltz, 1979:97-99). 
Waltz illustrates this point by stating "We. do not ask whether states are revolutionary 
or legitimate, authoritarian or democratic, ideological or pragmatic. We abstract from 
every attribute of states except their capabilities" (Waltz, 1979:99). What is asked is 
what range of expectations arises merely from looking at the type of order that prevails 
among them and at the distribution of capabilities within that order. There is an 
abstraction from the particular qualities of states and from all their concrete 
connections. What emerges from this abstraction is a positional picture. This 
positional picture is a general description of the ordered overall arrangement of a 
society in terms of the placement of units rather than in terms of their actual qualities 
(Waltz, 1979:99). 
(20) According to Suzan, the complaint of narrowness arises from Waltz's restriction 
of his inquiry to the international political system and from his sparce definition of 
structure. According to Suzan, "In combination these two restrictions exclude or 
marginalize a range of factors others see as being (1) structural, (2) important to 
outcomes, and/or (3) lying both beyond a strictly political domain and above a strictly 
unit level of analysis" (Suzan, 1993:25) 
(21) As previously quoted in Endnote 15 of Chapter One, Suzan et al., state that 
Waltz's "concern to develop a structural theory led him into a terminologically 
unfortunate distinction between reductionist theories (those at unit level), and systemic 
ones (those about structure). By this route, his usage of terms such as "systems 
theory" and "systems level" makes the term system effectively a synonym for structure. 
In confusing system and structure in this way, Waltz made his theory unnecessarily 
provocative, helping the case of those who wish to dismiss him as a structural 
determinist" (Suzan, 1993:28). 
(22) While Waltz was always well aware that the unit causes played an important role 
in outcomes, and that "any theory of international politics requires also a theory ·of 
domestic politics," Suzan maintains that since Waltz's emphasis was on system 
structure, he was simply not interested in investigating what went on beyond his 
definitional boundary (Suzan, 1993:24 ). 
(23) Robert Keohane, John Gerard Ruggie and others have also criticised Waltz for his 
inability to explain change. 
\~ 
(24) Indeed, Waltz provides a means of understanding, in more general terms, the 
larger systemic forces at play in Angola during the period of greatest superpower 
intervention. 
(25) They envisage it as one theory among many and make no claim that it is the only 
valid way of conceptualising the international system (Suzan, 1993:20). 
(26) The subject of a Southern African regional sub-system is an area of research 
interest to Professor Peter Vale of the University of the Western Cape and Professor 
Timothy Shaw of Dalhousie University, Canada. Further research into the regional sub-
systems level of analysis within the Southern African region could be a potentially 
productive area of future research. 
(27 ) In addition to "Total Strategy in Southern Africa: An Analysis of South African 
Regional Policy Since 1978" published in 1985, Robert Davies and Dan O'Meara also 
together produced "The State of Analysis of the Southern African Region: Issues 
Raised by the Total Strategy" (1984). On an individual basis Robert Davies has 
published the following: "South African- Regional Policy Post-Nkomati: May 1985 -
December 1986" (1987) and "Review Article: The Military and Foreign Policy in South 
Africa" (1986). 
(28) Evans and Newnham have this to say about the American sponsored negotiations: 
"Constructive Engagement - Term used to describe US policy towards Southern Africa 
from 1980 onward. The term was coined by Chester Crocker, Assistant Secretary of 
State for African Affairs, and refers to US attempts to reform the South African system 
by working within in and honouring its rules. A form of "quiet" diplomacy which seeks 
to encourage White-led change in the region, focusing especially on Namibia and the 
withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola" (Evans and Newnham, 1992:65). 
(29) According to Chester Crocker, when the London round of negotiations convened 
in the first week of May 1988 there was no way of knowing this would be the beginning 
on an ongoing process which would continue for the next eight months. The London 
meeting was to be the first of twelve Angolan-Cuban-South African meetings under 
American mediation. 
(30) According to Rob Davies, "Pretoria's changed stance in the region was the 
product, fundamentally, of reverses on air the main fronts of regional destabilization ... 
But the most decisive of these was that suffered by the SADF at Cuito Cuanavale. A 
Cuban publication has aptly described Cuito Cuanavale as "South Africa's Waterloo:" 
it smashed the myth of SADF invincibility and revealed important windows of 
vulnerabiliti' (Davies, 1989: 172). 
The enormously controversial subject of the "Battle for Cuito Cuanavale" is dealt with 
in some detail in Sections 5;7 and 5.7.1 of Chapter Five. 
(31) Joseph Hanlon also published Apartheid's Second Front: South Africa's War 
Against Its Neighbours in 1986. This book is based on the more detailed account, 
Beggar Your Neighbours: Apartheid Power in Southern Africa, published earlier that 
year by the Catholic Institute for International Relations. 
(32) Between 1980 and 1987 South Africa's war on its neighbours cost approximately 
750 000 lives and more than R50 000 million in destruction and lost production 
(Hanlon, 1987:333). 
(33) Grundy, however, was sceptical of the ability of the SADF to convert itself into a 
political junta. · 
(34) Grundy states: "Policy still is predicated on a belief that South Africa is a besieged 
state, subject to the full panoply of hostile policies touching virtually every aspect of 
public life. Indeed, the very concepts of total onslaught and total national strategy are 
products of the military mind. That the agenda of government can be dictated by such 
a perspective itself attests to the extent of insecurity in [apartheid-era South Africa] 
( Grundy, 1988: 1 ). 
(35) Of central importance to the literature of South African foreign policy is Deon 
Geldenhuys with Diplomacy of Isolation (1984) being considered a foundation book on 
the subject. In addition, Geldenhuys has produced the following: "South Africa's 
Search for Security Since the Second World War" (1978), "Regional Co-operation in 
Southern Africa: A Constellation of States?" (1979), "Some Foreign Policy Implications 
of South Africa's Total National Strategy (with particular reference to the 12 Point Plan)" 
(1981 ), "The Constellation of Southern African States and the Southern African 
Development Coordination Council: Towards a New Regional Stalemate" (1981 ), "The 
Destabilization Controversy: An Analysis of a High-Risk Foreign Policy Option for 
South Africa" (1982) and Isolated States: A Comparative Analysis (1990). 
(36) Frankel identifies the undoubted influence the concept of total strategy has had 
on the SADF and P.W. Botha. He points to the many consequences of the infusion of 
this concept in central decision-making structures and in the SADF itself. Like Grundy, 
Frankel wishes to illustrate the necessity of examining the military seriously in any 
analysis of the South African state. 
CHAPTER Ill: 
THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA'S INITIAL INTERVENTION IN THE 
ANGOLAN CONFLICT (1975-1977) 
3.1 The Global Context: 
It is imperative to place the period of prolonged anti-colonial warfare into its 
proper historical context. The years of the anti-colonial struggle, 1961-1975, coincided 
with the height of Cold War rivalry in what was a bipolar world. After 1945, the Truman 
Administration regarded the Soviet Union's expansion into Europe as yet another threat 
to international stability and responded by projecting American power onto the 
Continent but, unlike World War II, without an actual war. That same concern with 
potentially hostile aggregations of power shifted to the world at large as the Cold War 
intensified. By the 1950s any disturbance in the global status quo, however 
insignificant, may have appeared to threaten what was perceived to be the USA's 
global security interests (Gaddis, 1992:9). 
The nature of the ideological and geopolitical rivalry between the two 
superpowers was essentially characterised by competition over nuclear weapons. 
However, strategic interests in Europe and the emergence of a Qerceived power 
vacuum in the decolonising nations of the develoe_ing world also became the focus of 
American-Soviet comP-etition. The traditional European colonial powers were eclipsed 
by the two dominant superpowers which jostled for influence and position in what would 
come to be regarded as their respective spheres of influence. In the era of 
decolonisation the formulation of superpower policies in the Third World was 
dominated by objectives related to their rivalry as opposed to the interests of new 
patioos~ In addition, John Lewis Gaddis reminds us that no one had ever envisaged 
an end to the Cold Wc4r. Hence, the developments which occurred throughout that 
period of Angola's history should be viewed in the context of the prevailing Cold War 
conflict which defined the nature of the international order at the time (1 ). 
3.2 Prelude to Civil War and External Intervention, 1961-1975: 
Commencing in 1961, three nationalist liberation movements began an anti-
colonial struggle in Angola but were unable to either unify their fo"rces or achieve any 
degree of military success against the Portuguese army. The tides turned in Lisbon, 
25 April 1974, when a group of junior officers disillusioned by Portugal's colonial wars 
launched an armed coup against the Caetano regime (2). This action resulted in a 
ruling military council which was more amenable to decolonization in Angola 
(Somerville, 1986:40, Menon, 1986: 132). 
The process of Portuguese disengagement produced the Alvor Agreement which 
was signed 15 January 1975 by the Portuguese Government and three liberation 
movements, the MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola), the FNLA 
(Frente Nacional de Libertacao de Angola) and UNITA (Uniao Nacional para a 
lndependencia Total de Angola). The Alvor Agreement established a Transitional 
Government for the ten month interim period leading to independence set for 11 
November 1975 ( see Map, Appendix 1 ). The agreement represented an att~mpt, by 
the Portuguese, to create an independent Angolan government and, in so doing, 
promote a working relationship between the three factions in the period preceding 
independence (Somerville, 1986:41-42, -Menon, 1986: 132). 
The Transitional Government, established 31 January 1975, was headed by a 
Prime Ministerial Council consisting of a member from each of the three movements. 
Government decisions would require a two-thirds majority. Under the agreement the 
armed forces of the liberation movements were to be integrated into a single, united, 
national army. A National Defence Commission, representing all involved parties, was 
appointed with the task of overseeing the integration of all troops into a mixed military 
force. Once this was achieved, Portuguese troops would gradually withdraw between 
1 October 1975 and 29 February 1976. Democratic elections would be held prior to the 
end of October 1975 in anticipation of national independence (Hodges, 1976:47, 
Menon, 1986: 132). 
Although the nationalist leaders were formally committed to implementing the 
agreement, their historic rivalries' did not diminish as the imminent arrival of 
independence drew nearer. Indeed, the struggle for power continued in a running 
battle of insults, slander, and physical attacks on one another. Unfortunately, Portugal 
lacked the authority to enforce its political will and, despite the consensus achieved on 
paper, the factions remained deeply divided along ethnic lines (3). As with all previous 
agreements between the MPLA and FNLA, none survived their signature. After the 
Alvor Agreement, factional fighting broke out and within weeks hundreds had died. Any 
hope of a peaceful transition to independence receded as the signatories of the Alvor 
Agreement became embroiled in a fratricidal struggle for supremacy and each 
competed for foreign support (Hodges, 1976:48, Somerville, 1986:41, Menon, 
1986:132-133). 
On the day of independence the Portuguese High Commissioner and all 
remaining Portuguese military personnel simply left. In the wake of their departure, 
Angola instead of peacefully becoming an independent nation was in the midst of civil 
war and witnessed the proclamation of two rival republics. While the MPLA proclaimed 
the People's Republic of Angola (PRA), based in Luanda, the FNLA and UNITA 
proclaimed the existence of the Democratic Popular Republic of Angola (DPRA), based 
in Huambo (4). With heavy Soviet and Cuban backing, it took the MPLA another three 
months of fighting to finally prevail over its rivals and establish control over the majority 
of the country (Hodges, 1976:47, Bridgland, 1986:151, Jaster, 1988:72). 
3.3 The Nationalist Factions: 
In terms of characterising the Angolan conflict, according to some typology of 
war, it may be viewed primarily as a liberation struggle. According to Klinghoffer, 
labelling the Angolan war as purely "civil" or "external" is an exercise in futility as it 
obviously incorporates ingredients of both (5). Most civil wars or wars of national 
liberation have some external linkages. Nonetheless, too often, the external aspects 
are overemphasised as the war is perceived in a global context Therefore, one must 
be wary of obscuring the indigenous roots of conflicts which have become externalized 
(Klinghoffer, 1980:6). With this observation, and given that the Angolan war included 
a civil dimension in which three nationalist movements contested for power, it is useful 
to provide a survey of these competing movements. 
3.3.1 The Nationalist Factions - MPLA: 
MPLA (Movimento Popular de Libertacao de Angola) was the most bourgeois, 
urban, and intellectual of the three movements. Its membership consisted of those 
most exposed to Portuguese education and culture and included many mulattoes 
(mesticos), assimilated blacks (assimilados), as well as some affiliated whites'. Its core 
was composed of intellectuals with Portuguese university degrees and leftward leaning 
civil servants. While MPLA members generally had closer ties to the colonial 
administration than either the FNLA or UNITA and shared a common bond arising from 
their Portuguese heritage the MPLA was, nonetheless, adamantly opposed to colonial 
rule. It, therefore, shared ideological ground with Portuguese socialism and close ties 
developed. Uniquely, and in accordance with their Marxist orientation, the MPLA took 
the class structure of Angolan society as their basic unit of analysis as opposed to 
ethnicity. John Marcum comments that the MPLA's lack of ethnocentrism was 
facilitated by the integrationist effect of Portuguese language and culture. Along with 
the MPLA's Marxist ideology, their multi.:ethnic inclination proved helpful in attracting 
Soviet and Cuban aid (6) (Klinghoffer, 1980:8-9, Somerville, 1986:36). 
The MPLA received its greatest support from the mulattoes (mesticos), 
assimilated blacks (assimilados), and Kimbundu. The mesticos constituted roughly 1.5 
percent of the population but had influence which far exceeded their numbers. They 
were heavily urbanized and were favoured by the Portuguese in education and 
employment opportunities. The assimilados constituted an even smaller percentage 
of the population but included the MPLA's first president as well as former president, 
Agostinho Neto (7). Both men were Mbundu coming from the Kimbundu people who 
reside in the region around the capital city of Luanda. They are Angola's second 
largest ethnic group, constituting 18 percent of the population, and experienced the 
greatest exposure to Portuguese colonial influence. The Portuguese Communist Party, 
after World War II, organised an affiliate in Angola and was assisted by white 
communist residents. The Partido Communista de Angola (PCA) was founded in 
October 1955 and quickly broadened its base of support, merging with other leftists to 
eventually create the MPLA in December 1956. The MPLA thus included communist 
members from its inception (8) (Klinghoffer, 1980:9-10, Somerville, 1986:30-33). 
3.3.2 The Nationalist Factions - UNITA: 
UN/TA (Uniao Nacional para a lndependencia Total de Angola) drew its base of 
support from the Ovimbundu, Angola's largest ethnic group, which constituted 31 
percent of the population. Although lacking educated cadres and arms, UNITA had the 
benefit of a unified command structure under the leadership of Jonas Savimbi. After 
leaving the FNLA in July 1964, Savimbi was invited to join the MPLA but instead 
decided to establish a new nationalist movement under his control. He founded UNITA 
in Angola in March 1966. Soon afterwards, in August 1967, UNITA witnessed the 
severe curtailment of its operations when it was expelled from Zambia. Zambia, reliant 
on Angola's Benguela Railroad for the transport of its copper exports, retaliated against 
UNITA when some of its members inadvertently blew up a section of railway 
(Klinghoffer, 1980: 14, Somerville, 1986:35-36). 
UNITA drew most of its support from rural areas and, in addition to a lack of 
educated cadres, had fewer arms and foreign contacts than the other two movements. 
As a result, UNITA stressed self-sufficiency and guerrilla warfare (9). After _Portugal's 
military coup UNITA astutely tried to take advantage of its electoral popularity. In 
addition, UNITA sought to minimize its military weakness by advocating a political 
solution in Angola. Having acquired a reputation over time for being pragmatic and 
resilient, UNITA tried to appeal to Angolan whites by adopting moderate positions 
regarding racial issues and property ownership (Klinghoffer, 1980: 13-14). 
3.3.3 The Nationalist Factions - FNLA: 
FNLA (Frente Nacional de Ubertacao de Angola) was both less intellectual and 
less urban than the MPLA while being more conscious of race and traditionalist in 
orientation. Other than its espousal of an anti-Marxist bias, the FNLA lacked any 
consistent or coherent ideoiogy and regarded the MPLA as a collection of bourgeois, 
Marxist mesticos. The FNLA was based in Leopoldville (Kinshasa), Zaire where it had 
military training facilities. It enjoyed the support of successive Zairian governments 
and, as a result, had land access to northern Angola which allowed it to prevent MPLA 
cadres from crossing through its zone of influence. The FNLA, infused with Bakongo 
cultural values, was the outgrowth of Bakongo political movements originating in the 
northwest region of Angola and among Bakongo emigres across the border in Zaire 
(10). Naturally, the majority of the FNLA's support base was derived from the Bakongo 
people, comprising 12 percent of Angola's population, and in Zaire. Many of the 
Bakongo emigres were French-speaking which served to further isolate them from their 
Portuguese-speaking counterparts in the MPLA and UNITA (Klinghoffer, 1980: 12-13). 
The FNLA was established as a result of the merger between the UPA (Uniao 
des Populacoes de Angola) and another party. In March 1961 the UPA organised a 
massive uprising in northern Angola. Their leader, Roberto Holden, achieved 
recognition and became the FNLA's secretary general. In April 1962, the FNLA 
established a government in exile, GRAE (Governo Revolucionario de Angola no 
Exilio). In 1961, Jonas Savimbi, an Ochimbundu, had joined the UPA and soon 
afterwards became foreign minister but left the FNLA three years later, in July 1964, 
denouncing the Bakongo's ethnic dominance of the movement. Militarily, the FNLA 
was better equipped than both the MPLA and UNITA combined and had the most 
conveniently located base in adjoining Zaire. However, it lacked experienced 
administrators, support in the capital and a sufficient level of OAU sympathy. It was 
also strongly identified with Bakongo interests (11) (Klinghoffer, 1980: 12-13, 
Somerville, 1986:32). 
l3.4 Factional Fighting, Early to Mid 1975: 
John A Marcum provides an insightful explanation of the intense factional rivalry 
in terms of the legacy of clandestine activity inherited by each of the liberation 
movements. The reasons for each of Angola's three major ethno-linguistic communities 
producing a major liberation movement, each with a separate army and separate 
sources of external aid, merits examination of their shared history· in a common 
struggle. The deep schisms dividing Angola's three insurgency groups were both 
ethnic and the result of Portugal's colonial policies (Marcum, 1976:409). 
3.4.1 Portuguese Colonial Policies: 
In terms of the latter, the Salazar government conducted a search and destroy 
policy in the 1950s towards individuals and groups in the colonies suspected of 
harbouring nationalist sympathies. The nationalist groups drew their members from a 
very small segment of the population and their leadership ranks were further limited by 
police harassment and lack of funds. Their membership remained parochial and never 
fully transcended the ties that bind in terms of ethnic and regional affiliations. 
Infiltrations and years in exile only reinforced mutual suspicions and extreme distrust. 
Their history of struggle in the face of repression, the insecurity of clandestine activity 
and, most importantly, the attitudes their history engendered did not immediately 
dissipate under new and changing circumstances. Hence, even with their long-fought-
for goal of independence within range, the nationalist liberation movements 
nonetheless wasted much of their effort fighting one another (Somerville, 1986:26, 
Marcum, 1976:409-10). 
3.4.2 Factional Character of the Civil Conflict: 
According to Tony Hodges (12), indicative of the factional character of the 
Angolan conflict was the nature of the first major physical clash after the establishment 
of the Transitional Government. Less than two weeks after the Transitional 
Government came into being the MPLA launched an assault against their own expelled 
Eastern Revolt faction led by Daniel Chipenda. The MPLA attack succeeded in driving 
Chipenda's group out of the capital. It was justified on the grounds that the MPLA's 
Eastern Revolt faction had not been recognised as a liberation movement by the Alvor 
Agreement and was, therefore, illegal. In reality, the MPLA's assault was motivated by 
their determination to avoid having a rival present in the capital. Chipenda was driven 
to seek the legal status that membership in a recognised liberation movement brought 
and, therefore, announced that his troops would join the FNLA. In April 1975 he was 
formally admitted to the Front and elected assistant secretary-general. 
3.4.3 The Fight for Control of Luanda: 
Fighting erupted in February 1975 between the MPLA and FNLA in Luanda (13). 
Fighting between the MPLA and Daniel Chipenda's followers also erupted in February 
1975 and was soon followed by a virtual invasion of northern Angola by FNLA forces 
supported by the Zairian army. Holden Roberto sought to gain control of the north and 
to expel the MPLA from its traditional stronghold in the capital before independence 
was formalised (14). To complement its military strategy, and to overcome its political 
weakness, the FNLA set up a well-financed political apparatus. With funds supplied 
by Zaire and the US the FNLA was able to purchase newspapers and other important 
media outlets in Luanda (Hodges, 1976:50, Somerville, 1986:39-40). 
The fighting in Luanda affected UNITA seriously for the first time in early June 
1975. By this time, fighting was widespread in both the north and the south of the 
country with particularly heavy clashes in the northern, eastern and Cabinda districts. 
UNITA was, by far, the weakest faction militarily and had little to gain from a military 
power struggle. Hence, it concentrated on winning political and electoral support. 
However, despite UNITA's best efforts to avoid the fighting in Luanda, its offices were· 
attacked and several of its members killed by the MPLA (Hodges, 1976:51, Somerville, 
1986:43). 
3.4.4 Alvor Agreement in Disarray: 
At this stage, the Alvor Agreement was in a state of disarray and the Transit}onal 
Government barely functioning .. For example, the provisional constitution which was 
supposed to have been ready months earlier, had still not been published and the 
Electoral Law had not even been approved. The mixed military units were still not 
organised and, instead, all the rival movements were competitively recruiting troops as 
fast as they could. There was not even agreement on the number of refugees living in 
Zaire and, therefore, how many would be allowed to vote in the election. Further 
complicating matters, each liberation movement had taken dozens of prisoners during 
the fighting and refused to release them despite prior agreements to do so (Hodges, 
1976:51 ). 
3.4.5 Nakuru Agreement: 
It had become necessary once again for the Portuguese regime to intervene by 
summoning the three rival faction leaders for a virtual re-run of the Summit in Alvor. 
In signing the Nakuru Agreement, 21 June, the three signatories pledged their 
adherence to the transitional government and agreed to stop fighting. However, the ink 
was not dry before shooting broke out again among the movements. So low were 
expectations for the success of the peace-seeking agreement that, in the first week of 
July, a letter was released to the three factional leaders from the Minister of Economic 
Affairs warning that the country was on the brink of economic and political collapse. 
The first week of July did see a modest attempt made to implement the provisions of 
the agreement. However, 9 July, the fourth major wave of fighting erupted pushing the 
nation to the precipice of civil war and, for the first time, dividing the country into military 
spheres of influence. (Hodges, 1976:52, Somerville, 1986:43). 
By mid-July the MPLA had driven the FNLA out of Luanda with the exception of 
three small pockets of resistance. Everywhere else in the capital FNLA installations 
had been gutted or seized. The MPLA offensive, however, was not limited to the 
capital. It was part of a well-prepared, coordinated drive to eject the FNLA from all its 
traditional strongholds. By the end of July 1975, the MPLA had driven back the FNLA 
and acquired unchallenged control over the entire centre of the country. The MPLA 
was able to launch such a calculated offensive in defiance of the Nakuru Agreement 
because it had received foreign military aid, since March 1975, which undercut the 
military advantage held by the FNLA in the early months of the year. For instance, in 
March, several Soviet planes delivered arms to the MPLA in Congo-Brazzaville which 
were then smuggled into Angola. In the period, April - June 1975, armaments arrived 
by sea from Yugoslav, Soviet and East German vessels (Hodges, 1976:52): 
3.4.6 Transitional Government Evacuated From Luanda: 
The three factions ruled out compromise and the situation eroded further as they 
became more deeply embroiled in conflict. By the first week of August, UNITA forces 
were also coming under repeated attack by the MPLA. A major battle between the 
MPLA and FNLA, in Luanda in early August, compelled Portuguese authorities to 
accede to MPLA demands that the FNLA's Transitional Government Ministers be 
evacuated from the capital. At the same time, UNITA also withdrew its Ministers and 
soldiers from Luanda, effectively rendering the capital a military sphere of influence 
under the exclusive domain of the MPLA (Hodges, 1976:53). 
In the first week of August, clashes were occurring between the MPLA and 
UNITA in the Cunene valley area and, in mid-August, major clashes broke out between 
them in Lobito and Benguela. The MPLA and UNITA were fighting in Lusa. Finally, 21 
August, UNITA formally declared war on the MPLA. In the following days battles raged 
between the two movements and, as the fighting spread, UNITA's forces were evicted 
from a string of southern cities. The MPLA's military successes reflect the fact that 
UNITA, in strictly military terms, was by far the weakest of the three factions at this 
point and that the MPLA had by then received sufficient armaments to challenge both 
its southern rival as well as the FNLA in the north (Hodges, 1976:53). At the end of 
August 1975, attempted negotiations in Lisbon failed to produce any agreement and 
Angola's downward spiral into civil war acquired even greater momentum. 
3.5 The Period Immediately Preceding Independence, 11 November 1975: 
By the beginning of September, the MPLA appeared to have the upper hand in 
the struggle. In control of the capital, it had access to the government apparatus and 
communications facilities. It controlled 11 of the country's 16 district capitals and 
occupied more territory than its rivals. Virtually the entire seaboard was in MPLA hands 
including all the major ports. UNITA, in contrast, had been pushed back into the 
Ovimbundu heartland of Huambo and Bie although clashes continued around Lusa in 
September and October. In the north, the FNLA, despite receiving large shipments of 
U.S. aid via Zaire, was unable to break through the MPLA's defence into Luanda. The 
MPLA, although having considerable success, was unable to inflict a decisive defeat 
on UNITA and FNLA as both, by this time, were receiving large arms shipments from 
the United States as well as other sources (Hodges, 1976:55, Somerville, 1986:44-45). 
3.5.1 Withdrawal of the Portuguese Government: 
By mid-September, given the intense factional rivalry of the past months, Lisbon 
resolved they had little option other than to get out of Angola. This decision was 
preceded by massive public demonstrations in opposition to Portugal's continued 
colonisation of Angola. Protests by both soldiers and civilians intensified in Lisbon 
after 200 military police and 5 000 supporters marched through the city, in early 
September, demanding the withdrawal of troops. Leonel Cardoso made the 
declaration, 18 September, that Portugal would start to withdraw its troops and, 28 
October, the Portuguese Government announced that all its troops would be withdrawn 
prior to independence. The most politically expedient policy, especially in view of the 
military dangers facing the MPLA at the time, would be to leave the doors open to 
cooperation with whatever nationalist faction ultimately came to power (15). To this 
end, Lisbon decided against extending recognition to any of the factions. Other 
actions, however, provided the MPLA with valuable support. For instance, the 
departing Portuguese army left behind large quantities of arms in MPLA controlled 
areas (Hodges, 1976:55). 
3.5.2 The FNLA's March on Luanda: 
Having had its troops driven out of Luanda, the FNLA announced that all its 
military uriits had been placed in "a permanent state of military alert." 
At this advanced stage, in the move towards independence, any hope for a cessation 
of hostilities appeared increasingly remote. Accusing the Portuguese of siding with the 
MPLA, the FNLA declared that their troops would march on Luanda. The next day the 
FNLA announced that Holden Roberto had returned to Angola, after a 14 year 
absence, in order to lead his troops in the march on Luanda (16). 
The FNLA assault began two hours after first light on 10 November 1975. 
Roughly 1 500 soldiers began advancing in a single column across the broad and 
marshy valley of the Benge River 30 kilometres north of Luanda. The FNLA force was 
supported by two regular battalions of the Zairian Army and 100 Portuguese-Angolan 
soldiers. As the FNLA advanced across the swamp along a narrow road, of top of a 
dyke, a devastating barrage was launched by the Cubans and MPLA forces. Heavy 
mortar shells and salvos of 122-mm rockets, fired from Stalin organs, rained down on 
the FNLA column (Bridgland, 1986:146-147). 
The South African artillery was no match for the state-of-the-art Soviet hardware 
being used by the Cubans. Most of Roberto's armoured cars and jeeps mounted with 
anti-tank rockets were knocked out within an hour. The CIA operatives watching the 
unfolding debacle, from a nearby ridge, estimated that 2 000 rockets had landed among 
the FNLA forces. Three SAAF warplanes, which attacked Cuban and MPLA positions, 
were of no real assistance to the FNLA. Due to the need for secrecy they flew so high 
that two missed their targets while the third failed to release its bombs. Roberto's 
troops panicked and became bogged down in the swamp. Hundreds of FNLA and 
Zairian soldiers died along with a number of the Portuguese. The disaster became 
known as "Death Road." It broke the FNLA which was never to recover (Bridgland, 
1986:147). 
fJ/- 3.5.3 South African Direct Military Intervention: 
Of paramount importance at this stage, only weeks prior to independence, was 
the military operation mounted by the South Africans. South Africa's earlier, relatively 
small-scale interventions across the border consisted of their military occupation of the 
hydro-electric dam installations at the Ruacana Falls on the Cunene River as well as 
conducting pre-emptive, hot-pursuit missions across the border to seek out and destroy 
SWAPO (17). These earlier interventions stand in contrast to South Africa's dire..ct 
military intervention on the side of the anti-MPL,8Jor:cces.,_UHIII.Land the EJ~L8,_Q[l 
Angola's southern front commencing 23 October (18). Similar in purpose to American 
covert aid, the South African direct intervention was designed to engineer a military 
stalemate between the factions and, in so doing, increase Pretoria's leverage. With the 
benefit of greatly advanced leverage in the situation, Pretoria intended to force 
concessions from the factions vis-a-vis future Angolan policy towards the region and 
Namibia, in particular (Hodges, 1976:56, Somerville, 1976:37). 
3.6 American Involvement (1975-1976): 
The U.S. responded to the evolving situation in Angola by resuming a covert 
channel to Holden Roberto's FNLA and, in the period July-December 1974, the CIA 
channelled small amounts of aid to the FNLA. January 22, 1975, the "Forty Committee" 
of the National Security Council (NSC) approved the modest sum of $300 000 in order 
to strengthen the FNLA's position in the Transitional Government. No funds were 
approved for UNITA and the $300 000 was for political purposes only with no portion 
used to finance arms. This modest parcel of US aid did not reach the FNLA until March 
by which time the Soviet Union had already escalated its arms deliveries significantly, 
. and, therefore could not have "triggered" the massive Soviet arms deliveries that 
month. Obviously, as logistical operations were already in operation by March, the 
Soviet decision had to have been made months earlier. 
Regardless, the American versus the Soviet response to the Angolan situation 
was vastly disparate at this time: while the United States only provided a small amount 
of money the Soviet Union introduced a large quantity of arms. American aid to the 
FNLA was a more accurate reflection of Kissinger's statements, before the Senate 
Subcommittee on African Affairs, that the immediate U.S. objective was to provide 
leverage for diplomatic efforts in order to bring about a just and peaceful solution (U.S. 
Congress, Senate, 1976:20, William Schaufele and Nathaniel Davis in Klinghoffer, 
1980:88). 
3.6.1 President Ford Approves $14 Million in Cover Aid: 
In the summer of 1975, President Ford's approval of a further $14 million ($6 
million in July and $8 million in August) in covert aid and arms shipments marked the 
beginning of serious American involvement in Angola. This decision was taken largely 
in response to Soviet intervention, the MPLA military offensive, and appeals from 
\ 
nations such as Zambia and Zaire concerned about the security threat posed by the 
Soviet presence in neighbouring Angola. The U.S. resorted to covert aid because overt 
support would have embarrassed its allies in the region. Furthermore, it was felt 
reversing overt commitments would prove more difficult once initiated: As a result, 
covert aid was adopted as the best alternative for reaching a negotiated solution with 
the Soviet Union in order to terminate external involvement. 
It was perhaps surprising that the U.S. became involved at all given the climate 
of opinion in Washington following U.S. troop withdrawal from Saigon and the 
Watergate Scandal. The July disbursement was followed by President Ford's 
authorisation of further aid which was dwarfed when compared to the magnitude and 
scale of Soviet and Cuban involvement. Nonetheless, Kissinger was adamant that 
Soviet actions so far afield had to be contained. Kissinger's position was not, however, 
unopposed. He was vigorously countered in the State Department and even more so 
in Congress. 
3.6.2 Congressional Opposition to American Covert Aid: 
Nathaniel Davis, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs in the spring and 
summer of 1975, actually resigned over the Ford Administration's position on covert aid 
to Angola. A memorandum, 1 May, sent to Secretary of State Kissinger on the subject 
of covert aid to Jonas Savimbi expressed concern about a possible linkage between 
Savimbi and Pretoria, warning that "the .South Africans have expressed interest in 
providing financial assistance." Davis concluded: 
If the major actors [in Angola] settle on Savimbi, that might be the best 
solution. However, signs are multiplying that Angola is moving toward a 
violent denouement. If we launch a program of covert support for 
Savimbi, I think we must reckon with probable disclosure. At most we 
would be in a position to commit limited resources, and buy marginal 
influence ... We might find ourselves drawn in deeper very fast, as the 
fighting produces more intense pressures for arms and ammunition - as 
well as money. The political price we might pay- as reports of bloodshed 
and alleged atrocities multiply-would, I believe, exceed the possibility of 
accomplishment (Davis, 1978: 111 ). 
Soon afterwards, Davis took the Chair of an inter-agency National Security 
Council (NSC) Task Force on Angola. The Task Force Report, submitted 13 June, was· 
strongly opposed to military intervention and advocated diplomacy aimed at 
encouraging a political settlement among the rival factions. The "diplomatic option" 
would have encouraged Portugal to play a stronger, impartial role and urged the Soviet. 
Union to reduce its support of the MPLA. This option favoured the U.S. working in 
concert with Tanzania, Zambia, and Zaire in order to reduce the flow of arms to Angola. 
Davis viewed the major advantages of a diplomatic effort to be the opportunity to shift 
the factional competition back into the political arena thereby improving FNLA and 
UNITA prospects as well as reducing the likelihood of an outcome determined by Soviet 
arms. Davis explained the major advantages, thus: 
We believed that such an effort might reduce the danger of big-power 
confrontation and might further our policy of supporting peaceful solutions 
on that continent. We felt it would reflect our recognition that Angola was 
basically an African problem, and that Africans could and should play a 
major role in an Angolan solution. The Task Force also made the point that 
such a diplomatic-political initiative would probably elicit congressional and 
public support in the United Sates (Davis, 1978: 112). 
Furthermore, the Task Force firmly rejected the option of covert military 
intervention pointing out that such intervention would commit U.S. resources in a 
situation the outcome of which was in doubt and over which the U.S. could only hope 
to exercise limited influence at best. Saliently, the Task Force Report also observed 
that U.S. military intervention carried with it the possibility of increased involvement by 
the Soviet Union and other foreign powers (Davis, 1978:112-113). 
The Forty Committee, met 14 July, on the Angolan issue and was inconclusive 
(19). A small ad-hoc working group was then formed to refine their covert action 
proposal. Davis sent Under Secretary Sisco a third memo, 16 July, with a copy to 
Secretary Kissinger. The memo outlined salient developments which further undercut 
the viability of covert aid: 
In the four days since my memorandum to you of July 12, the situation in 
Angola has importantly changed: 
-We have evidence the Soviets are introducing more, heavier and more 
sophisticated weapons ... 
-The MPLA appears to have accomplished the expulsion of the 
FNLA from Luanda; substantial numbers of FNLA troops have 
surrendered their arms and sought Portuguese protection or fled ... 
-South Africa is reported to be giving Roberto some support. 
If it were not true before, it seems clear now that is unrealistic to think in 
terms of a program that could be both effective and covert (Davis, 
1978:116). 
3.6.2.1 Resignation of Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs: 
On the following day, 17 July, Davis sent Under Secretary Sisco a fifth memo 
with a copy to Secretary Kissinger. It continued to argue firmly against intervention: 
"So far as the CIA Draft Action Plan is concerned, my view - which I have expressed -
is that the measures proposed are inadequate to accomplish the purposes outlined" 
(Davis, 1978:116). Following the Forty Committee's consideration of the CIA Action 
Plan, nearing the end of July, it was given to President Ford and approved. Upon 
learning of the President's decision to pursue the covert action program in Angola, 
Nathaniel Davis submitted his resignation as Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs. 
3.6.3 Clark Amendment to the Defence Appropriations Bill: 
In the Senate, opposition to U.S. covert aid to Angola took the form of the Clark 
Amendment to the FY76 Defence Appropriations Bill. Approved in the Senate, 19 
December, it essentially prohibited the use of any money appropriated under the 
defence appropriations bill for the purpose of financing CIA operations in Angola. The 
reasons behind the resignation of Nathaniel Davis as Assistant Secretary were not 
immediately made public. His opposition, and the reasons which compelled him to 
resign, only became public in an article by Seymour Hersh, in The New York Times, 
five days before the introduction and Senate passage of the Clark Amendment. Davis 
himself questions whether the 14 December Hersh story triggered the introduction and 
Senate passage of the Clark Amendment as Senator Dick Clark and a number of other 
members of Congress had previously expressed strong opposition to U.S. involvement. 
By that time it was also apparent that a large and rapidly expanding commitment would 
be necessary if there was to be any realistic chance of diverting an MPLA victory 
(Davis, 1978: 119). 
Commenting briefly on the Senate floor, 17 December, Tunney argued that 
Kissinger and his policy staff appeared to be suffering from some form of reverse 
myopia viewing events as part of a grand scheme for global influence in which every 
new Soviet venture contained the seeds of an eventual Communist check-mate of the 
free world. According to Tunney, the Angolan war was no opening gambit in some 
colossal scheme for Soviet hegemony but a conflict among three warring factions 
whose tribal origins and animosities went back decades if not centuries and who 
possessed little or no ideological commitment. Tunney believed that conflict between 
rival factions was based more upon ethnic considerations than political or philosophical 
inclinations and, moreover, viewed MPLA courtship of the Soviet Union as largely a 
matter of convenience rather than conviction (U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 
1976:41208-41209). 
3.6.3.1 Congress Prefers Diplomacy to Aid: 
Tunney viewed the issue not in terms of countering the Soviet Union .but in terms 
of the U.S. siding with factions on the same side as the South African apartheid regime. 
~ ~ 
He maintained that this could damage U.S. relations with moderate black African 
countries. Although concerned over Soviet and Cuban willingness to intervene in 
Angola, Tunney felt the U.S. could exert pressure on the Soviet Union by emphasising 
the inco~patibility of their African strategy with the policy of detente. Tunney 
envisaged the potential damage the Soviet Union's actions in Angola would have (20), 
not only in jeopardizing the relationship of detente, but also in disrupting the export of 
American products (U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 1975:41208-41209). 
3.6.3.2 Two Competing Lines of Argument in the US Senate: 
In the debate which followed, the Senate split along two competing lines of 
argument. Those opposed to the Clark Amendment, in large part agreed with the 
administration, viewing Soviet activity in Angola from a global perspective. They 
, 
focused on the gee-strategic importance of Angola in terms of access to ports and 
critical sea-lines. On the other hand, those in favour of the Clark Amendment focused 
on the region itself and argued that an MPLA victory would be no different from the 
coming to power of Samora Machel, a self-declared Marxist in Mozambique, or the 
presence of the leftist government in Guinea-Bissau. Senator McGovern succinctly 
encapsulated their attitude on the importance of American involvement in Angola: "I 
do not think it makes 60 cents worth of difference to the interests of the United States 
which of these three groups ultimately prevails" (U.S. Congress, Congressional Record, 
1975:41201 ). 
3.6.3.3 Timing of the Clark Amendment: 
Senator Domencini's contention that the timing of the proposed amendment 
might be of critical importance in terms of the degree of leverage the U.S. could hope 
to exert on Soviet activity was not debated. Nor did the Senate engage in any serious 
discussion over the insertion of Cuban forces and the probable implications this would 
presage in the course of American - Soviet relations. The Senate voted (54 to 22) to 
attach the Clark Amendment to the Defence Appropriations Bill, 19 December 1975. 
The House of Representatives voted overwhelmingly (323 to 99) in favour of the 
Amendment, 27 January 1976, and President Ford signed the Defence Appropriations 
Act into law, 9 February 1976. All additional covert funds destined for Angola were 
therefore blocked. Kissinger tried to broker a compromise with the Clark Amendment 
supporters to receive $9 million rather than the $28 million he had originally requested 
but was unsuccessful. (Klinghoffer, 1980:85, Bridgland, 1986: 155). 
3.6.3.4 Clark Amendment Gives Soviets and Cubans the Green Light: 
The 19 December Senate vote in favour of the Clark Amendment proved a 
disaster as the timing of its passage was so inopportune. Although it is easily argued 
that additional U.S. aid would have had little impact in countering the formidable Cuban 
presence the situation in Angola was nonetheless still fluid at the time of the vote and 
not immune to developments in Washington. Indeed, the Senate passage of the Clark 
Amendment acted as the equivalent of a green light to Soviet intervention and that of 
their proxy state. Kissinger later testified, in Senate Hearings on Civil War in Angola, 
that he first raised the Angolan issue with the Soviet Union in late October 1975 after 
public warnings failed to bring about an adequate response. The issue of Angola was 
then raised by Kissinger, twice in November, and again by President Ford in December. 
Kissinger stated: "There was some indication the public and private warnings had the 
effect of giving the Soviets pause for, between December 9 and 24, no _Soviet planes 
delivered arms to the MPLA. It was only after the Senate vote ... cutting off funds that 
the arms flow recommenced" (U.S. Congress, Senate, 1976:52). All Cuban troop 
movement had ceased as well during this period. 
3.6.4 American Military Option: Direct Naval and Aerial Involvement: 
However, this account of the diplomatic initiatives undertaken is not 
representative of all the options which were considered at the time. Kissinger did not 
state that, in addition to arming the FNLA and UNITA and abetting the Zairian and 
South African invasions, the United States also considered direct naval and aerial 
involvement in the war. In the period, 15-23 November, a U.S. task force was 
organised and given contingency orders relating to the Angolan conflict. The aircraft 
carrier Independence, capable of providing significant tactical air support, sailed from 
Portsmouth, England the evening of 27 November. It joined forces with the cruiser 
Boston and three destroyer escorts in the Azores. The task force was placed on full 
alert (Klinghoffer, 1980:84). 
With public and political sentiment rising against U.S. involvement in Angola, 
both Kissinger's military as well diplomatic efforts were severely curtailed and the task 
force never sent. At the very least, Kissinger's advocacy of covert action was designed 
to increase the cost of intervention to the Cubans and, thereby, improve the prospects 
for negotiation. However, that option was effectively aborted with the passage of the 
Clark Amendment, 19 December 1975. 
3.7 South Africa's Initial Involvement: 
The SADF was not unfamiliar with the Angolan terrain. In the early 1970s, South 
Africa and Portugal enjoyed a cooperative relationship sharing intelligence 
on guerrilla activity. While Vorster provided clandestine support to the Portuguese in 
the form of helicopters and arms, the Portuguese reciprocated by allowing the SADF 
to penetrate Angola up to a depth of over 300 kilometres for the purpose of rooting out 
SWAPO guerrillas. These incursions were justified as being pre-emptive raids of a 
defensive nature. By 1975, however, the perceived secu~ity threat to Namibia was 
growing with SWAPO t§king advantage of the .ch~_q_s ariaj!:!g from the collapse of 
Portuguese authori!y with an attendant increase in ~u_e!!!!!§_acti'{ltx. Tension along the 
Angolan border with Ovamboland was further heightened by incidents throughout July 
and August 1975 including the assassination of an Ovambo Chief Minister (Barber and 
Barratt, 1990:190, Jaster, 1988:69). 
3.7.1 Which Faction Would South Africa Support: 
It was of strategic interest for South Africa to assess each of the rival factions 
and the role each would be likely to play in the course of Angola's development. 
Therefore, the Vorster regime initiated contact with representatives of the Angolan 
movements. In M.arch 1, 975 an intelligence official met, in Europe, with Jonas Savimbi 
who soon afterward a02ealed, albeit unsuccessful!~, for South African aid. In May and 
July 1975 the FNLA's Daniel Chipenda made visits to Windhoek for secret talks with 
Van den Bergh of BOSS and, two months later, met with P.W. Botha in Pretoria. 
If Pretoria was to support any one of the factions, the FNLA would have beeri the 
obvious choice in view of the FNLA's anti-Soviet bias, American funding, and Zairian 
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support. However, UNITA, although militarily weak, derived its majority support from 
tbe Ovambos in the south. Therefore, UNITA could potentially form a buffer between 
_nprthern Namibia and a hostile Angolan government or, alternatively, create further 
p;oblems for South Africa ~ continuing to su1wort SWAPO. UNITA's military 
weakness placed Pretoria in an advantageous bargaining position (21 ). Indeed, 
Savimbi was not slow in approaching South Africa for assistance upon realizing how 
decisively the MPLA was being strengthened by Soviet aid (Barber and Barratt, 
1990: 190-1 91 ) . 
3.7.2 When Did South Africa Actually Intervene: 
South Africa's first reported entry into Angola was at the end of August 1975 for 
the stated purpose of defending the joint Cunene River hydro-electric project. The 
SADF entered Angola to occupy and defend the dam site following clashes between 
the MPLA and UNITA and the alleged harassment of workers. As stated in Endnote 
17, from an admission made in Parliament it is evident that South Africa must have 
actually moved its forces across the border prior to August. Minister of Defence, P.W. 
Botha, stated in Parliament that "from 14 July 1975 to 23 January 1976" South Africa's 
total casualties in Angola consisted of 29 killed in action and 14 killed in accidents. 
This account was collaborated by Jonas Savimbi: "South Africa, for some reasons of 
its own, invaded southern Angola in July 1975" (Legum, 1976:36). 
3. 7.3 Protection of Ruacana Falls Hydro Electric Facility From SWAPO: 
Regardless, Pretoria claimed it informed the Portuguese Government in mid-
August, that in accordance with the SA-Portuguese agreement guaranteeing water 
supplies, a patrol numbering 30 would be moved to the Calueque pumping station. 
Botha maintained the troops were sent to protect South African workers at the Ruacana 
Falls hydro-electric scheme "who feared they would become involved in fighting 
between rival Angolan nationalist groups" adding that this action was taken only after 
the Portuguese had failed to provide the requested protection. 
o In September, between 800 and 1 000 SADF troops with armed helicopters 
moved approximately 40 kilometres across the border and occupied Ongiva and 
Rocadas. This action was justified as retaliation for an earlier SWAPO attack of an 
SADF camp on the SWA/Namibian side of the border with "Russian made rockets." 
Botha claimed at this time that "our troops are at strategic points along our borders but 
we do not interfere in the affairs of others." This statement, however, was soon 
qualified with the explanation that South Africa's policy of non-interference did not 
extend to "terrorist attacks." This qualification soon served as the prelude to a number 
of SADF attacks inflicting heavy casualties on SWAPO. Neto, at that time, criticised 
Portugal for its failure to protest against South Africa's entry, a remark which Portugal's 
President called "slanderous." Also in September 1975, an MPLA spokesperson 
expressed fears, which in the next month would prove prophetic, that South Africa was 
not simply planning to defend the Cunene River installations (Legum, 1976:36). 
The intervention of close to 2 000 SADF troops with armoured cars dramatically 
shifted the military balance on the southern front. The South Africans mounted an 
operation from a staging base at Runtu, SWA/Namibia. A motorised force of Bushmen, 
some of whom had previously fought for the Portuguese, with a group of Portuguese 
officers and approximately 1 000 followers of Chipenda, crossed into Angola at 
Cuangar. Led by a South African commander, with a handful of South African officers 
and technicians, the column swiftly dislodged MPLA forces from Pereira· de Eca. 
Moving on to Rocadas it was joined by South African units, including twenty armoured 
cars and a platoon of 81-mm mortars, as well as by a small band of Portuguese recruits 
(Marcum, 1978:269, Bridgland, 1986:145). 
Air supplied, and accompanied by helicopter gun ships, the column had forced 
.the MPLA out of Sa da Bandeira by 26 October. By the end of the month, the pe,rt of 
Mocamedes had fallen and,· in the first week of November, the SADF column drove the 
MPLA out of Benguela and Lobito 640 kilometres north of the Namibian border and, 12 
November, South Africa captured Novo Redondo a port 275 kilometres south of 
Luanda. These major military setbacks for the MPLA were only to be reversed some 
weeks after independence following the arrival of massive Soviet arms shipments and 
thousands more Cuban troops (Hodges, 1976:56, Bridgland, 1986: 145). 
~-7.4 Strategic Reasons for Direct Intervention, 23 October 1975: 
South Africa's reasons for risking a large-scale intervention commencing 23 
October are of a different nature from their earlier relatively small scale interventions 
in pursuit of SWAPO. P.W. Botha, then Minister of Defence, explained South African 
motivations thus: "South Africa is playing a limited role in Angola because Russia is 
involved in a campaign of militaristic imperialism in that country ... We were prepared 
to leave it to the ~le of Angola to solve their own problems, but the Russians 
interfered becaus~Jb~~want to control the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope 
and because they_want te> exploit the wealth of Angola." Relying on a similar line of '. 
argument, Vorster said t~e ~9Yl~!JJni9n intended to have "a string of Marxist States 
across Africa from A..ngola to Tanzania. This would have serious consequences not ,, 
only for South Africa but for States such as Zaire and Zambia, and the Westerr:, world" 
(Legum, 1976:37). 
Further, Vorster warned that if the Soviet Union through "the left-wing MPLA 
established a permanent presence in Angola, it would stand astdd.albe Cape sea 
route." In a subsequent interview, after having described the variety of Russian 
weaponry introduced into Angola, Vorster remarked "Only big powers can offset this 
I 
arsenal, above all the 122-mm rockets. It is certainly beyond our limits" (Legum, 
1976:37). 
The dominant theme of politicians and the pro-government press was that ~ 
Africa was fighting "the battle for the West" and the West was letting South Africa down 
as well as ignoring their own best interests. Vorster appealed publicly for greater 
Western involvement "to save the war-torn country [Angola] from communism. Apart 
from protecting the substantial interests of the Ovambo people in the Cunene River 
scheme, our only involvement is that of the free world." The South African press 
s_.ompared the magnitude of the security threat in Angola to the Cuban Missile Crisis of 
1962. Accordingly, South African leaders called upon the West not to "leave South 
Africa in the lurch in the struggle against the advancing forces of international 
communism" (Legum, 1976:37). 
3.7.5 OAU Indecision And Eventual Recognition of the MPLA Government: 
As previously stated in Section 3.2, Independence Day witnessed the 
proclamation of two rival Governments. The OAU refused to admit either government 
to its ranks, instead calling for a cease-fire between the factions and the establishment 
of a Government of National Unity. On the eve of independence, official OAU policy 
had come under increasing fire as African member states learned, after weeks of 
denials, that South African troops had entered the war on the side of UNITA and the 
FNLA. The Nigerian Government announced its recognition of the MPLA regime, 27 r 
November, citing South Africa's role as its reason (22). Tanzania followed in extending 
recognition to the MPLA regime, 5 December, also citing the SADF intervention. Early 
in the new year several other African nations followed suit. An emergency Summit of 
the OAU called to debate the Angolan crisis, 10-13 January, was evenly split: 22. 
r, 
nations supported recognition of the MPLA regime and 22 maintained a stance in 
favour of a cease-fire and the formation of a Government of National Unity. Ethiopia 
and Uganda abstained and the Summit ended in deadlock (Hodges, 1976:56, 
Bridgland, 1986:162, Jaster, 1988:74). 
Nonetheless, in the wake of the MPLA's territorial gains early in 1976, official 
recognition quickly followed. By the beginning of February 1976, twenty five African 
states recognised the People's Republic of Angola (PRA). The OAU Council of 
Ministers accepted the MPLA's military supremacy and decided, 11 February 1976, to 
recognise the PRA as the legal government. Only Zaire protested openly, calling the 
decision "illegal." Zambia did not extend formal recognition but stated "In our view, the 
MPLA victory is not really theirs. It is a Soviet-Cuban victory." The EC nations 
extended recognition, mid February, and Portugal followed suit, 22 February. By that 
time over seventy nations had recognised the MPLA regime (Hodges, 1976:58, Legum, 
1976:32). 
3.7.6 SADF Intervention Legitimated Soviet and Cuban Involvement: 
The entry of South African forces into the war, 23 October, and the resultant 
turn-about in the military fortunes of the MPLA prompted the Soviet Union to escalate 
arms supplies and Cuba to send thousands of troops. As a result, by mid-January 
1976, the MPLA was reported to be supported by 9 000 Cuban troops, 6 500 
Katangese gendarmes and 400 Russian advisers. The South African intervention had ',. 
clearly backfired ~rom~ting many: OAU members to recognise MPLA and legitimizing, 
iQ the eyes of manY, the MPLA's use of Cuban troop~ and Soviet arms (Hodges, 
1976:57-58). 
These developments allowed the MPLA to reverse the military situation that had 
existed at the end of November 1975. Despite South Africa's string of earlier military 
successes, the SADF was overwhelmed by their new and changed circumstances. 
By 20 November the SADF advance from the south had been effectively halted on the 
Queve River. As the SADF and UNITA columns moved north in November and 
December they encountered stiffening resistance from MPLA forces and from the 
Cubans whose forces probably numbered roughly 3000 by late November (Hodges, 
1976:58, Jaster, 1988:73, Bridgland, 1986:148-150). 
This shift in the military balance was demonstrated when the MPLA began a 
major offensive in December against the FNLA's positions in the north. By 5 December 
the MPLA claim'ed it had driven the FNLA out of Caxito and was moving towards 
Ambriz. Advancing into the Bakongo heartland, the MPLA announced. 5 January 1976 
that its forces had captured the strategic FNLA air-base at Negage and the city of Uige. 
Then, 12 January, the MPLA went on to seize Ambriz and the FNLA's defence 
collapsed. An ill-prepared, last-ditch effort to defend these cities by British and other 
mercenaries ended in disaster (Hodges, 1976:58, Bridgland, 1986:148-150). 
3.7.7 Military Gains by MPLA Early 1976: 
Following the MPLA's gains in the north in January 1976 the MPLA turned its 
attentions to UNITA in the south. South Africa, deciding to cut its political losses and 
avoid confrontation with the MPLA, pulled its troops out of the front line, and let UNITA 
fend for itself. P.W. Botha announced, 4 February, that SADF troops had been 
withdrawn to a 50 kilometres deep "cordon sanitaire" on the Angolan side of the 
border. The MPLA's southern offensive began at the end of January and by mid 
February the battle was effectively over (Hodges, 1976:58). 
3.7.8 Political Repercussions of SADF Intervention: 
Colin Legum postulates that "for South Africa, the Angolan affair was possibly 
the most traumatic in its history since the Anglo-Boer war at the turn of the century." 
Regardless of whether such an assertion is accurate, a number of negative 
repercussions followed South Africa's ill-fated intervention in the Angolan civil war. 
Perhaps the worst result, from Pretoria's point of view, was that the Vorster regime 
failed to achieve precisely the goal for which it had committed its army: creating the 
necessary leverage to force the withdrawal of the combined Russian and Cuban 
presence. If anythin,9, South African involvement leg_itimized the intervention of the. 
Soyiet Union and Cuba as well as increas_ing the MPLA's level of popular support in the 
rest of Africa (23). The Angolan enterprise left the apartheid regime with little 
consolation and, instead, served to boost the morale of South Africa's internal 
opponents (Legum, 1976:38, Menon, 1986:135). 
3. 7.8.1 Political Liability of Having South Africa as an Ally: 
The Vorster regime had miscalculated by underestimating the political liability 
of having Pretoria as an ally, if seriously expecting the West to support openly South 
African actions in Angola. While the precise nature of South Africa's relationship with 
the United States is unclear, and the subject of great controversy, there is no evidence 
of any Western nations openly responding to South Africa's invitation. The two states 
exchanged intelligence and coordinated some of their actions in the field but South 
Africa made its own decision to become involved in Angola and did not do so explicitly 
in response to pressure from the United States (24). There is, however, evidence to 
support South Africa's claims that they were encouraged to intervene by a number of 
' 
African states to prevent a "Soviet-Cuban victory" (Legum, 1976:37, Bridgland, 
1986:19). 
What seems probable is that some Angolan leaders and some African leaders 
encouraged South Africa to intervene. South Africa responded and Vorster may have 
envisaged one of two scenarios: that the SADF would win a rapid "blitzkrieg" victory 
enabling them to withdraw their forces immediately after the capture of Luanda or, 
alternatively, that South Africa would receive U.S. aid if the Cuban-led attacks could be 
halted long enough for the Ford Administration to obtain Congressional support for 
intervention (25). However, these probable scenarios envisaged by Pretoria never 
materialized (26). 
South Africa's decision to fntervene demonstrated that the expectation of having 
any Western nation identify openly with the Republic would be unrealistic and would 
defy the reality of an isolated and internationally ostracized regime. Marcum argues 
American policy, above all, failed completely to realize the negative implications of 
dealing with South Africa in terms of African politics. The greater the dependence of 
the United States on tacit cooperation with South Africa to stem Soviet involvement, the 
more the United States opened the way to Soviet intervention by removing any risk of 
united African opposition (27) (Legum, 1976:38, Marcum, 1976:421, Menon, 1986: 135-
138). 
3.8 Soviet Involvement: 
The Soviet decision to become involved in Angola emanated from a number of 
policies which have been applied to Sub-Saharan Africa with some consistency. Soviet 
aims generally fall into categories that endeavour to, firstly; enhance the USSR's 
strategic position specifically by gaining access to African port and air facilities, 
secondly; seek political influence by supporting "progressive" movements, particularly 
those that fight wars of liberation, and thirdly; undermine American, Western 
European, and Chinese influence in the region while in the long term hoping to acquire 
access to strategic minerals and other resources. While the Soviet decision to 
intervene appeared to be consistent with these goals Angola nonetheless represented 
a significant departure from traditional Soviet policies. Instead of the usual deliberate 
cautiousness that characterised previous efforts abroad, Soviet actions in Angola were 
representative of a far more assertive and aggressive policy (28). 
3.8.1 An Improbable Locus for Superpower Collision: 
According to John Marcum, Angola was an improbable locus for superpower 
collision. Indeed, the Angolan civil war marked the Soviet Union's debut as a major 
power in Africa (29). Although the Soviet Union had previously been involved as a 
supplier of arms in African conflicts, never had Soviet arms shipments to any African 
nation reached the massive levels that were attained in Angola. Nor had this number 
of Cuban combat troops ever directly intervened in a third world conflict as Soviet proxy 
forces (Porter, 1984:147, Marcum, 1976:407). 
From the Soviet point of view, it seems likely that the Angolan conflict was seen 
as an opportunity to maintain the strategic and diplomatic momentum that had been 
acquired with the Communist victory in Vietnam. A massive Soviet-Cuban force in Sub-
, Saharan African would have been inconceivable only a few years earlier and highly 
unlikely even a year earlier prior to the fall of Saigon. However, Hanoi's conquest of 
the south, by stirring isolationist sentiment in the USA, created the very conditions 
which made Soviet involvement in the Angolan conflict both feasible and ultimately 
successful (30). Furthermore, the victories of Vietnam and Angola allowed Brezhnev 
to enjoy the twenty-fifth party congress in February 1976 accompanied with accolades 
for foreign policy successes (Porter, 1984: 147). 
3.8.2 Soviet Arms Shipments: 
Bruce Porter divides Soviet arms deliveries into three_ distinct stages. The first 
arms shipments took place in August 197 4 and began reaching the MPLA, via Dar es 
Salaam and Brazzaville, in October (31 ). The second delivery stage began in March 
1975 when Moscow substantially increased the value of weaponry destined for Angola. 
Porter contends that these deliveries were initiated most likely in response to signs the 
Alvor Agreement was disintegrating as opposed to Colin Legum's assertion that Soviet 
escalation was a competitive response to the PRC's modest effort to aid the FNLA. It 
is important to note Soviet arms were already en route before the FNLA attacks on the 
MPLA in Luanda and Caxito in March 1975 and were, therefore, probably unrelated to 
the FNLA's receipt of Chinese support. The impact of Soviet arms deliveries, in March 
and April 1975, gave the MPLA a decisive military advantage and, by late August, 
resulted in their control over the majority of Angola. 
The third major acceleration of Soviet arms shipments commenced, in October 
1975, after the launch of South Africa's "Operation Zulu" and the resultant decline in-
MPLA fortunes. At this stage the Soviet Union initiated an extensive airlift of 
sophisticated weapons systems. What had previously been a flow became a flood with 
the bulk of heavy weapons, such as tanks, arriving in this third period (32). Between 
November 1975 and March 1976 seventy flights by An-22 cargo planes and 19 ships 
discharged weapons including T-34 and T-54 tanks, MiG-21 fighters, and large 
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quantities of 122-mm rockets which devastated the unsophisticated opposing forces of 
the FNLA and UNITA. By February 1976 it was estimated by the CIA that the value of 
the weaponry sent by Moscow to its MPLA clients and Cuban allies had reached $US 
400 million (Porter, 1984: 159-64, Bridgland, 1986: 149). 
3.8.3 Soviet Contribution Turns the Tide in Favour of the MPLA: 
Immediately prior to independence the MPLA was in a beleaguered military 
position with the SADF advancing towards the capital and the FNLA only just held off 
in the north. The arrival of Cuban troops, combined with Soviet arms shipments, 
was sufficient to turn the tide which had flowed against the MPLA after South Africa's 
intervention. The South Africans found themselves greatly outgunned and 
outnumbered in both tanks and soldiers and were unwilling to commit the forces 
necessary to match the Cuban presence with their abundant stocks of Soviet weapons. 
Moscow provided everything necessary for the MPLA victory and, for good measure, 
added weapons little used and not even needed such as the MiG-21 fighters (Porter, 
1984:162, Somerville, 1986:45, Garcia Marquez, 1977:128, Stockwell, 1978:231-232). 
The Soviets proudly admit their contribution was decisive in averting a South 
African blitzkrieg from succeeding against the MPLA. In addition, the airlift was 
coordinated with the transfer of thousands of Cuban combat troops possessing 
sufficient expertise to use the sophisticated weapons effectively. In the period, 9-24 
December, the Soviet airlift halted entirely, evidently, in response to an American 
diplomatic initiative. The Cubans followed suit. However, this brief hiatus did not last 
long and was, at any rate, of little military importance as the MPLA-Cuban forces were 
already amply equipped for waging an offensive which they continued throughout that 
period unhampered. By January 1976 the FNLA had been defeated in northern Angola 
and by February the SADF had withdrawn across the border into SWA/Namibia 
(Legum, 1976:20, Somerville, 1986:45, Garcia Marquez, 1977: 128, Stockwell, 
1978:231-232). 
, Having blunted the South African advance the Soviets were then able to use 
South Africa's intervention to their advantage. Although the Soviet Union's justification 
for Soviet involvement in Angola was patently self-serving, after recognition was 
extended to the fledgling MPLA government 11 November, the Soviet Union could 
claim it was not in any way intervening (Marcum, 1976:417, Bridgland, 1976:149). 
Rather, the Soviet Union was aiding a legitimate government in its defence against 
foreign intervention by imperialist powers. An Izvestia article laid out this position in 
accordance with other Soviet press articles at the time: 
The Western Press is trying to present matters as though a civil war were 
underway or continuing in Angola. In fact, there can be no question of 
any civil war in Angola. Foreign military intervention is being undertaken 
against the young republic's legal government employing, as a cover-up, 
misled Angolans under the influence of factional groups. The 
unquestionable aim of this intervention is to overthrow the legal 
government of ... Angola (Porter, 1984:154). 
3-.9 The Cuban Role: 
According to Jorge Dominguez, Cuba's foreign policy can be seen as reflecting 
a relatively clear hierarchy of objectives, as follows, in descending order: firstly; 
survival of the revolutionary government, secondly; economic development, thirdly; 
influence over governments, fourthly; influence over the Left, and finally; support of 
revolution. Despite variations throughout the 1960s and 1970s in individual policies 
this pattern has remained consistent. A persistent characteristic of Cuban foreign 
policy was that it operated under Soviet hegemony. Essentially, so long as the Soviet 
Union acted at the guarantor and primary supporter of Cuba's internal development, it 
was in the position to set the permissible boundaries for Cuban behaviour in the foreign 
policy arena (Dominguez, 1978:88). 
3.9.1 Cuba's Ideological Motivations: 
The global thrust of Castro's foreign policy was ideological in nature. The 
collective experience of the Cuban leadership as guerrillas in the 1950s demonstrated 
the importance of support from abroad. After 1959 substantial assistance ~as received 
not only from the Soviet Union but from other eastern bloc nations as well as China. 
/ 
This history strengthened the ideology of the Cuban leadership which carries an 
obligation, in the name of "internationalist solidarity," to support their allies as others 
had supported the Cuban revolutionaries in their time of need. The target of Cuban 
ideology was to oppose the American led forces of "imperialism" wherever those forces 
are weak. Jorge Dominguez succinctly encapsulates the utility portended by Cuban 
intervention in the Angolan episode: 
The Angolan war, then, was well related to Cuba's long-standing policy 
goals. Without threatening the survival of the Cuban government, it 
increased Cuban international influence over governments and over the 
Left. It promoted the spread of revolutionary regimes while it 
consolidated the alliance with the Soviet Union. This was the first time 
in two decades of revolutionary rule when all of these goals could be 
achieved simultaneously (Dominguez, 1978:98). 
As part of its ideological portfolio, Cuba had a long-standing African policy which 
included an effort to diversify political and diplomatic relations, promote trade, and 
provide elements of military assistance whenever appropriate. As early as 1959, · 
Ernesto "Che" Guevara established links with the Front for the National Liberation of 
Algeria then based in Cairo. In 1963, a few Cuban troops performed in logistical 
support roles in Algeria's fight with Morocco. Close ties were also established with the 
anti-Portuguese liberation movements and, in particular, between Guevara and Amilcar 
Cabral who led the revolution in Guinea-Bissau. By the mid 1960s, Cuba's long 
association with Congo (Brazzaville) was underway. Cuban interest in anti-colonial 
guerrilla fighting against the Portuguese developed partially for ideological reasons and 
partially for the purpose of acquiring greater political influence (33) (Dominguez, 
1978:94). 
3.9.2 Cuban Military Support: 
Cuban support for the MPLA was not a novel development but the latest 
instalment of an ongoing continuum, the military component of which can generally be 
broken down into five stages. The Cubaris firstly; trained and armed the MPLA in the 
Congo and Cuba, secondly; provided advisors for the MPLA within Angola, thirdly; 
established military training centres in four Angolan locations, and fifthly; dispatched 
intact military units for combat alongside the MPLA. Cuba's combat role in the war was 
much greater than originally anticipated and Edward Gonzalez, a specialist in Cuban 
foreign policy, states that "after Havana's initial decision to commit troops, the increase 
in Cuba's involvement was essentially incremental and reactive." Indeed, Cuba's initial 
involvement was similar in scope to previous revolutionary roles in Africa, such as in 
Guinea-Bissau, for example. However, the South African intervention led Cuba to 
substantially escalate its support for the MPLA as of 5 November 1975 with the official 
advent of Operation Carlota (34) (Klinghoffer, 1990:111, Jaster, 1988:73). 
The earliest account of Cuban relations with the MPLA followed a May 1975 
meeting between Cuban Commandant Flagio Bravo and Agostinho Neto in Brazzaville. 
According to Gabriel Garcia Marquez, a Colombian novelist with close ties to Castro, 
"Neto requested help with shipment of arms and asked about the possibility of further 
more specific aid." Neto was particularly interested in the prospect of having Cuban 
military instructors sent. The MPLA made a formal request for aid, 16 July 1975 after 
which Cuba escalated its assistance. Garcia Marquez states that the first delegation 
of civilian instructors, led by Raul Diaz Arguelles, arrived in Luanda three months later 
in August. This is in accordance with Castro's later claim that there was not a single 
Cuban instructor in Angola until August (Porter, 1984:5, Garcia Marquez, 1977:124). 
In September, troop-carrying merchant-ships embarked for Angola and, 
according to Jorge Dominguez, "sometime between 20 August and 5 September 1975 
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the chiefs of the three armies and of the air 
force, and other vice ministers of the Armed Forces Ministry were temporarily relieved 
of their posts." They soon appeared in Angola and were only returned to their posts 
close to full year later. Then, 4 October, the first Cuban troop ship El Vietnam Heroico 
arrived at Peurto Amboim. · The El Coral Island docked, 7 October, and La Plata 
discharged at Peurta Negra, 11 October. Troops were also airlifted to the Congo and 
transported to Angola by sea. Roughly 1 000 Cuban troops were present in Angola by 
mid-October 1975. The Cubans immediately established four training centres at 
Delatando, Benguela, Henrique de Carvalho, and Cabinda (Porter, 1984:6, Klinghoffer, 
1980:111, Jaster, 1988:73, Garcia Marquez, 1977:124-125). 
3.9.2.1 SADF Attack on Cuban Training Camp at Benguela: 
On 3 November, a South African ·column attacked the Cuban training camp at 
Benguela. According to Castro, it was this attack at which Cubans first perished in 
Angola that led to the decision to send combat troops to assist the MPLA. Castro 
states that "on November 5 the Revolutionary Government of Cuba decided to send the 
first military units to Angola; to support the MPLA" (35). The effort was given the 
symbolic name of "Operation Carlota" after a black slave who led a Cuban uprising in 
1843. 
It began with the arrival of a reinforced battalion of special forces, 650 elite 
fighters from the Ministry of the Interior. The first contingent of 82 men, dressed in 
civilian clothes and carrying luggage full of small arms, left Havana 7 November. The 
' 
next day three ships departed, carrying an artillery regiment, and arrived in Angola 27 
November. Separate Cuban units began operating for the first time. Between 7 
November and 9 December, a total of 70 air trips from Havana to Luanda were made 
with stops in Barbados, Guinea-Bissau and Congo. In the period 9 - 24 December all 
flights were discontinued as were Soviet arms shipments, in response to American 
overtures, and appears to indicate close coordination between Havana and Moscow 
(Klinghoffer, 1980: 112, Porter, 1984: 166, Bridgland, 1986: 148). 
3.9.2.2 Cuban Air Conveys Re-Commence Post Clark Amendment: 
After this brief hiatus came to an end Cuban flights resumed with some difficulty · 
because Barbados had, in the meantime, denied landing rights to the Cubans. Due to 
such difficulties, in obtaining landing rights to refuel, a number of transport planes were 
modified with supplemental gasoline tanks which allowed non-stop flights from Holguin 
to Brazzaville but with a reduced number of passengers. Most of the transport planes 
used by the Cubans were Air Cubana planes of Soviet manufacture. In early January 
1976 the Soviet Union dispatched two 11-62 transport planes to Havana to assist the 
ailing aircraft. Castro later acknowledged that the USSR "collaborated with our efforts 
when imperialism had cut off practically all our air routes in Africa" (Porter, 1984:167, 
Garcia Marquez, 1977: 131 ) . 
Converted cargo ships also carried soldiers to Angola. Indeed, Garcia Marquez 
wrote that they usually were crowded well beyond their intended capacity and that at 
one time as many as 15 Cuban vessels were en route to Angola. The Cuban 
expeditionary force expanded rapidly and, by late April 1976, there were an estimated 
15 000-20 000 thousand Cubans in Angola (36). If anything, this estimation is low as 
a result of the consistent under-estimation of Cuban military strengths by Western 
intelligence agencies prior to 1976. Furthermore, more individual Cubans served in 
Angola than even the highest approximations reveal due to a policy of rotating troops 
between Angola and Cuba during the war (Porter, 1984: 168, Garcia Marquez, 
1977: 131-132). 
// 
3.10 The Importance of South Africa's Internal Milieux: South African Politics, 
Decision-Making Structures, Personalities and Organisations: 
3.10.1 Introduction: 
As stated in Section· 1.5.2, this chapter may have more appropriately been 
called the "Multiplicity of Intervention by External Actors." Indeed, due to the 
overwhelming degree of superpower intervention in the 1975-1976 period, the second 
paradigm or body of literature is of less relevance in explaining South African actions 
in Angola. Hence, causation in terms of the militarization of South African society, 
leadership personalities, the internal decision-making structures, and other domestic 
influences are of less importance. This conclusion is supported by the overwhelming 
evidence to the contrary presented in the preceding discussion of Chapter Two. There 
is, however, a notable exception to this assessment of the 1975-1976 time period. 
3.10.2 The Importance of Bureaucratic Rivalry: 
With direct implications in terms of SADF intervention in Angola, Kenneth 
' 
Grundy identifies the eclipsing of the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) by other 
governmental departments and agencies even on decisions directly related to foreign 
policy. This displacement began under the leadership of B.J. Vorster with the rise of 
the Bureau of State Security (BOSS) and the Department of Information with the 
associated personalities of General van den Bergh and Connie Mulder, respectively. 
The DFA, in terms of bureaucratic manipulation, was outmanoeuvred and later 
outflanked even further by elements of the defence establishment. According to 
Grundy, as well as Barber and Barratt, it came as no surprise as the Angolan civil war 
unfolded that Hilgard Muller, then Foreign Minister, would take a back seat while more 
forceful personalities would take control! (Barber and Barratt, 1990: 192). 
Philip Frankel likewise maintains that the bureaucratic dialectic between the 
military approach, versus the DFA's political approach to foreign policy decisions, 
proved critical in shaping South Africa's responses and policy towards Angola and 
SWA/Namibia. Frankel argues, in both cases, military leaders with access to central 
decision-making institutions had gained the ascendant in contrast to the OF A and its 
greater appreciation of inherent political considerations. 
The notable exception to the military's dominance of the South Africa state's 
decision-making apparatus was the decision to withdraw from the Angolan conflict in 
January 1976. In this specific instance, BOSS and DFA were able to impose the view 
on B.J. Vorster that a continued South African presence north of the Cunene would do 
incalculable harm to South Africa's image and interests in the West. The military 
hierarchy, in contrast, had wanted to continue to aid the FNLA and UNITA (Grundy, 
1986:90, Frankel, 1984: 150). 
The South African military leadership did, however, appreciate that little could 
be gained by committing more South African troops without more tangible Western 
support. When the South African leadership realised that Western assistance would 
not be forthcoming (in reference to the Clark Amendment) SADF leaders were willing, 
perhaps reluctantly, to pull back to more defensive positions. Also cited as contributing 
to this decision is the realisation that what had been a bush war had become more like 
a conventional war requiring a similarly costly commitment (Grundy, 1986:88-90). 
( 3.11 The Importance of the Global Order: 
As previously stated, the overwhelming extent of super power,intervention would 
appear to vindicate the utility of nee-realist system level theory in the 1975-1976 period 
(37). At the height of the Cold War era during which time the world order was defined 
by allegiance to one or the other super powers, Soviet and Cuban involvement in a 
regional conflict would have attracted American competition for influence. Under 
normal circumstances, UNITA, in all likelihood, would have received greater American 
backing and military support in an effort to counteract Soviet an'd Cuban influence in 
the region. 
This, however, was not to be the case as discussed in Sections 3.6.3, 3.6.3.1, 
3.6.3.2 and 3.6.3.3. The increasingly isolationist climate of opinion in Washington, 
following U.S. troop withdrawal from Vietnam and the Watergate Scandal, culminated 
in the Senate passage of the Clark Amendment banning U.S. aid to any Angolan party. 
Originally adopted for one year in December 1975, the ban was extended in 1976 and 
efforts to repeal it failed in 1977-1978. The 19 December 1975 Senate vote in favour 
of the Clark Amendment proved a disaster because its timing was so inopportune. As 
stated in Section 3.6.3.4, the situation in Angola was still fluid at the time of the vote 
whose passage acted as the equivalent of a green light to Soviet intervention and that 
of their proxy state. 
General Geldenhuys, for example, clearly identified the Clark Amendment as the 
major turning point. According to Geldenhuys, "The turning point of the war that led to 
the withdrawal of the South African troops was the new law passed by the American 
Congress forbidding military support to any Angolan Party ... The South African position 
was that it was not prepared to protect Western interests alone." He further states: "By 
27 March 1976 the last troops of Operation Savannah had ~lready withdrawn from 
Angola via Ruacana ... had the Americans kept up their pressure against Russian 
intervention, the result might easily have been some form of neutral government in 
Angola" (Geldenhuys, 1995:54,58). 
Rajan Menon asserts that the Soviets and Cubans escalated their involvement 
because it was obvious American influence in the region was waning. Once this 
became apparent, with the passage of the Clark Amendment, the Soviet and Cuban 
presence could increase without serious risk of provoking a major super power 
confrontation (Menon, 1986: 136). 
Furthermore, the entry of South African forces into the war and the resultant 
turn-about in the military fortunes of the MPLA prompted the Soviet Union to escalate 
arms supplies and Cuba to send thousands of troops. £4.s stated in Endnote 23 of this 
chapter, "For the USSR, Cuba, and the MPLA, South Africa's intervention was a 
godsend. In the eyes of most black African leaders, the FNLA and UNITA had 
committed an unpardonable ·sin by joining forces with South Africa. While a number 
of them had criticised Soviet-Cuban involvement in the Angolan civil war, their 
unhappiness about this was now displaced by their anger over South African 
intervention. This boosted the political fortunes of the MPLA" (Menon, 1986: 135). 
~oubt, the MPLA's victory ~X the end of Februa!'Y. 1976 had been lal"~Y 
brought about by the increas~aY-ailqpili.t}LoLS.Qviet aon.s_Jmd. Cuban soldiers. As 
" 
stated in Section 3.7.4, South Africa, independently, and without crucial American 
support did not constitute an effective deterrent to Soviet and Cuba escalation. In 
accordance with a nee-realist perspective, in the face of an overwhelming Soviet 
military commitment and Cuban troop presence, and without crucial American support, 
South Africa consequently withdrew from Angola. 
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER THREE: 
(1) General Jannie Geldenhuys took over from General Constand Viljoen as the Chief 
of the Army in November 1980 and became Chief of the Defence Force in November 
1985. He recognised regional conflicts such as Angola's had to be seen against the 
backdrop of the cold war conditions which prevailed internationally (Geldenhuys, 
1995:51 ). . 
(2) The Portuguese coup was carried out by disillusioned army officers many of whom 
had fought in Portugal's colonial wars. The high casualties among the armed forces 
in Portugal's colonial conflicts (10 000 dead and 30 000 wounded) had created 
disenchantment within army ranks. The public was also disenchanted as the economy 
was suffering due to the government's enormous expenditure on far-flung military 
campaigns (Somerville, 1986:40, Marcum, 1978:241 ). 
(3) General Geldenhuys asserts that Portugal, due to internal problems, either "could 
not or would not really exert its influence during the transitional period" (Geldenhuys, 
1995:51 ). 
According to the editor of the Angola Report "There is no excuse for the manner in 
which decolonisation took place, namely a complete abdication by the Portuguese ... 
The already very difficult situation in Angola was damned from the very moment when 
the provisional [transitional] government under Rosa Coutinho allowed the 
movements into Luanda without giving up their arms. People who had no political 
experience were allowed to play politics with their fingers on the triggers of 
Kalashnikovs" (Bridgland, 1986: 132). 
(4) According to Fred Bridgland, this alliance was urged upon reluctant partners by the 
CIA and other covert partners. It was an unnatural alliance and, indeed, Savimbi 
quickly expressed reservations about it. The DPRA was to comprise nine ministers 
from each of the movements with two nominated prime ministers holding office in 
alternate months. However, within a month of forming their coalition government, the 
FNLA and UNITA were fighting each other with as much vigour as they had the 
MPLA. 
Bridgland states "The DPRA failed to gain recognition from anywhere, whereas the 
South African intervention had the effect of legitimising Soviet and Cuban support for 
the MPLA" (Bridgland, 1986: 151 ). The subject of the SADF intervention legitimating 
greater Soviet and Cuban involvement is discussed in greater detail in Section 3.7.6. 
(5) George Modelski likewise maintains the semantics of labelling are based on 
expediency and advises the following: "As a general rule, those who wish to bring 
about the internationalisation of a violent conflict find it desirable to call it an external 
war; their opponents, on the other hand, may wish to isolate the conflict and for that 
reason may prefer to describe it as internal war" (Klinghoffer, 1989:6). 
(6) In 1969 the MPLA attended a Soviet sponsored meeting in Khartoum the name of 
which was the "International Conference in Support of the Liberation Movements in the 
Portuguese Colonies and Southern Africa." The MPLA's attendance confirmed its 
status as the favoured faction of the Soviet Union in Angola. It also enabled the MPLA 
to join an alliance with other liberation movements which was instrumental in allowing 
the ANC, SWAPO and ZAPU to set up training camps in Angola and in allowing 
SWAPO to use southern Angola as a base from which in infiltrate SWA/Namibia 
(Somerville, 1986:36). 
(7) Agostinho Neto was president of the MPLA from 1962 to 1979. In response to his 
election as MPLA president in December 1962 three factions developed within MPLA 
ranks. Firstly, Viriato da Cruz was, due to" differences with Neto, removed as secretary 
general of the MPLA. After his split became final he led a breakaway faction attempting 
to join the FNLA. Secondly, Mario de Andrade was the driving force behind the 
creation of the Revolta Activa (Active Revolt) faction, which was mesticos dominated, 
in opposition to Neto's personalised methods of leadership. He was soon joined by his 
brother, Joaquim Pinto de Andrade, who had been the MPLA's honourary president 
while in detention. Thirdly, the commander of the eastern front had become a potent 
threat to Neto's leadership. Daniel Chipenda had military autonomy, operating out of 
Lusaka rather than Brazzaville, and had the support of most Lunda, Chokwe and 
Ovimbundu party members. The three MPLA factions were temporarily reconciled in 
Lusaka, Zambia in June 197 4 but disunity was soon evident. In the end, unity 
continued to prove elusive and Chipenda opened an office in Kinshasa, Zaire in 
. October 197 4. Two months later he was formally expelled from the MPLA although the 
Active Revolt faction remained within the movement (Klinghoffer, 1980: 11-12, Marcum, 
1976:411-12). 
(8) The MPLA took part in the anti-colonial uprising, in Luanda, in February 1961. 
Although abortive, it essentially marked the beginning of the national liberation 
struggle. After their expulsion from Leopoldville, Zaire in November 1963, MPLA 
headquarters were transferred to Brazzaville, Congo. While centred in Brazzaville the 
MPLA maintained an additional office in Dar es Salaam from 1964. The MPLA's 
military prospects were boosted in May 1966 when an eastern front was opened in 
Zambia. As a result, the MPLA finally had direct land access to Angola. Daniel 
Chipenda, an Ochimbundu, commanded the eastern front where he enjoyed some 
success. When the Congo placed restrictions on MPLA activity in Brazzaville, in 1968, 
they then established another headquarters in Lusaka. Hence, by the late 1960s, the 
MPLA had major offices in three centres: Brazzaville, Congo, Dar es Salaam, Tanzania 
and Lusaka, Zambia (Klinghoffer, 1980: 11, Somerville, 1986:30-33). 
(9) Savimbi, having visited Peking and been received by Mao Tse-tung in 1964, 
adopted a highly self reliant strategy which emulated the Chinese. Once the colonial 
regime collapsed, however, UNITA promptly dropped its Maoist affiliation and adopted 
a more conciliatory posture which was deemed appropriate for the changed 
circumstances (Marcum, 1976:411 ). 
(10) After the outbreak of fighting in 1961 up to 400 000 Bakongo war refugees poured 
across the border and joined other ethnic Bakongos in Zaire. Added to the already 
sizeable population of these transplanted Angolans, long attracted northward by the 
favourable economic and social conditions of the former Belgian Congo, these refugees 
effectively constituted a transplanted political constituency (Marcum, 1976:410). 
(11) With regard to the FNLA's dominant ethnic affiliation, Immanuel Wallerstein states 
"the problem of the MPLA was to enlarge its base vertically in terms of popular support. · 
The problem of the FNLA was to widen its base horizontally in terms of ethnic support" 
(Klinghoffer, 1980:12-13). 
(12) The English (and French) speaking author of this dissertation regrets not being 
able to consider two books very relevant to the task at hand. They are firstly; Operasie 
Savannah, Angola 1975-1976 by Professor F.J. du Toit Spies, and secondly; Avontuur 
in Angola: Die verhaal van Suid-Afrika se soldate in Angola 1975-76 by Sophia du 
Preez. As is evident from their titles both are written in the Afrikaans language. As a 
result of their absence, this part of the dissertation, concentrating on the 1975-1976 
period, relies heavily on Tony Hodges, Arthur Klinghoffer, Colin Legum, John Marcum, 
Keith Somerville, Fred Bridgland, Robert Jaster and Rajan Menon. 
(13) The first substantial conflict occurred, 23 March, when FNLA units attacked MPLA 
installations at Cazenga and Vila Alice in Luanda. Three days later, 30 miles north-
east of Luanda, 51 MPLA recruits were reportedly massacred after being seized by the 
FNLA. Fighting raged in Luanda for days despite the cease-fire agreement of 28 March 
and a further truce signed 8 April. A second wave of battles began at the end of April. 
In Luanda, in the early hours of 28 April, the FNLA launched a coordinated series of 
assaults against MPLA headquarters and against the headquarters of the pro-MPLA 
trade union UNTA (National Union of Angolan Workers). The assaults, which led to the 
cancellation of UNTA's May Day March, left 700 dead and 1 000 wounded. Meanwhile, 
fighting had erupted in the north according to Agostinho Neto and, in the south, fighting 
between the MPLA and FNLA was reported at Nova Lisboa (Huambo) as well as further 
east. 
The Luanda fighting came to another temporary halt with an emergency visit by the 
Portuguese Foreign Minister, Melo Antunes, after the liberation movements had agreed 
to a new cease-fire agreement. The cease-fire agreement, signed 12 May, came to an 
abrupt end sixteen days later with the onset of a third more serious wave of clashes. 
The National Defence Commission, appointed under the Transitional Government, 
made the charge that the MPLA had launched coordinated assaults against the FNLA 
east of Luanda. The MPLA claimed it was only retaliating after months of aggression 
by the FNLA. The FNLA responded by mounting attacks against the MPLA in its 
northern strongholds. Heavy fighting also broke out between the two movements in 
the oil-rich enclave of Cabinda. In two days of fighting, during which the FNLA was 
driven out of Cabinda's capital, a total of eleven MPLA and FNLA members were killed 
and the fighting spread to Luanda. The fighting eventually subsided when another 
cease-fire agreement was signed, 7 June, although further battles were reported at 
Santo Antonio do Zaire, 8 June, and at Henrique de Carvalho a few days later (Hodges, 
1976:51 ). 
(14) In early 1975, strictly in military terms, the FNLA enjoyed a distinct advantage over 
its rivals. In comparison, the MPLA had built a relatively small guerilla army with 
approximately 6 000 soldiers, while UNITA had a guerilla force of only 1 000 troops. 
In contrast, the FNLA in its Zairian military camps had trained an army of approximately 
15 000 soldiers. Furthermore, it was well supplied with arms having received 450 tons 
of Chinese weaponry in 197 4 and the assistance of 125 Chinese military instructors. 
The FNLA's Chinese and Romanian aid was, in addition to being complemented by 
extensive assistance from President Mobutu of Zaire, also assisted by growing amounts 
of American funding according to a CIA operative (Stockwell, 1978:67, Hodges, 
1976:50, Somerville, 1986:42, Menon, 1986: 133-134). 
(15) Bridgland describes the Portuguese departure thus: "The High Commissioner, 
Leonel Cardoso, appeared before the press at midday in the High Commissioner's 
Palace and read a .short statement in which he handed sovereignty to "the Angolan 
people." No Angolans were at the ceremony. The departing High Commissioner 
rejected any Portuguese responsibility for the situation in the country, but expressed 
regret that the three liberation movements had been allowed to arm themselves in the 
run-up to independence ... Cardoso immediately left the palace with his entourage, and 
under heavy guard went down to the port quarter of San Miguel to fold the red and 
green Portuguese flag ... The Portuguese then boarded a waiting convoy of frigates 
and transports which left the harbour in daylight and stayed just off Luanda until a little 
before midnight when they weighed anchor and passed out of Angolan territorial 
waters" (Bridgland, 1986:132). 
(16) According to General Geldenhuys, Holden Roberto's ambition to conquer Luanda 
before 11 November 1975 made no sense as his soldiers were inexperienced and 
unskilled. In the end his stubbornness sabotaged not only his own future but, to a large 
degree, that of Operation Savannah as well (Geldenhuys, 1995:54). 
(17) It is alleged South African troops started operating in Angola as early as July and 
that by mid-August there were 1 000 SADF troops stationed at the Ruacana Falls and 
at Caleque in southern Angola (Somerville, 1986:44, Hallet, 1978:347-386). 
Adding weight to this account is an admission made in parliament, perhaps 
inadvertently, by P.W. Botha. He stated that "from 14 July 1975 to 23 January 1976" 
South Africa's total casualties in Angola consisted of 29 killed in action and 14 killed 
in accidents. This account was further collaborated by Jonas Savimbi: "South Africa, 
for some reasons of its own, invaded southern Angola in July 1975" (Legum, 1976:36). 
(18) South Africa's direct military intervention, officially dated 23 October, will be 
discussed in greater detail in Section 3.7 of this chapter. 
(19) Two days before this meeting, 12 July, Davis submitted a memorandum to the 
Under Secretary Joseph J. Sisco, State Department representative on the Forty 
Committee, with a copy to Secretary Kissinger. Essentially, the memo argued the 
following: that covert intervention would not serve larger U.S. interests, that an 
attempted intervention could not be kept secret, and that covert intervention would have 
to be so circumscribed so as not to meet its objectives while the other side could 
escalate at will. 
Davis sent a second memo to Under Secretary Sisco and Secretary Kissinger, 14 July, 
the day the Forty Committee was to meet on the Angola issue. While it was largely a 
synthesis of the memo of two days earlier, in the final paragraph it referred explicitly to 
the 13 June Report of the Task Force stating the diplomatic-political alternative "was 
favoured by most of the agencies participating." The essence of such a diplomatic-
political alternative "would be to reduce the infusion of arms and enlist African, 
Portuguese and multilateral influences toward a political solution" (Davis, 1978: 113-
116). 
(20) According to John Marcum, Washington was sensitive about the $800 million in 
American foreign investment in Zaire. This investment was threatened by internal 
instability brought about by a drastic fall in world copper prices, the failure to advance 
agricultural production beyond pre-independence levels, and the conspicuous affluence 
of the ruling elite. While none of these factors was directly attributable to the Soviets, 
the resultant instability, nonetheless enhanced the capacity of the Soviets for "mischief' 
in the region (Marcum, 1976:416). 
(21) While Barber and Barratt's reasoning appears sound, Bridgland nonetheless 
asserts that it was not UNITA but the FNLA which South Africa initially chose to 
support. Bridgland alleges that in a trip to Pretoria, 10 November 1975, Savimbi was 
told by John Vorster that "a concerted effort by the West and South Africa was being 
made to put the FNLA into Luanda by Independence Day." Bridgland also alleges that 
Savimbi, years later, learned from Western intelligence of the plan to offer UNITA three 
or four minor portfolios in the new government if the FNLA were successful in taking 
power. According to Savimbi, "The main part of the 2000-man South African force was 
in our area and yet they [the South Africans and the West] had planned to take over 
Luanda and give it to the FNLA without telling us. What sort of friendship is that?" 
(Bridgland, 1986:145-146) .. 
General Geldenhuys' comment in Endnote 16 may well refer to Bridgland's contention 
that South Africa had initially supported the FNLA before they partook on their 
catastrophic pre-independence assault on Luanda. 
22) Nigerian motivation for recognition of the MPLA Government is discussed in greater 
detail in Endnote 27. 
(23) According to Rajan Menon, "For the USSR, Cuba, and the MPLA, South Africa's 
intervention was a godsend. In the eyes of most black African leaders, the FNLA and 
UNITA had committed an unpardonable sin by joining forces with South Africa. While 
----------------~-------
a number of them had criticised Soviet-Cuban involvement in the Angolan civil war, 
their unhappiness about this was now displaced by their anger over South African 
intervention. This boosted the political fortunes of the MPLA" (Menon, 1986: 135). 
(24) While South Africa believed that the U.S. condoned and even approved, of its 
action, Arthur Klinghoffer asserts it does not necessarily follow that any American 
instigation was present (Klinghoffer, 1980:53). 
John Marcum takes a contrary view and states the following: "Although Mr. Kissinger 
has asserted it was untrue that there had been any U.S. collusion with South Africa, 
high officials in Pretoria have announced that South Africa's entry into Angola was 
made on the basis of an understanding with American officials that the United States 
would rush sufficient supplies to counterbalance the weapons superiority -of the 
MPLA/Cuban forces, and have expressed particular disappointment at Secretary 
Kissinger's inability to make good on his promises. At the very least the United States 
connived at the South African intervention and sought to cooperate with it (Marcum, 
1976:422). 
(25) On this subject Bridgland goes much farther than Marcum in citing American 
complicity. Bridgland argues: "South Africa, waiting for the Cubans to roll southwards 
into the vacuum that its withdrawal had left, was bitter about the failure of the West and 
the secret black African allies to give open support. P.W. Botha, John Vorster and 
"high officials" in Cape Town began to tell senior South African journalists that South 
Africa had intervened in Angola at the urging of the United States and certain black 
African countries, particularly Zambia and Zaire. Bernard Nossiter, of the Washington 
Post, met Botha who spoke of several black African states and at least one "free world" 
power giving their blessing to Pretoria's Angolan adventure. The nearest Botha came 
to identifying directly that "free world" power was when he told Nossiter enigmatically 
"I would be the last man to destroy our diplomatic relations with the United States"" 
(Bridgland, 1986: 168-169). 
This debate is enormously controversial, will not be resolved in the context of this 
dissertation and will, without doubt, continue. 
(26) According to Colin Legum, South Africa's intervention achieved four undesirable 
results. Firstly, it led to an escalation in Soviet arms shipments and greater numbers 
of Cuban combat troops creating a substantial force which could only be countered by 
a similarly major commitment. Secondly, in the eyes of the rest of the Continent and 
the OAU it provided more credible justification for the SovieUCuban role in Angola. 
Thirdly, it marked the beginning of the collapse in OAU consensus by compelling a 
number of African nations, led by Nigeria and Ghana, to abandon their earlier support 
for UNITA. Fourthly, and not unrelated to the previous point, South Africa's 
involvement and the SADF presence was helpful in discrediting any Angolan party 
harbouring anti-MPLA sentiments. Those groups were immediately suspected of 
colluding with "Africa's arch enemy." In other words, South Africa's decision to 
intervene led precisely to the results they sought to prevent (Legum, 1976:38). 
--------------- ---~--~ - ~~--
(27) Nigeria reversed its stand,. opposing Soviet and Cuban involvement, and 
recognised the legitimacy of the MPLA Government. Nigeria gave South Africa's 
intervention as the reason for its sudden change of policy. According to Bridgland, this 
marked the beginning of UNITA's diplomatic downfall. Nigeria's recognition of the 
MPLA Government was followed by Tanzania, whose government owned newspaper, 
carried Bridgland's report of South Africa's invasion of Angola under the headline 
"Savimbi Admits Betrayal" (Bridgland, 1976: 150). 
Savimbi was particularly upset about Nigeria's change of heart and said: "I thing they 
show ignorance or they trust very much the lies of the MPLA. Be recognising the MPLA 
they are only encouraging the continuation of our civil war. Instead of encouraging the 
civil war, they should do all they can to bring this war to an end through political 
negotiation (Bridgland, 1986: 153). 
(28) U.S. Congress, The Soviet Union and the Third World: A Watershed in Great 
Power Policy. Report to the Committee on International Relations by the Specialists 
Division Congressional Research Services Library of Congress, 1976: 109. 
(29) Marcum may be over zealous in claiming Angola represented the Soviet Union's 
debut as a major power in Africa. In this regard one could reasonably cite Egypt and 
Somalia as examples of Soviet influence on the continent. 
(30) On this subject, Marcum states: "One would have thought that the President and 
Secretary of State would have perceived, as the Soviet leadership must have, that an 
American public chastened and disillusioned by a lost war in Vietnam would not tolerate 
even a very modest involvement in another distant, unfathomable, civil conflict" 
(Marcum, 1976:416) 
(31) By late November, 600 tonnes of Soviet military equipment were in Dar-es-Salaam 
awaiting shipment to Luanda for the MPLA. Also in Dar-es-Salaam harbour was a 
Soviet ship which, according to the ship's manifest, was carrying 785 tonnes of arms 
for SWAPO. Western intelligence believed these arms were in fact intended for the 
MPLA. The Tanzanians were also holding 100 tonnes of arms sent by China via Dar-
es-Salaam for UNITA. President Nyerere, however, diverted these weapons to the 
MPLA which caused immense bitterness on the part of UNITA (Bridgland, 1986:149). 
(32) The U.S. State Department estimated that. by as early as January 197 5 sufficient 
arms had been delivered to equip five to seven thousand MPLA troops (U.S. Congress, 
Senate, 1975:184). 
(33)Two internal changes within Cuba made possible the shift in scale that 
characterised Cuba's African policy from the 1960s to the 1970s. Firstly, after a dismal 
performance throughout the 1960s the Cuban economy recovered in the first half of the 
following decade, aided by the soaring world price of sugar, and also by internal 
changes in economic management and organisation. Secondly, the Cuban armed 
forces went through an important process of professionalisation in the early 1970s 
transforming them into the effective troops which were later deployed in African wars. 
Furthermore, Cuba developed a large and competent military reserve. For example, 
fully 70 percent of Cuban forces deployed in Angola in 1975-76 were reservists 
(Dominguez, 1978:94). 
(34) In addition, Marcum states that due to "the powerful racial symbolism of South 
Africa, its intervention had [sic] a convulsive effect among Africans, overriding anxieties 
related to Soviet and Cuban intervention" (Marcum, 1976:420). 
(35) Castro's description of 5 November as the date a Cuban decision was taken on 
Angola was politically self-serving and probably inaccurate. The arrival of three Cuban 
ships, with supplies for the MPLA in early October, indicates that the Cubans must 
actually have decided, perhaps by late September, on substantial military involvement 
( Jaster, 1988: 73 ). 
The activities of the South Africans in Angola did, however, provide an extremely 
politically expedient cover for expanding Cuban involvement. 
(36) Klinghoffer estimates there were approximately 14 000 Cubans in Angola by 
February 1976 and 17 000 by late March (Klinghoffer, 1984:114). 
(37) The author of this dissertation wishes to avoid tedious repetition of the events 
previously described throughout the bulk of Chapter Three. Therefore, this concluding 
section is very brief. 
CHAPTER IV: 
THE WIDENING SOUTH AFRICAN INVOLVEMENT IN THE ANGOLAN 
CONFLICT UNDER THE LEADERSHIP OF P.W. BOTHA (1978-1986) 
4.1 Conditions Post-Independence: 
On independence day, 11 November, the rest of the newly 'established nation 
outside the capital had little to celebrate under the weight of Zairian and South African 
occupation ( 1 ). Gradually, in the months that followed, the MPLA forces in Luanda 
regained authority throughout the provinces. It was therefore a surprise for the 
victorious MPLA to discover that the first challenge to its rule came from its own urban 
constituency (2). 
4.1.1 Agricultural Production and Food Distribution: 
During the first year of independence Angola experienced all the stresses of a 
newly independent African nation in the most acute form possible. However, probably 
the greatest problem facing Angola after independence was that of agricultural 
production and food distribution. The entire Angolan food distribution network failed 
at three levels; production, transport and retail. Agricultural produce in colonial Angola 
had grown on both white owned plantations and on black owned plots. The former 
sector relied heavily on the transfer of labour from south to north but, when the 1975 
war split the country in two, this integration of northern land and southern labour was 
destroyed. Expatriate management withdrew to Europe and Ovimbundu labour 
retreated to the shelter of the highlands. Independence and war disrupted the system 
to such an extent severe shortages ensued (Birmingham, 1992:77, Somerville, 
1986:47). 
4.1.2 Disruption of the Transport System: 
According to David Birmingham, the failure of produ~tion was not the only 
reason why food shortages became so severe as to almost unseat the government. 
The transport system was severely disrupted. Firstly; the Benguela railway was 
operating only on limited sections as a large number of rail bridges had been 
demolished. Secondly; all civilian transport planes were flown out of the country never 
to return, and thirdly; Portuguese lorries and other vehicles were driven to South Africa 
by refugees or destroyed in "scorched earth" actions. Due to the lack of transport even 
where crops were grown there was little opportunity for delivering them to market due 
to the reasons discussed. 
4.1.3 Retail Distribution: 
In addition to the collapse of production and transport, there were great 
difficulties in retail distribution. Angolan colonial society was built on a nation-wide 
network of small white shop owners and inn-keepers. Even in the capital, retailing was 
still largely a white preserve. The rebuilding of an African class of petty traders to 
replace those who fled was not part of the new government's social strategy. The 
MPLA's ideal was a state-run system of "people's shops." However, experienced 
entrepreneurs were in short supply and the city sorely lacked a responsive capitalist 
retail network to match the needs of a newly liberated people. The food crisis was a 
fundamental cause of political fission. Foreign exchange, needed for producer goods, 
was instead redirected for the purchase of emergency imports. Six months after the 
1977 coup Angola was forced to airlift 30 000 bags of maize from Zambia, for 
emergency feeding, which marked the beginning of a long-term policy of feeding the 
city while neglecting the farmers (Birmingham, 1992:78). 
4.1.4 Shortage of Experienced Administrators: 
Exacerbating such post-independence difficulties, was the shortage of 
experienced administrators (Birmingham, 1992:77-78). By African standards, Angola 
was a highly bureaucratised country in the 1970s. However, the withdrawal of 90 per 
cent of its expatriates, between July and November 1975, left essential services such 
as transport, harbours, currency, customs, police, revenue, local government and 
health all chronically short-staffed. 
4.1.5 The MPLA's Ambitious Ideological Programme: 
Furthermore, the MPLA's ambitious ideological programme may possibly have 
taken priority over the immediate developmental needs of the new nation. The MPLA 
desired to launch a programme of socialist transformation despite all the immediate 
problems facing it. One of the principal decisions of the new government was the 
official adoption of Marxism-Leninism. The MPLA's political bureau declared "to defend .,.. 
and advance the Revolution, we must analyse and characterise the different phases 
and stages of our struggles, and clearly define socialism as the highest aim of our 
Revolution." This included plans to nationalise vital industries and implement state 
control of foreign trade. However, in order to implement this socialist programme, 
economic reconstruction was necessary. Toward this end the Neto government 
introduced a strict austerity programme. The austerity measures coupled with the 
MPLA's increasingly Marxist stance led to conflicts between the government and its 
traditional constituency in Luanda (Somerville, 1998:47-49). 
4.2 The Coup d'etat: 
Considering the circumstances and based on the available evidence, the 
attempted coup d'etat of 27 May 1977 should not have been a surprise (3). After the 
war of 1975, frustration rose rapidly among the urban poor reaching a crescendo, two 
years later, in 1977 (4). Confrontation had also been building within the MPLA Central 
Committee itself. Gradually, the debate became polarised into two main tendencies; 
the official one of President Agostinho Neto and the dissenting one of Nito Alves. This 
divide was recognised in October 1976 when the third plenary session of the MPLA 
Central Committee set up a committee to investigate factionalism within the Movement. 
Its report, presented 20-21 May 1977, condemned the factionalism as aiming to "deflect 
the People from the true objectives of the current stage of struggle which is national 
reconstruction and the defence of national integrity against imperialism" and stated that 
its leaders, Nito Alves and Jose van Dunem, be expelled from the Central Committee 
(Birmingham, 1992:73-75, Somerville, 1986:50-53, Bridgland, 1986:263-264) . 
• 
The stage was thereby set for a coup d'etat which, over the following six days, 
unrolled in a poorly planned and incompetent manner. The coup of 27 May 1977 was 
seen as an uprising of the Luanda slums. · The first coup attempt failed. A second coup 
was then planned in which the army was to kill half a dozen leaders hostile to the Nito 
Alves faction. This too failed. Therefore, a third coup was planned without the 
assistance of the armed forces sympathetic to the Nito Alves faction. However, before 
these plans could be executed independent insurgents from the ninth military brigade 
blew open the prison and captured the radio station. The planned coup d'etat was 
revealed and the MPLA Government was able to retake the radio station with Cuban 
assistance (5). Nito Alves's attempted coup d'etat was foiled and he and his closest 
associates were captured. The six dissident MPLA leaders were taken to a house in 
the slum area of Sambizanbga and shot (Birmingham, 1992:75-76, Somerville, 
1986:52-53, Bridgland, 1986:264-265). 
4.3 The Continuing Downward Spiraland External Involvement: 
The year 1977 provided Angola with the worst possible start in its quest for 
peaceful and independent development. At the time of the attempted coup, the MPLA 
made little mention of the significant fighting occurring in five separate zones across 
the country. All five war zones involved foreign interests. Similarly, the coup 
engendered a variety of different foreign responses (6). 
4.3.1 Rural Rebellion: 
While the first challenge to the MPLA came from their own tradition constituency 
in Luanda the second originated over a much broader front in the provinces. The short-
lived urban rebellion was followed by a long term rebellion of the countryside. Three 
factors rendered the rural rebellion particularly tenacious: firstly; it suited Pretoria to 
follow the civil war soon afterwards with a war of destabilization comparable to the one 
it was conducting in Mozambique. Secondly; it suited the USA not to recognise the 
MPLA Government in light of the crucial support it had received from America's arch 
i 
enemy, Cuba. Thirdly; the provincial rebellion had a political focus which began with 
the highland mobilizations of UNITA and continued with UNITA's increasing 
militarization in the south east where protection was offered by South African air-cover 
(Birmingham, 1992:81-82). The combined result was an intensifying civil war with new 
international involvement. 
4.3.2 The Destruction of the Ovimbundu Highlands: 
The war acquired greater intensity throughout the 1980s and in the process tore 
the Ovimbundu highlands apart. The Ovimbundu found themselves attacked by both 
UNITA forces and the people's army of the MPLA Government. UNITA's objective was 
to impoverish zones under government control through indiscriminate killing, burning 
and pillaging (7). The atrocities, however, were not limited to anti-government actions 
but were mirrored by the MPLA. The MPLA strategy of confining UNITA to the south 
east to prevent its return to the highlands was equally hostile. To prevent UNITA 
insurgents from developing a social base, the government removed the people they 
thought vulnerable to guerrilla penetration. The war came to resemble colonial wars 
in which authorities herded people into barbed wire villages in order to deny them any 
possibility of contact with the enemy (8). The MPLA Government adopted the same 
arbitrary and inhumane strategy assuming that all peasants were potential UNITA 
sympathizers (Birmingham, 1992:82-83). 
4.3.3 American and South African Points of View: 
The first international change to affect Angola directly was the defeat of 
President Carter and his replacement _by Ronald Reagan in 1980 (9). Carter had 
restricted American intervention in local wars involving the other superpower. Reagan, 
in contrast, came to power with a policy of stopping all wars of national liberation. This 
was accomplished by arming and ·financing client groups in so-called low intensity 
conflicts. In Angola the chosen vehicle for a low intensity campaign to inhibit nationalist 
aspirations was UNITA which had failed to acquire power in 1975 (10). UNITA was 
rebuilt in the 1980s and given a military base in the remote south east section of the 
country far outside the old constituency where it was founded. In this new base UNITA 
benefitted from a powerful South African air shield which protected it from recapture 
(Birmingham, 1992:84). 
The South African invasions of the 1980s received a different reception than 
those of the previous decade. Birmingham describes how, in the 1970s, the moral 
revulsion at the armies of apartheid marching into a newly independent African nation 
brought international sympathy to Angola. However, by the 1980s South Africa had 
learnt to better manage its public relations. The Angolan Government was supported 
by a Cuban force of 30 000 troops which South Africa presented to the world as Soviet 
puppets. The joint campaign on the part of UNITA with SADF support, to overthrow the 
government of a Soviet satellite in Africa, attracted political support in Europe and 
financial support from other regions of the world. 
4.4 South Africa's War of Destabilization: 
Meanwhile the times were changing with South Africa, as well, being the target 
of increased sabotage including the destruction of three oil installations in June 1980 
by ANC operatives. The South African· security situation continued to worsen and, 
throughout 1980, South Africa experienced the worst resurgence of black unrest in 
several years. These challenges created insecurity against which Pretoria reacted. 
It was viewed as crucial, in terms of the nation's vital interests, to prevent the internal 
opponents of apartheid from believing that sabotage and armed resistance could be 
effective against white minority rule. Hence, Pretoria struck hard against the ANC and 
SWAPO guerrilla bases with little regard for national borders. 
South Africa's war of destabilization had been devastating in Mozambique and, 
although not less so in Angola, it was very distinct in kind and effect. The presence of 
a hostile marxist-oriented government in Mozambique, whose capital lay only a few 
miles from the South African border, posed a greater military threat than such a 
government would in Angola. Ideologically, however, Angola was the greater security 
threat due to the ability of radical Angolan nationalism to inflame black opposition within 
South African territory (11 ). Therefore, according to Pretoria's thinking, such influences 
needed to be curbed for security reasons and a campaign of destabilization was 
undertaken in Angola as well (Birmingham, 1992:84). 
According to Birmingham, in the 1980s the balance between "local" and 
"international" forces was altered in the Angolan conflict. In the 1970s the various 
nationalist movements had been strong enough to compete with one another for central 
authority but, in the 1980s, the domestic forces of opposition largely withered away and 
were confined to the UNITA enclave and its highland sympathizers. Meanwhile, 
opposition in the form of the regional strategy of destabilization, orchestrated by South 
Africa, dominated the situation (Birmingham, 1992:84). Adding to an already explosive 
quagmire was the presence of a Cuban expeditionary force of 30 000 troops for the 
purpose of supporting the MPLA Government bitterly opposed by the USA and South 
Africa. . ' ~·~· ~. . .. 
4.4.1 Operation Reindeer. The First Raid Against SWAPO in Angola. May 1978: 
South Africa's first deep penetration raid against a SWAPO camp in Angola 
occurred under Vorster's leadership and was launched on Ascension Day, 4 May 1978 
(12). Operation Reindeer consisted, firstly. of an air and parachute attack on SWAPO's 
most important training and supply base, "Moscow," which was 250 kilometres north of 
the Namibia -Angola border (13). The second part of Operation Reindeer consisted 
of a simultaneous ground attack by a mechanized force on various forward transit 
camps around the Angolan border area. This included a SWAPO complex, "Vietnam," 
which was 28 kilometres north of the border (Geldenhuys. 1995:92-93). 
SADF intelligence reports had identified Cassinga as SWAPO's main 
operational headquarters for southern Angola consisting of a training complex large 
enough to house between 700 and 1 200 troops. The base also consisted of a vehicle 
park, various headquarters buildings, a large engineer training complex, parade ground 
and an extensive trench system. It was further equipped with anti,..aircraft defences. 
In the wake of the SADF raid, in the form of Operation Reindeer, SWAPO flatly denied 
Cassinga was a military base (14). They claimed that the town, at the time of the 
attack, was populated by refugees, largely women and children, and that the only 
fighting force present had been a "camp defence unit" of only 300 men. Cassinga's 
military and strategic importance was, however, clearly evidenced by the large 
quantities of equipment and supplies destroyed and documents seized. The quality of 
military intelligence gathered by the SADF was high and had a significant impact in 
future operations (15) (Geldenhuys, 1995:93, Steenkamp, 1983:18).). 
May 1978 was a delicate period in the SWA/Namibian settlement talks and 
Operation Reindeer effectively suspended them for several months. Likewise, in March 
1979, prospects for a negotiated settlement on Namibia once again suffered when P.W. 
Botha unleased a blistering condemnation of the UN and Contact Group (16). Claiming 
that South Africa had been "left in the lurch" by the West, Botha rejected Waldheim's 
proposals which would have allowed SWAPO to establish bases in SWA/Namibia and 
only nominal monitoring of its bases in Angola (17) (Jaster, 1988:80). 
4.5 P.W. Botha and the Total National Strategy (TNS): 
In the early months of 1980 P.W. Botha began to more heavily promote the 
concept of total national strategy (TNS) to the white electorate. In March he argued in 
Parliament: "The main objective ... under the guidance of the planners in the Kremlin, 
is to overthrow this State and to create chaos in its stead, so that the Kremlin can 
establish hegemony here" (18). The present Soviet strategy is to avoid a direct, 
conventional onslaught because "the threshold is too high." But, he added, "an indirect 
strategy is being pursued by every possible means." The military onslaught is being 
waged by proxy, by the <;;ubans, "who are a crowd of slaves of the rulers in Moscow" 
(Jaster, 1988:91 ). 
In a statement which anticipated his government's imminent shift to a far more 
aggressive response to the so-called onslaught, he also warned of a conventional 
threat. Botha stated: "there is the conventional military onslaught we have to bear in 
mind. There is a gradual build-up of more sophisticated arms in neighbouring states, 
especially in Mozambique, Angola, and Zambia. Such equipment can be converted 
almost overnight into a credible instrument of Soviet aggression" (Jaster, 1988:91 ). 
Hence, acting with the intent to preserve the nation's vital security interests and long-
term survival, the stage was set for South Africa's more militant policy towards 
neighbouring nations and defiance towards the West. 
4.6 South Africa's War Against SWAPO: 1979 Onward: 
South Africa's war against SWAPO began seriously and consistently in. 1979 
(19). In an effort to obtain intelligence, via cross border operations, South Africa 
launched both Operation Rekstok and Operation Safraan in early March 1979. They 
were actually only a single operation conducted over an extended area. The part which 
took place in Angola-was called Operation Rekstok and that which took place in Zambia 
was called Operation Safraan. SWAPO bases were simultaneously attacked in Angola 
during Rekstok and in Zambia during Safraan. During an air attack in Angola a 
Canberra light bomber crashed, presumably after being hit by ground fire, killing the 
crew. Neither the Angolan nor Zambian aspect of the operation achieved great 
material success (20) (Geldenhuys, 1995:108-109). 
4.6.1 The 32 Battalion: 
A few months later, in June, 8000 South African reservists were put into service 
to track down roving SWAPO units which had infiltrated Ovamboland. South Africa 
also reactivated a covert SADF unit, the 32 battalion, composed of black Angolans who 
had previously been FNLA guerrillas until Roberto Holden's defeat in 1975 (21 ). Led 
by white officers, units of the 32 battalion operated in Angola on a full-time basis (22). 
Their task, reminiscent of American involvement in Vietnam, was to carry out sweeps 
through villages searching for SWAPO guerrillas as well as seeking to destroy 
essential local infrastructure such as bridges and roads (23). By late 1980, the 32 
battalion had been highly effective in creating a buffer zone up to 50 kilometres deep 
in which abandoned villages and scorched countryside allowed little opportunity for life 
as it had existed and scant cover for the SWAPO contingents hoping to move 
southward toward Namibia (Jaster, 1988:93). 
4.6.2 Operation Sceptic/Smokeshell, June 1980: 
In June 1980 the SADF launched Operation Smokeshell against SWAPO (24). 
Operation Smokeshell came about as the result of two realities one of which was 
pol.itical and the other military: Firstly; by early 1980 progress in the negotiations over 
S~~Namibian independence "had slow~d down to a snail-like crawl for the umpteenth 
time" and, secondly; SWAPO was once again showing signs of life (Steenkamp, 
1983: 167). In addition to disrupting insurgent activities and inflicting maximum 
casualties, Operation Smokeshell also sought to damage Soviet confidence in SWAPO, 
restore confidence in the SADF, and place South Africa in a position of strength in the 
SWA/Namibian negotiations (Steenkamp, 1983: 169). 
There were a number of reasons for SWAPO's apparent revival. Probably the 
most important impetus was derived from SWAPO's loss of credibility, not only among 
the local population in Ovamboland, but in the eyes of its Soviet sponsor. In fact, as 
SADF intelligence duly reported to the general staff, the Soviets had demanded that 
SWAPO produce some definite results by the middle of the year. As a result of this 
ultimatum there was a abrupt resurgence in SWAPO activity. Suddenly, diligent 
attempts were made to relieve the scarcity of food, captured deserters were harshly 
punished and personal motivation programmes implemented for SWAPO personnel in 
their various camps across Angola (25) (Steenkamp, 1983:167-168). 
More ominous was the transfer of 800 insurgents from south western Zambia to 
the Cunene Province in south western Angola. This served as an obvious and 
immediate threat to the power lines emanating from the Ruacana Falls hydro electric 
generating station in that area. SWAPO's mine laying operations intensified and an 
intense recruitment effort was reported (26). Attempts were made to infiltrate south of 
this area into white owned farming areas and there was a noticeable increase in mine 
laying and recruiting in Koakoland as well. SADF intelligence became aware that 
increased planning for military mobilization was taking place at all levels of the 
organisation. By early May 1980 SWAPO's planning activity appeared to be complete 
and it was obvious that some sort of action would have to be taken. Permission for the -----SADF to mount a sizeable pre-emptive attack on SWAPO targets in southern Angola 
was soon granted (27) (Steenkamp, 1983:168). 
Operation Sceptic, better known as Smokeshell, was launched in June 1980. 
It was the largest South African mechanized infantry operation since World War II. It 
began with"a blitz attack on a SWAPO base in southern Angola but developed into an 
/ 
extended operation as more SWAPO caches were found in the vicinity. The objective 
was t_o destroy SWAPO's command and control centre at Chifufua 180 kilometres north. 
of the bo_rder. On June 10, after an air strike and artillery bombardment, battle groups 
10 and 61 struck Chifufua (codenamed Smokeshell) (28). The operation was to have 
ended 17 June but, due to information found on the scene, was extended to bases west 
--
of Smokeshell and eventually c_ame to an end 13 June (29). It brought about the first 
serious clashes between the SADF and FAPLA and South Africa's first contact with 
SWAPO's mechanized elements. SWAPO lost its forward base facilities and the SADF 
seized several hundred tonnes of equipment and supplies as well as numerous 
vehicles. (Geldenhuys, 1983:120-121). 
4. 7 SWAPO, Soviet and Cuban Integration: 
South African security concerns were not exclusively devoted to the threat posed 
by SWAPO alone. By mid 1981 the security situation in northern SWA/Namibia took 
a sinister turn not only due to SWAPO. The ongoing delivery of Soviet arms, 
continuing Cuban presence, and the stock-piling of vast quantities of advanced 
weaponry in Angola all contributed to the escalating security threat. Likewise, the 
increasing concentration of FAPLA and SWAPO forces in southern Angola. posed a 
real and significant threat to South African security interests in northern SWA/Namibia. 
Taking place throughout July 1981 various skirmishes between the SADF and SWAPO 
attained a higher .and more feverish pitch (Geldenhuys, 1995:144, Jaster, 1988:94). 
General Lloyd, SADF commander in Namibia, warned the introduction of Soviet 
early-warning radar and ground-to-air missiles rendered it more difficult to provide air 
ended 10 September 1981 (Geldenhuys, 1995:145). 
Operation Protea resulted in the second serious confrontation between the 
SADF and FAPLA (34) and, at the time, represented the largest South African 
mechanized operation since World War II. It was also the SADF's first deep 
penetration attack since South Africa's initial intervention in 1975. Unlike previous 
engagements, the eight day campaign saw heavy direct fighting between Angolans and 
South Africans. Among the approximately 4 000 tonnes of captured arms were several 
T-34 and PT-76 Soviet tanks and armoured cars, heavy trucks, 100 SAM-7 missile 
launchers, a large number of 122-mm rockets and almost 200 logistical vehicles (35) 
(Geldenhuys, 1995: 145, Jaster, 1988:94-95). 
The repercussions of Operation Protea were of significant benefit to UNITA. 
The SADF military success provided UNITA with a safe rear base inside Angola as well 
as shorter communication and supply lines. The South African presence in southern 
Angola also drew large numbers of FAPLA troops to the south and away from areas 
into which UNITA wished to spread its campaign. UNITA's level of military activity 
increased and the war eventually spread northwards. As UNITA activity spread so did 
the tactic of seizing foreign hostages and using them to publicise UNITA's fight against 
the government. In March 1983 eighty-four Czech and Portuguese construction 
workers were seized and taken to Savimbi's base at Jamba. Western press coverage 
gave UNITA a higher military profile than it deserved and gave the world the mistaken 
impression that the MPLA government was on the brink of defeat (Somerville, 1986:64-
65). 
4.7.3 Operation Daisy, November 1981: 
Just as Operation Protea was a result of information collected during the 
preceding operation, Operation Protea provided the information which gave rise to 
Operation Daisy. In November 1981 Gen Charles Lloyd launched Operation Daisy, a 
three-week incursion, aimed at destroying a bunker complex near Cassinga 160 miles 
inside Angola. Military objectives were attacked at Bambi and Chetaquera. Although 
no clashes took place between South African and Angolan ground forces, the SAAF 
had encounters with a number of MiG-21 fighter aircraft. Operation Daisy, a success 
for South Africa, ended 20 November (Geldenhuys, 1995:146, Jaster, 1988:95). 
4. 7.4 Operations Super. Meebos and Phoenix. 1982 -1983: 
Operations Super, Meebos and Phoenix were representative of South Africa's 
continued military aggression in the region and the success of P.W. Botha's policies 
of destabilization (36). Firstly; the SADF launched Operation Super in January 1982 
as a countermeasure to SWAPO's bid to open a new front in Koakoland. 
Reconnaissance elements of the 32 Battalion were sent to locate SWAPO cadres 
preparing to infiltrate the area. Once located, near the town of Iona, the 32 ,Battalion 
were flown there to launch a blitz attack: SWAPO's casualties were great and the 
SADF were able to seize a large quantity of weapons and ammunition. Secondly; 
Operation Meebos, executed during July and August 1982, consisted of a number of 
air and ground attacks on SWAPO's command and control structure. SWAPO lost 345 
troops and their headquarters at Mupa was destroyed. Thirdly; Operation Phoenix, a 
defensive counteraction, was launched against SWAPO's new deliberate wave of 
infiltration into Ovamboland in February 1983. Phoenix commenced 15 February, and 
when it finished two months later, SWAPQ and SADF casualties had occurred at a rate 
of roughly 11 to 1 (Geldenhuys, 1995: 146). 
The risk to South Africa, that their war of destabilization might provoke a direct 
intervention by Cuban forces in the conflict, diminished with the SADF's Operation 
Protea in August 1981. At this time, and in response to the SADF intervention, Cuba 
issued an official statement warning that Cuban troops would go into action "with all 
forces available" if the SADF columns approached the defensive positions of the 
Cubans (Jaster, 1988:5). Castro stated publicly, close to a year later in July 1982, if 
the South Africans "strike deeply into Angolan and reach our lines, we will fight with all 
our might against these parasitic, racist mercenaries" (Jaster, 1988:95). Hollow 
rhetoric aside, the Cubans were evidently reluctant to take a more active combat role 
at the time. Hence, Pretoria intensified military pressure on the MPLA Government 
based on a successful gamble that greater Soviet-Cuban involvement in the fighting 
' ' )~'S\ 
would not take place. ,../} . ()~ 
4.8 The Era of the Lusaka Peace Accord, 1983 - 1985: 
i ,::i;- ,. 
However, there was nonetheless reason for concern over continuing SADF 
involvement in an escalating war. Militarily, the Angolans had been increasingly 
offering the SADF more serious resistance. By 1983 heavier and more sophisticated 
weapons were being used and the rate of casualties was accelerating. In December 
of that year, a Soviet UN representative privately warned his South African counterpart 
against further attacks on Angola and, in January, the Soviet Union announced it had 
reached agreement with Angola to bolster Angolan defense capabilities (Jaster, 
1988:96). Nor, significantly, could South Africa rely upon continuing support and 
understanding from the Reagan Administration. When the United Nation's Security 
Council (UNSC) voted to condemn South Africa for its continuing occupation of 
Namibia, October 1983, the U.S.A. chose to abstain rather than exercise their veto. 
Therefore, both South Africa and Angola were ready to consider a cease-fire and 
mutual force disengagement when first proposed by the USA in late 1983 (37). South 
Africa informed the U.N. Secretary General, December 1983, of the decision to 
commence withdrawal of SADF troops from Angola, 31 January 1984, provided the 
Angolans agreed to prevent SWAPO from taking advantage of the situation to infiltrate 
its forces into Namibia. Angolan, South African and American representatives met in 
Lusaka in early February 1984 to finalize the details (Jaster, 1988:96). 
4.8.1 Operation Askari, December 1983 - January 1984: 
Nonetheless, South Africa's next cross-border operation, Operation Askari, took 
place in December 1983 despite the U.N. brokered cease-fire having been initiated 
(38). General Meiring launched Operation Askari, 6 December 1983, when it became 
apparent that SWAPO was planning a large scale infiltration for early in 1984 (39). 
Operation Askari was launched with a number of ground and air attacks aimed primarily 
at disrupting SWAPO's logistical infrastructure. Although the SADF claimed the attacks 
were concentrated on SWAPO, Angolan forces nonetheless also became involved .. 
The largest clash between the SADF and F APLA took place 3 January 1984 when 
FAPLA's eleventh brigade and two Cuban battalions came to SWAPO's assistance as 
the SADF were attacking SWAPO's headquarters five kilometres from Cuvelai (40). 
Operation Askari was the last operation of its kind and ended 3 January 1984 ( 41) 
(Geldenhuys, 1995: 154-155). 
4.8.2 Provisions of the Lusaka Accord, -February 1984: 
The Lusaka Accord, signed 16 February 1984, limited the cease-fire to a 
triangular area which was bounded by the Cunene River on the west, the Cubango 
River in the east and a 480 kilometre strip of the Namibia-Angola border to the south. 
The area was systematically cleared by zones (42). In the resulting demilitarized zone 
(DMZ) Angola agreed to notify South Africa of any movements taking place in this area. 
The Lusaka Accord also prohibited SWAPO members, Cuban forces and any SWAPO 
supplies, such as tanks and guns, from passing through the DMZ area once the SADF 
had fulfilled their part of the agreement and withdrawn (43). The Americans assured 
South Africa that, in the event of Angolan violation of the accord, the U.S.A. would give 
diplomatic support to South Africa. A joint monitoring commission (JMC), comprised 
of both Angolan and South African representatives, was established to monitor the 
execution of the agreement. The JMC would patrol the border and prevent violations 
by any of the groups, including SWAPO, whose forces resident in Angola had 
conditionally agreed to accept the terms of the cease-fire ( Geldenhuys, 1995: 157, 
Jaster, 1988:96-97). 
4.8.2.1 South African Withdrawal Falls Behind Schedule: 
The February 1984 Lusaka cease-fire witnessed South African withdrawal fall 
far behind schedule as SADF commanders charged SWAPO witt., continuing to infiltrate 
its operatives through the cease-fire zone ( 44 ). The SADF withdrawal was finally 
completed, only in April 1985, a year later than agreed. Throughout this period few 
clashes occurred between South African and Angolan forces. Two months after 
withdrawing, however, in June 1985, South African troops recrossed the border and 
attacked SWAPO units 45 kilometres inside Angola (Jaster, 1988:97, Paratus, 1985:10-
11 ). 
4.8.3 Operation Boswilger, June 1985: 
From the South African point of view their reason for the launch of Operation 
Boswilger, of June 1985, was .clear: the terms of the Lusaka Accord were not adhered 
to (45). Therefore, the SADF was compelled to continue with their operations against 
SWAPO (46). Some of the practical problems with the implementation of the accord 
are described by General Geldenhuys in detail. For example, the SADF sometimes 
had intelligence of SWAPO activities in the DMZ in contravention of the Lusaka Accord. 
SWAPO, technically, could not violate the Lusaka Agreement as it was not a signatory. 
Therefore, the SADF had to address such information to the Angolan government for 
action as it was they who undertook to prevent SWAPO from entering the DMZ. This 
involved presenting the information to the Angolan component of the JMC which 
always, inevitably, found one argument or other for simply ignoring SWAPO's 
transgressions ( Geldenhuys, 1995: 158-159). 
In the June 1985 incursion, Operation Boswilger, and a similar operation in 
September 1985 SADF officials asserted that the Angolans were told of the raid on 
SWAPO bases "in its early" stages and did not interfere. SADF spokespersons also 
said that their forces were under strict instructions to avoid contact with FAPLA, the 
Angolan regular army, as well as to stay outside any town garrisoned by the Angolans. 
The cease-fire brought about by the Lusaka Accord. of February 1984, that led to a 
period of relative peace for roughly 18 months when there was virtually no fighting 
between Angolan forces and Sout_h African forces (47) (Jaster, 1988:97, Paratus, 
1985:10-11). 
4.9 FAPLA's Assault on UNITA's Main Base, September 1985: 
This oasis of peace brought about by the Lusaka Accord came to an abrupt end 
in late September 1985 when Angolan troops, newly equipped with Soviet helicopters 
and other weapons, launched a major ground and air offensive against the UNITA 
stronghold in the south-east corner of Angola. The surprise assault, the largest in a 
decade, raised the stakes of the Angolan conflict and presented South Africa with an 
immediate dilemma: UNITA was of utility to South Africa militarily in defending a 
sizeable area of the border just inside Angola and extending east of the Cubango river. 
Politically, as well, UNITA's lengthy claim to legitimacy as a nationalist movement 
entitling it to a share of power placed added pressure on the MPLA leadership. Hence, 
UNITA's continued survival was of strategic interest to South Africa (Jaster, 1988:98). 
4.9.1 South Africa's Commitment to UNITA: 
The South African commitment to ensuring UNITA's continued surviva( was 
frequently reiterated. For example, according to a confidential US State Department 
Memo later leaked to the press, Pik Botha told US officials in A.pril 1981 that his 
government "sees Savimbi in Angola as buffer for Namibia, [and] believes Savimbi 
wants southern Angola. Having supported him this far, it would damage [the South 
African government's] honour if Savimbi is harmed." Senior South African military 
personnel also suggested privately that they would like a federal solution in Angola 
leaving Savimbi in control of the southern region. With UNITA serving as a trip-wire 
security would be provided to deal with the threat of a cross-border invasion of 
SWA/Namibia (Jaster, 1988:99). 
4.9.2 SADF Intervention on UNITA's Behalf: 
As stated, this commitment to UNITA was put to the test in September 1985 
when the Angolan Government's first major offensive against Savimbi's forces came 
close to overwhelming the main UNITA base at Jamba. As the situation deteriorated 
Savimbi's requests for South African military assistance became increasingly urgent. 
By the time the decision was taken in Pretoria to intervene on UNITA's behalf the 
Angolan offensive was well under way. UNITA was preparing to abandon their base 
as FAPLA forces had progressed to within only 40 kilometres of Mavinga (48). P.W. 
Botha indirectly acknowledged the SADF's intervention by telling a National Party 
meeting that his government could "hardly sit · still" while Soviet tanks, jets and 
helicopters were being deployed in a drive to destroy UNITA. If the Soviet-supported 
forces succeeded in Angola, then surely they would do so in SWA/Namibia, reasoned 
Botha (Jaster, 1988:99, Heitman, 1990:13-14). 
4.9.2.1 Operations Magneto and Wallpaper: 
Pretoria feared, with the massive FAPLA offensive it was facing, UNITA could 
lose all their past gains and, thereby, allow SWAPO to gain access to Kavango _and 
West Caprivi. Pretoria therefore authorised limited assistance which took the form of 
two operations each in support of one of the two fronts. Firstly; Operation Magneto 
provided for the attachment of some artillery advisors and medical personnel to the 
UNITA force on the Cazombo front along with some additional logistical support. The 
SAAF undertook trooping flights from Mavinga and flew supply sorties from 
Grootfontein to airfields near the front. Secondly; Operation Wallpaper, the more 
ambitious of the two, provided for the deployment of a troop of multiple rocket launchers 
in support of UNITA on the Mavinga front. Operation Wallpaper extended from 27 
September to 3 October over which time the SAAF provided limited air support 
(Heitman, 1990:14). 
In the case of Operation Magneto the situation on the Cazombo front was 
irretrievable by the time South Africa intervened (49). On the Mavinga front to the 
south, Operation Wallpaper and the UNITA forces re-deployed from the failed 
Cazombo front, combined to oppose the FAPLA offensive. The direct fighting was done 
by UNITA. South Africa's contribution, in the form of a troop of multiple rocket 
launchers and the air strikes by SAAF Mirages and Impalas on FAPLA forces along the 
Lomba River, inflicted heavy casualties and were an important factor in stopping the 
offensive. The FAPLA offensive had, however, been stopped just in time as it had 
penetrated to within 28 kilometres of Mavinga. By early October, at which time the 
offensive had been halted, FAPLA began to withdraw its force so as to avoid 
harassment at the end of a long insecure supply line during the rainy season (Heitman, 
1990: 14-15), 
4.9.2.2 South Africa's Increasing Costs: 
The scale of the fighting in this offensive, resulting in heavy casualties, held 
sobering lessons for both South Africa and Angola (50). Months later, SADF officials 
expressed concerns over the Soviet Union's willingness and ability to replace major 
Angolan equipment losses "within a matter of weeks." Indeed, the chief of Angola's air 
force, in November 1985, made it clear that his country's recent acquisition of aircraft 
and radar installations was part of a plan to wrest control of the air over southern 
Angola from the South Africans, stating: "We·have to go over to the offensive and 
liberate the territory occupied by UNITA and cut off its supply lines from South Africa" 
(Jaster, 1988:99). 
4.1 O Escalation of the Soviet Commitment, 1986: 
Throughout 1986, large quantities of modern Soviet weapons systems were 
being delivered to Angola including aircraft which formed part of the Soviet Union's 
strategic reserve for conflict in Europe (51 ). There were 1 000 Soviet troops sent to 
take up training and command posts and 2 000 East Germans sent to boost FAPLA's 
intelligence and telecommunications services. By this stage, in 1986, Angola had close 
to 100 Soviet fighter aircraft including advanced MiG-23 fighter interceptors as well as 
125 helicopters from France and the Soviet Union. Angolan pilots were already flying 
MiG-21 s in ground attacks against the SADF in southern Angola. Angolan military 
bases in the south, designed for future offensives against UNITA, were supported by 
surface-to-air missile sites and advanced radar for monitoring SAAF flights in Namibia 
(Jaster, 1988:99-100, Geldenhuys, 1995: 190). 
4.11 Enhanced Angolan Military Capacity: 
Hence, by 1987 the Angolans had something which they lacked in their 1985 
offensive at which time the SAAF were able to attack Angolan vehicles and helicopters 
virtually without opposition. This could no longer be the case as it had been in their 
failed offensive against Savimbi's main base at Jamba because Angola now had the 
capability to provide air cover for assaults by its airborne and ground forces. South 
Africa responded to the growing Angolan encroachment of its previously unchallenged 
air superiority by upgrading the aging Mirage Ill ground-attack aircraft with new 
weapons and Israeli avionics. The renamed "Cheetahs" were apparently superior to 
the Soviet MiG-23s as well as less vulnerable to Angolan radar and missiles (Jaster, 
1988:99-100). The SAAF also achieved an improved air refuelling capability and 
unveiled two new locally-assembled helicopters in 1986 and 1987. 
In 1986 and 1987, the Angolans consolidated their gains in several areas and 
reinforced their southern bases from which they would attack UNITA in future (52). The 
external powers supporting the opposition deepened their commitment with the press 
reporting, in March-April 1986, that the USA had begun "covertly" supplying several 
hundred Stinger anti-aircraft missiles to UNITA. Meanwhile, the Soviets and Cubans 
still had no intention of departing and, in February 1986, issued a joint communique 
declaring their solidarity with the Angolan Government. Fidel Castro pledged to match 
every increase in American involvement and to keep Cuban combat troops in Angola 
until either the end of white minority rule in South Africa or as long as the Angolans 
wanted (Jaster, 1988: 100). Each escalation by one side was seemingly matched by 
spiralling escalation on the other thereby raising the stakes further and increasing the 
likelihood of continued fighting. 
4.12 The Importance of South Africa's Internal Milieux: South African Politics, 
Decision-Making Structures, Personalities and Organisations: 
4.12.1 Introduction: 
The period under discussion in Chapter Four (1978 - 1986) witnessed the 
resurgence of militaristic South African activity throughout the region. At this time the 
regional power balance, as it had existed prior to the massive superpower intervention 
of 1975 - 1976, gradually began to reassert itself. Therefore, the second paradigm or 
body of literature concerned with sub-national or domestic causation, at the unit level-
of-analysis, is of greatest utility in explaining South Africa's role in Angola throughout 
the 1978-1986 period. 
South Africa, as the dominant hegemon in Southern Africa, had the potential to 
act against any activity in the region perceived to threaten its internal order. South 
Africa, exclusively, possessed the requisite economic and military capabilities to 
enforce national aspirations and to defend its national security (53). Under the 
leadership of the anti-communist former Minister of Defence, it could not have been 
expected to sit idly by as external influences appeared to disrupt the regional power 
balance in favour of communism. Nor could it be expected that the region's dominant 
hegemon would have permitted smaller nations with far lessor capabilities to harbour 
South Africa's internal opposition, in the form of the ANC and SWAPO, without 
retaliating. 
The instability and perceived threat to South Africa's vital interests brought about 
by developments within the region, such as the end of Portuguese colonialism and the 
higher profile being assumed by liberation movements, raised the profile of the Defence 
Ministry. Public concern, on the part of the white electorate, over growing security 
threats at home and abroad undoubtedly contributed to the election of a "hawkish" 
candidate with a reputation for toughness and deemed capable of allaying white fears. 
4.12.2 P.W. Botha's Leadership and the Militarization of the South African State: 
Like Barber and Barratt, and similar to Grundy and Frankel, Geldenhuys and 
Kotze regard the personality of the Prime Minister, and later State President, of critical 
importance to foreign policy decision-making. Of instrumental importance for the 
course of events in the region throughout the peri.od covered by Chapter Four, was the 
election of Minister of Defence P.W. Botha as Prime Minister, 28 September 1978, after 
an internal party struggle. 
Until the time of his election as Prime Minister in 1978 Botha had been Minister 
of Defence, a portfolio he had held since 1966. According to Barber and Barratt and 
Geldenhuys and Kotze, it was his formative experiences in that portfolio which were to 
have the greatest influence on his leadership and particularly in the conduct of South 
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Africa's foreign policy. P.W. Botha's professional experience as Minister of Defence 
and life-long involvement in party politics are thought to explain his dogmatic view of 
security and inclination towards bureaucratic rationalisation which are, in turn, held 
responsible for South Africa's militaristic policy toward the region throughout the 1980s. 
In keeping with the notion of personalities exerting an important influence on 
policy-choices, Barber and Barratt observe that P.W. Botha's election as leader 
represented a significant break with the Vorster years. Botha was very different from 
his predecessor in personality and style and quickly put his own distinctive stamp on 
both domestic and economic policy. Botha's background was exclusively political. He 
was involved in party politics from a young age and rose through the ranks (Barber and 
Barratt, 1990:247-249). 
As stated, P.W. Botha developed more than any previous leader an almost 
dogmatic view of the world in military-strategic and gee-political terms. According to 
this perspective, the contest between "the free world" and communism was dominant 
with South Africa a target of communist expansionism. Botha had a reputation for 
strident anti-communism and complete intolerance of militant black nationalism. 
Botha's practical concerns, furthermore, revolved around the security and survival of 
whites as a group (Barber and Barratt, 1990:248). 
Barber and Barratt regard South African policy toward neighbouring nations as 
an extension of South Africa's domestic conflict and overriding security concerns. 
Pretoria's attitude toward the ANC and SWAPO was of particular importance. The 
deterioration of the domestic security situation strengthened the "hawks" on regional 
policy who were determined not to relax against the border threat. The exertion of 
military might therefore became an increasingly prominent aspect of South Africa's 
regional policy. Indeed, the concept of Total National Strategy (TNS) was, for example, 
the product of a military mind-set. 
As stated in Section 4.4 it was crucial, in terms of the continued survival of the 
apartheid order in South Africa, to prevent the internal opponents of apartheid from 
believing that sabotage and armed resistance could be effective against white minority 
rule. Hence, Pretoria struck hard against the ANC and SWAPO bases with little regard 
for national borders. After the SADF's reluctant withdrawal from Angola early in 1976, 
largely due to the U.S. Senate passage of the Clark Amendment, South African military 
activity once again began to escalate. For example, the SADF's first deep penetration 
raid against SWAPO began in earnest under B.J. Vorster in 1978 (see Section 4.4.1 ). 
Soon afterwards, in 1979 under the leadership of P.W. Botha, South Africa's war 
against SWAPO began seriously and consistently (see Section 4.6). Angola, due to 
its ability to inflame radical black opposition, was regarded by South Africa as a threat 
more potent than Mozambique. 
The application of this sub-national domestic level approach to P.W. Botha's 
assumption to power, as an explanation of South Africa's militaristic actions in the 
region, has been a theoretically fruitful exercise in the context of the 1978-1986 period. 
This analysis is in accordance with Geldenhuys and Kotze's argument in "Aspects of · 
Political Decision-Making in South Africa" published in 1983. They perceive decision-
makers at the level of an individual or group and concern themselves with who makes 
decisions and where in order to explain South African actions. Geldenhuys and Kotze 
ascertain the best way to identify the locus of power in a decision-making system is by 
"institutional or structural analysis" which establishes exactly which individuals, groups 
and agencies within the government machinery are most influential (54 ). 
4.13 The Importance of the Global Order: 
The first paradigm or body of literature, concerned with the international system 
level, is of less relevance than the second paradigm considered above in Sections 
4.12.1 and 4.12.2. South Africa's vital security interests did, however, most definitely 
provide continuous justification for the SADF to maintain involvement in Angola, and 
southern Angola, in particular. 
Perhaps the first international development to affect South Africa's involvement 
in Angola, after the ascension of P.W. Botha to power, was the defeat of President 
Carter and his replacement by Ronald Reagan in 1980. While Carter had restricted 
American involvement in local wars of superpower competition -Reagan came to power 
with a policy of ending all wars of national liberation. This was accomplished by arming 
and financing client groups in so-called "low intensity conflicts." In Angola the chosen 
vehicle for a "low intensity" campaign was UNITA. As a result, P.W. Botha and those 
on whom he closely relied - General Magnus Malan and other Generals - were able to 
pursue their militaristic agenda in the region without being hindered by American 
opposition. 
The South Africa state's military leadership under P.W. Botha clearly felt that the 
SADF intervention in Angola was orchestrated in the defence of South Africa's vital 
security interests due to the combined Soviet and Cuban military presence. For further 
justification on this matter, please refer to Sections 4.5, 4. 7, 4.9.1, 4.9.2, and 4.1 O of 
this chapter. 
Barber and Barratt cite General Malan's observation that the "flood" of Soviet 
military equipment and its sophisticated nature were much more than necessary to 
cope with South African actions against SWAPO and UNITA's guerilla campaign. 
Malan therefore asked: 
whether this was not a prepositioning of military equipment to be used, 
ultimately, against South Africa [and claimed] that the Russians want to 
develop a firm stabilized base in Angola and then use the equipment and 
the personnel positioned there wherever necessary in the sub-continent. 
If you look at [South Africa's] massive reserves of strategic minerals, don't 
you ask yourself whether this mineral treasure house is not the cherry on 
top of the African cake? . . . The Communists want a black-white 
I 
polarization in South Africa so that they can attack our country with 
conventional military 'forces, knowing that not a single country in the 
world will lift a finger to help South Africa, because they [the Communists] 
would be acting against those white racists" (Barber and Barratt, 
1990:314). 
Malan further referred to UNITA as a "potent anti-communist force" which would 
be lost to the West if the Marxist forces were allowed to wipe it out. Barber and Barratt 
cite P.W. Botha calling on the US and other African nations to join in trying to rid the 
region of foreign troops. "Say to the Cu_bans 'go home,' and say to the Russians 'go 
home,' and the minute this happens, I will be prepared to settle all our military forces 
inside South Africa." If the Russians and Cubans were allowed to succeed in Angola, 
he said, the next target would be South West Africa (Namibia), followed by Botswana 
and then South Africa (Barber and Barratt, 1990:314). 
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER FOUR: 
( 1) Keith Somerville argues the economic problems facing the newly independent 
nation were compounded by the continuing guerrilla wars in Cabinda (FLEC), Za"ire 
Province (FNLA), as well as Moxico and parts of southern and central Angola (UNITA) 
(Somerville, 1986:47). 
(2) In order to resist the intrusions of FNLA soldiers into the slums of Luanda, the MPLA 
developed the "popular power" structures. Throughout the period of South Africa's 
initial intervention these committees had remained loyal to the MPLA. However, 
disillusion soon set in once the costs of reconstruction were realized and the MPLA 
came to exchange increasingly virulent accusations with its dissident faction. These 
developments caused the MPLA to think again about the rural peasantry as the heros 
of their struggle. After the suppression of the coup much was made of the fact the 
urban workers had never been adequately politicised and had not borne their share of 
the struggle (Birmingham, 1992:77). 
(3) Keith Somerville's account of Angolan conditions post independence, November 
1975, is much the same as David Birmingham's account. Somerville states: "The 
country's economy was in tatters, as a result of the liberation and civil wars, and there 
was a desperate shortage of skilled and managerial manpower resulting from the mass 
exodus of Portuguese settlers who has monopolised all such skills during the colonial 
period. The destruction of bridges, roads and transport vehicles meant that many 
areas were cut off from food and other essential supplies while the departure of the 
Portuguese had wrecked the distribution system, the wholesale and retail sectors'' 
(Somerville, 1986:47). 
(4) Over this period, political cells mushroomed in Luanda's shanty-towns for which 
there were a number of contributing factors. The withdrawal of industrial capital led to 
the closure of manufacturing plants and the creation of serious unemployment while, 
in the countryside, insecurity about an uncertain future resulted in an uncontrolled influx 
from the rural areas into urban centres (Birmingham, 1992:73, Bridgland, 1986:263). 
The events surrounding the attempted coup took place against a background of food 
shortages, the collapse of the distribution system, and resentment among poor blacks 
toward the privileged mesticos in government. Six days prior to the rebellion Agostinho 
Neto articulated the grievances of Luanda's urban population: "the problem of food 
supplies is serious. There is no cassava, no potatoes, no groundnuts, no palm oil. 
There is nothing on the market ... this situation pleases no one." Hence, under these 
circumstances, it was not surprising the urban poor came to resent the MPLA's 
stringent austerity programme (Somerville, 1986:51-52, Bridgland, 1986:263). 
(5) The plot was ill prepared and easily put down as is evidenced by the radio station 
and other building being recaptured by loyalist troops on the same day as they were 
seized by the rebels (Somerville, 1986:53). 
(6) The Cubans were embarrassed by the whole affair but chose to support the MPLA 
Government while the interests of Zaire and South Africa were still influenced by their 
"defeat" two years previously and they were therefore prepared to welcome any change 
of government. The USA was looking for signs of division and would have been willing 
to act as broker between Nita Alves and the respective leadership of both the FNLA 
and UNITA. Singled out for particular condemnation was France which was described 
by the MPLA as an interfering foreign power with an oil-thirsty and expansive Africa 
policy (Birmingham, 1992:80-81 ). 
The MPLA Government was chagrined the dissidents had such close ties to the Soviet 
Union to the extent that they may have expected Soviet diplomatic personnel to come 
to their rescue if the coup failed. However, Somerville argues "it is unlikely that 
given Alves' views on race and his criticism of the MPLA programme of reconstruction, 
which the Soviet Union was assisting, the Soviet Union would have risked its good 
relations with Angola by supporting a poorly planned coup attempt" (Somerville, 
1986:53-54). 
(7) Survivors who failed to flee were marched to "liberated zones" beyond the reach of 
government forces. By 1990, Africa Watch estimated thousands had been captured 
by UNITA guerrillas and transported to the south for the creation of an internal colony. 
Children were especially prized as future guerrilla recruits. Plough oxen were stolen 
and seed-corn, likewise, stolen or destroyed. Farm roads were strewn with hidden 
landmines with the intent to kill or maim peasants attempting to return to their fields. 
UNITA's policy of bringing the government to its knees by starving the rural population 
resulted in the death of half a million children during the 1980s. Malnutrition in the 
towns, where peasants sought to escape, was exacerbated by UNITA's attacks on 
supply convoys. Even medical convoys were unrelentingly ambushed. By the end of 
the decade, nearly two million already vulnerable people were further weakened by 
drought (Birmingham, 1992:82). 
(8) The forced relocation of thousands of farmers, due to the fighting, intensified the 
shortfall in food production in the 1980s. Many highlands people suspected that a 
change in government would bring an end to their hardship and UNITA remained 
surprisingly popular. Although the MPLA regained command of the city in the 1980s, 
it was eventually compelled to change its stance on the ongoing war in the provinces. 
With encouragement from Cuba, attempts were made to seek a policy of harmonization 
and economic reform. Unfortunately, the scale of corruption and inefficiency was so 
great that even the huge oil revenues were unable to compensate for Angola's decline 
(Birmingham, 1992:83). 
(9) General Jannie Geldenhuys, in referring to fellow South Africans, stated: "We were 
all small fry. During 1981 big fish Ronald Reagan took over from Jimmy Carter as 
President of the United States. During the decade of the 1980s he was to play a major 
role in the new directions that Southern Africa would follow" (Geldenhuys, 1995: 144). 
(10) The situation had parallels with the Nicaraguan situation in which the USA created 
and armed an artificial opposition in an attempt to overthrow a government whose 
policies were disliked by Washington. In Angola, however, the US Administration ran 
into difficulties having acquired an ostracised bedfellow and ally which promised to be 
an embarrassment. One of the reasons why the alliance between the United States 
and South Africa survived throughout the 1980s involved the demand for Namibian 
uranium which was needed in the nuclear energy industry. Nonetheless, South Africa 
was still intent on destabilizing Angola for gee-political reasons (Birmingham, 1992:84-
85). 
(11) As mentioned in the previous chapter, UNITA derived its majority support from the 
Ovambos in southern Angola. UNITA could potentially form a buffer between northern 
Namibia and a hostile Angolan government or, alternatively, create further problems 
for South Africa by continuing to support SWAPO. Pretoria therefore selected UNITA 
as its ally for strategic reasons (Barber and Barratt, 1990: 190-191 ). 
(12) Ian Gleeson, the last commander of the 101 Task Force, and his fellow 
commanders, Colonel Blackie de Swardt of the Air Force and Colonel Giep Booysen 
of Medical Services, were in command of Operation Reindeer. The fighting forces were 
under the command of Colonel Jan Breytenbach, Commandant Deon Ferreira, and 
Major Frank Bestbier (Geldenhuys, 1995:92). 
(13) "Moscow" was SWAPO's code name for Cassinga and "Vietnam" was their code 
name for Chetaquera (Geldenhuys, 1995:93). 
(14) Although SWAPO's denial was widely believed in both South Africa and abroad 
Steenkamp persuasively argues the overall evidence would indicate otherwise. Even 
if one were to ignore the SADF's claim to have found ample documentary proof of a 
significant military presence, there is little doubt that large amounts of war material 
were found and destroyed at Cassinga. Aerial photographs prove the town had a 
network of deep, well-planned trenches far too extensive for the needs of any refugee 
camp (Steenkamp, 1983: 18). 
(15) General Geldenhuys boasts that a foreign military officer said the following about 
the SADF's execution of Operation Reindeer: "Not even the Israelis would in one day 
have used more than 250 paratroopers and a mobile air reserve of 120 men in an 
airborne operation on a target 250 kilometres across an international border, and then 
fly them back in helicopters" (Geldenhuys, 1995:93). 
(16) General Geldenhuys sheds some light on the subject of battle events derailing 
political and diplomatic initiatives and seeks to shatter the myth that battles were 
launched with the specific aim of derailing negotiations. He states: "Should one look 
carefully at a political chronology ... a continuous record of conferences, meetings and 
discussions ... and it would have been almost impossible to have executed a [military) 
operation which would not have taken place just before or after some political event or 
other'' (Geldenhuys, 1995:200-201 ). 
(17) The notion of "being left in the lurch" is a recurrent theme and may refer to 
promises, implicit or otherwise,, made by Henry Kissinger regarding an American 
commitment to assist the South African intervention in 1975. It may also refer to the 
Senate vote in favour of the Clark Amendment. According to Barber and Barratt the 
Clark Amendment "caused deep resentment and a sense of betrayal in Pretoria and it 
led to Vorster's subsequent statement that the Americans would never be trusted again" 
(Barber and Barratt, 1990: 195). 
(18) To some extent the suspicions and fears of the apartheid regime regarding Soviet 
influence have been vindicated by the recent visit of a high ranking Soviet-era official 
to South Africa. Former KGB General Oleg Kalugin claimed the ultimate aim of the 
SACP was to use the ANC · as a means by which to acquire power. According to 
Kalugin "They [the SACP] would have tried gradually to capture the leadership [of the 
ANC]. This subjugation would have been achieved through deception as well as 
financial means ... The ANC was just another liberation movement exploited by the 
Soviets" (The Argus, September 22, 1995: 19). 
(19) Helmoed-R6mer Heitman's book War in Angola: The Final South African Phase, 
provides a very good summary of the main battle events and trends from the late 1970s 
until the cessation of South African involvement in Angola in 1988 (Heitman, 1990: 10-
19). 
(20) Jaster maintains the joint land and air attack by the SADF destroyed more than a 
dozen SWAPO camps inside Angola and Zambia (Jaster, 1988:93). This, however, 
does not take cognisance of the SADF's inadequate combat intelligence at the time. 
Since Operation Reindeer, the time at which the intelligence was gathered, some of 
SWAPO's bases had subsequently relocated. As a result, during Operation 
Rekstok/Safraan, the SADF attacked bases some of which were empty (Geldenhuys, 
1995:109). 
Nonetheless, Geldenhuys identified these operations as one of the most important 
turning points in the war. In addition, the first prior of Rekstok/Safraan was to gather 
operational information and everything else associated with combat intelligence. 
Information is usually collected in order to plan operations but, in this case, an 
operation was executed in order to gather information (Geldenhuys, 1995: 110). 
(21) Daniel Chipenda's FNLA troops, under the leadership of Commandant Jan 
Breytenbach, became known as Bravo Group and then were later to become known 
as 32 Battalion (Geldenhuys, 1995:57-58). 
(22) Private Conversation, February 1995, Cape Town, Republic of South Africa. 
(23) Western press reports revealed that the 32 Battalion had been engaged in military 
operations in southern Angola since 1979. Citing a British mercenary, formerly a 
member of the 32 Battalion, the reports claimed that areas captured by this force were 
turned over to UNITA (Somerville, 1986:63). 
(24) Although Operation Sceptic was one of the most extensive trans-border incursions 
launched by the SADF, few people, including serving South African soldiers are familiar 
with the name of Operation Sceptic of June 1980. This is because it became known 
by the almost universal misnomer, "Operation Smokeshell," after its opening 
engagement (Steenkamp, 1983: 167). 
(25) Due to raids by South African forces on both sides of the Namibian-Angolan border 
and in south western Zambia, during 1979 and early 1980, SWAPO had lost a high 
number of troops. SWAPO's operational and logistical infrastructure were also 
seriously disrupted. Morale among the rank-and-file was extremely low and there were 
consequently a large number of desertions. In addition, SADF intelligence received 
several reports of insurgents actually dying of hunger in outlying camps due to food 
shortages (Steenkamp, 1983: 167). 
(26) There were numerous incidents of young students being abducted by SWAPO and 
carried off to Angola for training (Steenkamp, 1983: 168). 
(27) When General Magnus Malan, Chief of the SADF, granted permission for the 
operation he made it clear no MPLA targets were to be attacked and that Angolans 
would be attacked only if they tried to intervene. In early May 1980 it was still possible 
for this policy to be applied as SWAPO/FAPLA integration had not yet proceeded to the 
stage where the two constituted a combined fighting force as was to happen very 
shortly ( Steenkamp, 1983: 169). 
(28) Commandant Chris Serfontein was in charge of battle group 10, Commandant J.M. 
Dippenaar in charge of battle group 61 and Commandant Jorrie Jordaan was in charge 
of battle group 53. The task force consisting of these three mechanised battle groups 
crossed the border 9 June. An area across the border was first secured by 
Commandant Anton van Graan. Brigadier Witkop Badenhorst, commander of Sector 
10 (Koakoland and Ovamboland) was in command of the operation (Geldenhuys, 
1995:120). 
(29) Smokeshell was an "ants nest" with _most of the SWAPO insurgents scattering to 
find safety at other bases. A combination of follow-up operations and search-and-
destroy missions were launched to locate and destroy them (Geldenhuys, 1995: 121 ). 
(30) In 1980 General Charles Lloyd took over from General Jannie Geldenhuys as 
GOC, SWA Command until the end of 1983. General Georg Meiring then took over the 
post from General Lloyd until the beginning of 1987 (Geldenhuys, 1995:144). _ 
When General Magnus Malan became Minister of Defence under P.W. Botha in 1980 
General Constand Viljoen succeeded him as Chief of the Defence Force and Gen 
Jannie Geldenhuys succeeded him as Chief of the Army (Geldenhuys, 1995: 126). 
(31) During Operation Protea, in August 1981, the SADF seized a Soviet operational 
map of the Xangongo base and surrounding area. The map annotated in detail the 
integrated Cuban, FAPLA and SWAPO artillery fire plan. This demonstrated beyond 
doubt that SWAPO occupied bases jointly with the Cubans and FAPLA. SWAPO 
soldiers also wore FAPLA uniforms (Geldenhuys, 1995: 137). 
(32) Following the South African success the SADF provided UNITA with increased 
logistical, military, and political support. A radio station was established on South 
African territory which purported to be a UNITA radio station broadcasting from UNITA 
controlled territory. The station, called the Voice of the Resistance of the Black 
Cockerel, carried UNITA battle claims and speeches by Savimbi. The South Africans 
also later established a news agency for Savimbi (Somerville, 1986:64). 
(33) During Operation Protea two Soviets officers were killed and one taken prisoner. 
Maj Ywvgenii Victorovich Kireev, chief artillery advisor, and Col Joseph Lamonovich, 
advisor to the political commissar, were killed. Warrant Officer Nilolai Pestretsof was 
captured ( Geldenhuys, 1995: 136). 
(34) The first confrontation between the SADF and FAPLA occurred during Operation 
Sceptic (Smokeshell) June 1980. 
(35) Robert Jaster claims the SADF's display of weapons seizures left no doubt that 
the operation had been directed against Angolan forces as opposed to SWAPO 
(Jaster, 1988:94). Somerville likewise asserts that SADF attacks were not, as Pretoria 
claimed, pre-emptive or hot-pursuit strikes against SWAPO but represented a 
calculated attempt to weaken the Angolan economy, aid UNITA and undermine the 
MPLA Government (Somerville, 1986:65). However, these observations do not take 
account of the cooperative relationship, and the degree of integration which had 
occurred, between Soviet, Cuban, MPLA and SWAPO forces as of 1980. 
(36) Captain Jan Haugaard was in command of Operation Super (January 1982), 
Operation Meebos (July and August 1982) and Operation Phoenix (February 1983) 
( Geldenhuys, 1995: 146). 
These operations - and their predecessors - placed intense pressure, militarily and 
politically, on the dos Santos government. Already denied access to the southern third 
of the nation, where operations by SADF units and UNITA amounted to a virtual 
occupation of the territory, the MPLA Government by 1982 faced repeated air and 
ground assaults which Luanda was impotent to halt (Jaster, 1980:95). 
(37) According to Somerville, as a result of the fighting and of American pressure on 
both Angola and South Africa, talks began between Luanda and Pretoria with American 
officials acting as intermediaries (Somerville, 1996:67). 
(38) Robert Jaster argues Operation Askari was launched, in December 1983, in 
anticipation of the cease-fire and certainly in response to SADF reservations about 
withdrawing their troops from Angola. He also argues Operation Askari was officially 
undertaken for the purpose of preempting SWAPO's annual rainy season offensive 
implying that it was actually undertaken for the more sinister reasons mentioned 
(Jaster, 1988:97). 
(39) Operation Askari occurred soon after General George Meiring had taken over from 
General Charles Lloyd as GOC, SWA Command. 
(40) General Geldenhuys maintains this force retreated after suffering 324 casualties 
in comparison with the SADF's relatively meagre 24 losses (Geldenhuys, 1995: 155). 
Robert Jaster tells a slightly different story from that of General Geldenhuys vis-a-vis 
the success of Operation Askari. According to Jaster, Operation Askari met 
unexpectedly heavy opposition from regular Angolan forces. Committing their Soviet 
T-43 tanks to battle for the first time, the Angolans were able to counter-attack a SADF 
armoured column and inflict heavy casualties. The SADF acknowledged the loss of 24 
troops which was the largest number of South Africans killed in any single engagement_ 
up until that time. He points out, additionally, that Western diplomatic sources believed 
SADF casualties to be much higher (Jaster, 1988:97). 
(41) General Geldenhuys believes, although it was not their intention, Operation Askari 
convinced the Angolans to engage in discussions with South Africa over a cessation 
of hostilities in southern Angola (Geldenhuys, 1995: 157). 
However, if Jaster's less sanguine assessment of Operation Askari is the more 
accurate one, then Operation Askari may well have also given the South Africans the 
impetus to investigate a cessation of hostilities. Furthermore, Somerville describes the 
exertion of American pressure on both Angola and South Africa to seek a resolution to 
the fighting which was also undoubtedly a factor (see note 37). 
(42) Firstly; the northernmost part of the area was cleared, then the zone immediately 
south of it and then the zone still further south, and so on, until the SWNNamibia-
Angola border was reached ( Geldenhuys, 1995: 157). 
(43) It is not commonly known that South African troops had already been south of the 
border for quite some time before the Lusaka Accord was signed. However, as they 
were not believed, the SADF actually had to send troops back into Angola so that they 
could be visibly withdrawn in terms of the agreement (Geldenhuys, 1995:157-158). 
(44) This discussion, on the subject of Angolan and SWAPO violations of the Lusaka 
Accord, is covered in Geldenhuys, A General's Story from pages 158 to 164. 
Helmoed-Romer Heitman's assessment of Angolan and SWAPO behaviour toward the 
Lusaka Accord is even bleaker than that described by General Geldenhuys. Heitman 
argues Luanda hoped the combined impact of the Lusaka Accord and American 
political pressure would remove the South African presence leaving FAPLA free to 
concentrate on crushing UNITA. To this end the Angolans delayed the work of the JMC 
in supervising the SADF withdrawal, giving FAPLA time to deal with UNITA, before 
reneging on the agreement and resuming their support for SWAPO. The Angolans 
reasoned that, while the South Africans were busy with the JMC, they would not be in 
a position to pose a military threat or to assist UNITA (Heitman, 1990: 12). 
(~5) A_fter the withdrawal of the SADF from Angola, in April 1985, SWAPO exploited the 
srtuatron and began once again to operate across the border from their bases in 
~ngo_la. By the end of August the Angolan side were responsible for as many as 63 
vrolatrons of the Lusaka Accord while only three breaches were recorded against South 
Africa in the same manner. lt was therefore not surprising the SADF felt they were left 
with no option but to resume their operations against SWAPO despite the signing of the 
Lusaka Accord (Geldenhuys, 1995: 161-.162). 
Operation Boswilger, which commenced 29 June 1985 and ended 48 hours later, saw 
the SADF follow the tracks of SWAPO soldiers from Namibia back to their bases in 
three different parts of Angola. After the attack the SADF once again withdrew across 
the border (Geldenhuys, 1995: 163). 
(46) Somerville's view is completely different from the account provided by Geldenhuys 
and Heitman. Somerville states "It soon became clear that Pretoria had no real 
intention of withdrawing its troops and every intention of gaining its benefits from the 
accord without fulfilling its side of the bargain" (Somerville, 1986:67). 
(47) There was indeed virtually no fighting between the SADF and FAPLA with SWAPO 
being the notable exception to this arrangement. The SADF's operations against 
SWAPO continued as before due to SWAPO's apparent refusal to abide by the 
provisions of the Lusaka Accord. 
(48) The FAPLA offensive was known as Operation Second Congress (Heitman, 
1990:14) 
( 49) The Cazombo front was too far away from the border to receive direct South 
African support. As well, the size of the FAPLA force vastly overwhelmed the forces 
available to UNITA on that front. Under the circumstances, South Africa advised 
UNITA not to contest the issue there, under impossible odds, but to re-deploy their 
forces so as to reinforce the Mavinga front. The SAAF assisted UNITA in its withdrawal 
and re-deployment (Heitman, 1990:14). · 
(50) The number of casualties was high. UNITA estimated FAPLA losses at 1 043 
killed and roughly 1 300 wounded. Among those killed were 10 Soviets and 56 
Cubans. The SADF estimated UNITA losses at 1 500 killed (Heitman, 1990:15). 
(51) At a later stage Cuba, like the Soviet Union, would also send to Angola part of their 
strategic reserve for conflict in their own region (Geldenhuys, 1995: 190). 
(52) Jaster's assertion, which appears probable, is not substantiated by General 
Geldenhuys in his account of the events. 
(53) In terms of the importance of the regional power balance it is important to 
remember that, throughout the 1980s, South Africa was the unrivalled superpower in 
the region both in economic and military terms. In 1984 the GDP per capita was (in US 
dollars) $530 in Lesotho, $760 in Zimbabwe, $960 in Botswana, and a comparatively 
enormous $2 340 in South Africa. The fact that no World Bank figures are available 
for Angola and Mozambique bears sad testimony of the devastation of their economies. 
The GDP figures for 1986 are $210 in Mozambique, $370 in Lesotho, $620 in 
Zimbabwe, $840 in Botswana and $1 850 in South Africa with no figure available for 
Angola. Throughout the mid to late 1980s, the most imposing structural characteristic 
of Southern African affairs remained the virtually unchallenged economic domination 
of South Africa (World Development Report, 1986, 1988). 
(54) The notion of structure as used by Deon Geldenhuys and Hennie Kotze is distinct 
from the notion of structure as used by Kenneth Waltz. 
CHAPTER V: 
THE FINAL PERIOD: THE PROCESS AND DEPARTURE OF ALL 
MAJOR FOREIGN INFLUENCES FROM THE ANGOLAN CONFLICT AND 
SOUTH AFRICAN WITHDRAWAL (1987-1988) 
According to Chester Crocker, in July 1987 the end of the conflicts which 
characterised Southern Africa still seemed like a distant dream. Nonetheless, what 
were the final eighteen months of the Reagan era were also among the most eventful 
in the modern history of the region. By January 1988, the Cubans had joined the peace 
process as acknowledged participants and agreement had been achieved on the basic 
linkage principle - Namibian independence and total Cuban troop withdrawal. By May 
1988, the Angolans, Cubans and South Africans were enticed to the bargaining table 
for direct talks under U.S. mediation in London. This meeting was a watershed of sorts 
and the preceding nine months leading up to the London meeting represented a period 
of decisive flux. 
This final period of external intervention illustrated a certain interplay, a 
relationship of sorts, between international political developments and the events 
occurring on Angolan battlefields. This final end-period of marathon negotiations was 
also witness to some of the heaviest fighting of the entire Angolan engagement. 
Hence, Chapter Fiv~ is initially divided according to two historical dimensions. They 
are firstly; the strategic and tactical dimension, and secondly; the international political 
and diplomatic dimension. This chapter commences with the military dimension and 
specifically with the Battle of Lomba River of 1987. 
5.1 Strategic and Tactical Dimension: 
The Battle of Lomba River, September 1987: 
In early 1987, SADF intelligence sources perceived a very large build-up of 
MPLA forces in south eastern Angola believed to be aimed at capturing the town of 
Mavinga and then moving toward Jamba, UNITA's heartland (1 ). In the final months 
of 1987, the war in Angola escalated when Angolan forces launched a major offensive 
against UNITA's forward position at Mavinga in the south east. As had been the case 
in the 1985 campaign against UNITA, the SADF intervened directly on UNITA's behalf 
against the 1987 offensive. This resulted in a series of actions culminating in the Battle 
of Lomba River in which the south eastern thrust was repulsed by a combined SADF 
and UNITA force. Combined SADF and UNITA forces then thrust north west and 
eventually halted on the Eastern Bank of the Cuito River (2). Limited to a front of only 
ten kilometres the conflict of Lomba River took place over a period of five days in mid 
September. A number of limited battles were fought in the area and were later to 
become known as part of "The Battle for Cuito Cuanavale" (Embleton, 1994:2, Heitman, 
1990:53-64). 
South Africa was the victor in the 1987 campaign which represented a stunning 
humiliation for the Soviet Union and Soviet strategy. The Soviet orchestrated FAPLA 
offensive was smashed at the Lomba River near Mavinga resulting in a headlong 
retreat of close to 200 kilometres back to their launching point at Cuito Cuanavale (see 
Maps, Appendices Seven and Eight). A combined force of 8 000 UNITA fighters and 
4 000 SADF troops destroyed an entire F APLA brigade and "mauled" several others 
out of a total FAPLA force of 18 000 (3). Estimated FAPLA losses ranged upwards of 
4 000 killed and wounded. From start to finish, the whole endeavour was Soviet 
orchestrated with senior Soviet officers playing a central role in its execution. Roughly 
$1.5 billion in Soviet military hardware had arrived that year with huge quantities 
destroyed or seized by UNITA and the SADF when FAPLA broke into a disorganised 
retreat. As a result, paradoxically, the Soviet Union became the largest external source 
of arms to UNITA and South Africa (Crocker, 1993:360). 
The South African force could not immediately leave the battle area in the wake 
of their success as it was important to ensure the new situation would not soon be 
reversed (4). In order to secure the most advantageous security situation it was 
necessary to reinforce the Cuito River as an obstacle on which UNITA could base its 
future defence of the area (5). In terms of military doctrine, the line of exploitation was 
the Cuito River and the forces earmarked to take over from the SADF for the defence 
of the area was UNIT A. For this to be successful the SADF viewed it as imperative to 
form a tank force for UNITA. This was to be done by using tanks which had been 
captured from FAPLA. While they were securing the area the SADF also bombarded 
the Cuito Cuanavale Airfield with G-Ss rendering it unusable by mid October (6). In 
addition to destroying the airfield the SADF and UNITA pinned down thousands of 
FAPLA's remaining units clinging onto the town's defensive parameters. The situation 
was so severe, there was the risk of a complete FAPLA collapse in the south of Angola 
(Crocker, 1993:360-361, Geldenhuys, 1995:217-218). 
5.1.1 Further SADF-UNITA Mopping Up Operations: 
In November the SADF and UNITA launched further attacks. Battles fought 
9, 11, 13 and 17 November resulted in all elements, which had taken part in the 
offensive against Jamba and which still found themselves east of the Cuito River, now 
being driven back to within 24 kilometres east of the river. Although it was to prove too 
late to make a difference Castro nonetheless decided to strengthen the Cuban force. 
The 50th Division, which was to form the bulk of additional ground forces, began 
arriving in Angola in mid November. In mid December FAPLA was still receiving Cuban 
reinforcements including Cuban soldiers, T-62 tanks, MiG-23s and "some of our best 
pilots." These reinforcements were placed in the general Cuito Cuanavale area and, 
therefore, came under the fire of the SADF's G-5 guns (7) (Geldenhuys, 1995:218-219, 
Heitman, 1990:295). 
General Geldenhuys announced, 5 December 1987, the SADF would commence 
with a tactical withdrawal executed under operational conditions and that fighting could 
still take place. The troops scheduled to withdraw first were those not required to 
safeguard the area or to assist in the formation of UNITA's tank force. Toward the end 
of the month UNITA was able to take Munhango, Savimbi's birthplace, with the use of 
four T-55 tanks which had earlier been seized from FAPLA. The campaign entered its 
final phase with successful SADF-UNITA attacks on 13 January and 14 and 25 
February 1988. As a result, all FAPLA and Cuban forces which had participated in the 
Jamba offensive were driven west of the Cuito River. However, there remained one 
small FAPLA presence in the Tumpo area immediately east of the river (Geldenhuys, 
1995:219). 
5.2 Political and Diplomatic Dimension: 
The Cuban Offering, July - August 1987: 
The first major diplomatic development of this era was a five-day visit to Cuba 
by dos Santos commencing 30 July 1987. Upon its conclusion, 3 August, Castro and 
dos Santos issued a communique confirming their willingness "jointly to pursue the 
negotiations resumed in Luanda in mid-July." The next day a new Angolan-Cuban 
proposal was sent to Washington offering a reduction from three to two years in the 
timetable for the withdrawal of the 20 000 or more Cuban troops in the southern sector. 
The new bid was linked to a date for implementation of Resolution 435, an end to 
support for UNITA, and the end of all foreign interference in Angolan affairs. The 
Angolan Government representative, Mbinda, proposed US-mediated talks among 
military experts and proximity talks in order to bring SWAPO into the fold. Although dos 
Santos ran no risk that both Pretoria or Washington might agree the proposal of August 
4, in itself, represented a modest step forward (Crocker, 1993:354). 
The American Administration, 27 July, received a message from Castro. 
Saliently, his unofficial emissary proposed that Cuba join the US-MPLA talks. In 
essence, Cuba was prepared to work with the United States and the Angolans in order 
to achieve a solution. If a negotiated settlement did not occur then it was made clear 
Cuba was fully prepared to stay and fight another ten years if necessary. If, on the 
other hand, Cuba were to participate in a negotiating process, which clearly and directly 
affected Cuban interests, then it could assist in bringing about a solution. Castro 
wanted an urgent reply to his proposals, within forty-eight hours, prior to the arrival of 
dos Santos in Havana. 
From this overture it could be inferred that a deal entailing Cuban troop 
withdrawal was of vital importance to Castro. Although Castro's message was guarded, 
it was apparent Cuba was interested in scaling down its Angolan entanglement. Castro 
seemed to be implying that it would be beneficial if the twelve-year engagement of 
Cuban forces in Angola were concluded on honourable terms. The massive burden of 
Cuban involvement, more onerous in percentage terms than the American engagement 
in Vietnam at its peak, was not popular within Cuba. Furthermore, Angola was no 
longer keeping up with its hard-currency payments to Cuba. As well, there were 
additional factors which assist in explaining the sudden bid by Castro for a role in the 
negotiating process in summer 1987 (8) (Crocker, 1993:355-356, Bridgland, 1990:337). 
5.2.1 Cuban Dissatisfaction with its Allies: 
The Cuban military did not agree with their Soviet partner regarding military 
strategy. A debate broke out over probable SADF ground and air responses to another 
FAPLA thrust toward Mavinga and Jamba and as a result, arguing against the 1987 
Soviet-Angolan battle, Cuba played only a minimal role in it. Soviet military and 
Communist Party hardliners wanted the 1987 offensive and, because they paid the bills 
and supplied the hardware, the Soviet Union prevailed in allied decision-making. 
Castro felt he was hostage to, on the one hand, a poorly led strategic alliance and, on 
the other, to an inept local regime. Therefore, it was conceivable that Castro's bid to 
join the negotiating process could be viewed as an opportunity to acquire influence 
over decisions which affected Cuban interests (Crocker, 1993:356, Bridgland, 
1990:341 ). 
Secondly; Castro, in keeping with his grandiose sense of destiny, was 
committed to Cuba playing a distinct role in the world. In Chester Cracker's 
characterisation, Cuban policy "contained a blend of old-fashioned military adventurism 
and a sort of Robin Hood Marxism based on solidarity among the underdogs." 
According to Crocker, the new global fluidity represented both an opportunity and a 
potential threat to Castro. He had never forgotten how the superpowers had settled the 
1962 Cuban missile crisis over his head without regard for Cuban interests and, 
therefore, was intent that never happen again. Hence, he was deemed likely by the 
Americans to seek a visible role in the negotiating process over the future of what was 
the flagship of Cuban internationalist policy. 
5.3 Political and Diplomatic Dimension: 
Engaging the South Africans, August 1987 - January 1988: 
The period between August 1987 and January 1988 represented one of 
momentous change. Within weeks of their bid, discussed in Section. 5.2, the US 
informed the Angolans that further improvement to their proposal would be necessary 
prior to it being taken to Pretoria in an attempt to reengage the South Africans. Pretoria 
would categorically reject any formula for partial Cuban withdrawal. Nonetheless, 
there was adequate material to justify two informal meetings between the.Americans 
and Angolans, in September 1987, in Luanda and then Brussels. The South Africans 
expressed interest in the American-MPLA meetings and complained they were not 
being kept fully informed. The South Africans were expressing a flicker of interest in 
the diplomatic process which, unbeknown to the participants, was soon to be 
overshadowed by some of the most ferocious fighting of the entire conflict 
(Crocker, 1993:358-359). 
5.4 Political and Diplomatic Dimension: 
Engaging the Soviet Union and Cuba, November - December 1987: 
American officials began to perceive mounting disgust with the Angolan fighting, 
on the part of Soviet diplomats and academics, once the scale of the disaster at the 
Battle of Lomba River became known. Soviet strategy lay in ruins. Mid-November, US 
representatives Mike Armacost and Peter Rodman met with Deputy Foreign Minister 
Yuli Vorontsov and Vladellin Vasev in Geneva. Reportedly, the Soviets were defensive 
and edgy. When Vasev pursued the idea of including the Cubans in the talks, 
Armacost agreed to consider it if the MPLA put forward interesting new ideas. 
Responding to the question of whether the Cubans were ready to leave, Vasev replied 
lfJiltir Vif?§gi1'41 
a~irmatively, but added that the Soviet Union was not prepared to "throw Angola to the 
wolves." The Soviets were humiliated and their strategy in tatters but neither were they 
willing to suddenly reverse course in Southern Africa or hand the Americans what 
would be perceived as a diplomatic victory (Crocker, 1993:361 ). 
Meanwhile, in an exchange with Cuban Vice Foreign Minister Ricardo Alarcon, 
4 November, he complained to an American official that the USA had "changed its 
mind" about Cuban participation since August. A few days later, at a lunch with an 
American diplomat, Alarcon communicated that a settlement would enable Cuba to 
terminate honourably a very heavy commitment. However, in an exchange 20 
November in Mexico City, the tone had changed and Alarcon said he no longer felt "the 
same optimism" as he had previously. He now argued that an early American meeting 
with the MPLA, even with Cuban participation, would not necessarily be fruitful. The 
reason cited for this sudden change was P.W. Botha's mid-November visit to Savimbi's 
Angolan headquarters with members of the South African cabinet. Alarcon further cited 
statements by Botha, Malan, and Geldenhuys which laid out the rationale for SADF 
intervention. Essentially, provided with a choice between seeing UNITA defeated or 
halting "Russian aggression," South Africa had chosen the latter. Further cited as 
reason for Cuba's sudden disinterest, was General Geldenhuys' argument that the 
survival of UNITA served essential South African national interests by blocking access 
by SWAPO and the ANC to much of Southern Angola for the purpose of infiltrating 
Namibia (9) (Crocker, 1993:362). 
Likewise, by mid-December 1987, the Angolan representative was maintaining 
a similarly gloomy line and abandoned an earlier proposal for a December meeting 
requesting, instead, a one month delay. He argued the present climate did not favour 
talks and that, since Brussels, the Americans had failed to provide him with satisfactory 
answers to his demands concerning American aid to UNITA as well as Cuban 
participation. Luanda was displeased with Reagan's public reference to UNITA's 
"heres" at the Battle of Lomba River as well as with Savimbi's statements testifying to 
the effectiveness of American military· support. The Angolans did not believe 
negotiations should take place while there were still thousands of SADF troops in 
Angola in contravention of UN Security Council Resolution 602 (Crocker, 1993:362, · 
Jaster, 1988: 101 ). 
Resolution 602, adopted unanimously 25 November, condemned the 
intervention and called for South African withdrawal by 10 December. Pik Botha 
rejected the Security Council Resolution and declared South Africa would remain in 
Angola as long as the Cubans and Soviets did and as long as Pretoria's security 
required it. However, as stated in Section 5.1.1, General Geldenhuys announced 5 
December that his forces had achieved their military objectives. The SADF had 
therefore begun a "tactical disengagement under operational conditions" or, in other 
words, a gradual retreat that could be interrupted by combat (Crocker, 1993:363, 
Geldenhuys, 1995:219). 
In the second half of 1987, the Cubans played a distinctly secondary role in the 
fighting. As stated in Section 5.2.1, Havana disagreed with the Soviet battle plan and 
had done little to advance it. According to Crocker, by November, it was fair to say the 
Cubans had a lead role in neither the diplomacy nor the war. Nonetheless, events 
compelled one of the failed alliance to act. Castro, untainted by association with a 
failed strategy, was free to seize upon the void in leadership. In early November: the 
three Communist allies met during the seventieth anniversary of the Bolshevik 
Revolution. Castro later described how he had worked out a plan with dos Santos, 7 
November, and then had informed the Soviets. His military game plan, in which Cuba 
would assume the strategic lead, was met with initial Soviet scepticism (Crocker, 
1993:363-365, Bridgland, 1990:341). 
5.5 Strategic and Tactical Dimension: 
Dramatic Cuban Escalation: 
The military game plan arising from the meeting between Castro and dos 
Santos, in early November 1987, called for a dramatic escalation of the Cuban military 
commitment. Cuba would dispatch up to 15 000 additional troops to Angola, replace 
some conscript units, and deploy the vaulted 50th Division and other front-line combat 
units as well as the top air force pilots. Placed in charge of the Cuban escalation were 
four of the most experienced commanders from earlier African wars. Cuban ground 
forces were immediately authorized to move south of the 15th parallel, their traditional 
southern perimeter, and to move their primary defence lines to within some 320 
kilometres north of the Namibian border. After dos Santos endorsed Castro's plan in 
mid November, additional Cuban forces began arriving in Angola. The priority was the 
deployment of ground and air forces to assist FAPLA to hold Cuito Cuanavale although, 
as previously stated, it was too late to make any differe_nce (Crocker, 1993:365-366, 
Heitman, 1990:295-296, Bridgland, 1990:341-342). 
By taking up positions around the periphery of Cuito and pinning down its 
defenders, it appeared the SADF and UNITA aimed to seize it (10). With the view to 
help FAPLA defend the besieged town, the first three hundred Cuban reinforcements 
began arriving in Cuito Cuanavale in early December 1987 so as to prevent "the 
military and political catastrophe" that was expected to result if the FAPLA force at 
Cuito Cuanavale were "annihilated." A Cuban infantry regiment and a tank company 
later arrived from Menongue so as to strengthen the FAPLA defences (11 ). Bypassing 
FAPLA's chain of command the much decorated Cuban General, Cintra Frias, was 
placed in charge in Angola (12) (Crocker, 1993:366, Geldenhuys, 1995:237-238, 
Heitman, 1990:295). 
Castro began filling south western Angola with a major deployment of 
conventional combat power. Their first deployments in the south were all west of the 
Cunene River which the Cubans used to protect their eastern flank against any South 
African response. Once it became evident that the South Africans were not going to 
respond, Cuban forces then began deploying their forces in the area opposite Ovambo. 
In a reassertion of Angolan sovereignty the Cubans planned to reoccupy Cunene 
Province right up to the SWA/Namibian border. This would have the effect of permitting 
SWAPO to regain access to its most desirable sanctuary by which to infiltrate 
Ovamboland (Crocker, 1993:366, Heitman, 1990:296, Bridgland, 1990:342). 
The Cuban deployment continued to expand. By February 1988, an advance 
force of 3 500 had moved south into Cunene Province and established bases near the 
SWA/Namibian border. By late May, Cuba had established a new southern front 
roughly parallel with the border. It extended from Namibe througl1 Chibemba, Cahama, 
Humbe, Xangongo, Cuvelai and Cassinga The front was manned by between 11 000 
to 12 000 of Cuba's best units organised into three task forces. It was protected by 
MiG-23s and helicopter gun ships located, only 60 kilometres from the border, at the 
newly upgraded air bases at Cahama and Xangongo. The Cubans were exceedingly 
well-equipped with two hundred tanks, air defence radars and five different types of 
surface-to-air missile systems (Crocker, 1993:366-367, Heitman, 1990:296, 
Geldenhuys, 1995:237-238, Bridgland, 1990:342). 
5.6 Political and Diplomatic Dimension: 
Cuba's Pivotal Role; Castro's Gamble, February 1988: 
By this time, the tripartite peace talks had already commenced in London and 
interpreting Cuban intentions was not a simple matter. Castro was adding significantly 
to the Cuban military commitment stripping some of his best units and equipment for 
deployment to Angola. According to Crocker, Castro's unilateral escalation risked 
being misperceived and could trigger a major confrontation. Castro hoped to turn the 
tables on Pretoria forcing the South Africans to chose between a settlement acceptable 
to Cuba or else risk a conventional military confrontation. Castro's gamble would have 
to pay off quickly or he could face the undesirable choice of deescalating having 
achieved nothing or becoming more deeply involved in an even deeper quagmire .. 
According to Crocker, Cuban forces were capable of confronting the South 
Africans with visible displays of prowess and, by moving southward into Angola's 
contested areas, the Cubans could raise the stakes of South African involvement (13). 
In contrast to this evaluation of the Cuban gamble, which Crocker has portrayed as full 
of risk, Heitman offers a somewhat more cynical account. By carefully deploying the 
50th Division in south western Angola the Cubans were thought to be safe from any 
actual contact with the South African forces. "Having rattled his sabre convincingly 
enough to save face, but not so alarmingly that the South Africans would feel compelled 
to attack, he [Castro] could then negotiate his way out of Angola." Indeed, while the 
generals were deploying the 50th Division, and other elements into south western 
Angola, Cuban diplomats devoted themselves to seeking a negotiated settlement (14) 
(Crocker, 1993:367-368, Heitman, 1990:296). 
Castro had decided in late 1987 to design an honourable exit from Angola but, 
to get out of Angola with honour intact, he had to espouse the much-reviled linkage 
doctrine. Linkage became the one formula by which the Cubans could go home having 
accomplished a satisfactory state of affairs with the end of SADF intervention in Angola 
and the implementation of Resolution 435 for Namibian independence. In order to 
succeed on this course it was necessary, firstly, to hood-wink a number of audiences 
into believing that Cuba was compelling Pretoria to the table. Secondly, Castro would 
need to persuade Washington that, while he was ready for a wider war, he preferred 
a balanced settlement based on linkage. These two conditions had no hope of 
succeeding if the South Africans refused to engage in peace negotiations. Finally, 
Castro had to succeed in convincing the Angolan Government they were not being 
abandoned by their internationalist ally (Crocker, 1993:368-369, Heitman, 1990:296). 
5.7. Strategic and Tactical Dimension: 
Battle of Cuito Cuanavale, February - March, 1988: 
The turning point in the southern war was what came to be known as the Battle 
of Cuito Cuanavale fought in south eastern Angola (see Map, Appendix Nine). The 
battle can be viewed as having three phases: Operation Modular, Operation Hooper 
and finally Operation Packer. According to General Geldenhuys the names are 
misleading as they in no way signified strategic or tactical phases of the campaign. 
The names were allocated merely to indicate the three main periods in which units and 
personnel performed operational duty and, beyond this, had no significance (15). 
The main South African forces were the 61 mechanized battalion with 4 SAi (Fourth 
South African Infantry Battalion) in reserve and the 32 battalion (16) (Embleton, 
1994:14, Geldenhuys, 1995:209-210). 
A press statement of 20 February 1988 reiterated that the SADF were engaged 
in a tactical withdrawal but explained once again that it was being done under 
operational conditions and proceeding slowly (17). Meanwhile, the international 
diplomatic negotiations had begun to acquire momentum. As of March a negotiated 
settlement was in sight with an agreement achieved for the first round of tripartite talks 
to take place between Angola, Cuba and South Africa. Nonetheless, the SADF 
deemed it advisable to maintain a small military presence east of the Cuito River due 
to the possibility that FAPLA would try one last time to improve their position before the 
onset of negotiations. The South Africans suspected Castro of harbouring an immense 
desire for something that could be presented as a Cuban victory so as to restore his 
wounded pride (Geldenhuys, 1995:221, Heitman, 1990:303, Bridgland, 1990:345). 
The SADF's Citizen Force, 82 Brigade, established a presence east of the Cuito 
(18). The remaining FAPLA forces were concentrated at Cuito Cuanavale and Tumpo. 
The last battle was launched by the SADF's Citizen Force at Tumpo, 23 March, in an 
attempt to deliver a final blow in the battles east of the Cuito River (19). The SADF 
force, however, encountered a Cuban mine field of a very sophisticated nature (20). 
According to Commandant Gerhard Lauw "the enemy had us pinned down in the mine 
field ... and they had the chance of shooting out the Oliphants one by one. Fortunately 
the mine field was just inside the tree line. If it had been on the open ground, [the 
result would have been different]." The SADF broke off the attack and the result was 
inconclusive (21) (Geldenhuys, 1995:221-222, Bridgland, 1990:328-329). 
In the attack F APLA suffered considerable losses but the SADF none apart from 
three tanks mired in the Cuban mine field. According to General Geldenhuys, this was 
FAPLA's "success" of the war but argues "one cannot score a try in you own half of the 
field!" (22). While Geldenhuys jests about FAPLA believing to have scored a success 
it is nonetheless apparent the SADF also did not emerge victorious either (Geldenhuys, 
1995:222). 
Commandant Gerhard Louw's mission had been to drive the FAPLA-Cuban 
presence out of the Tumpo area, hold the captured terrain until last light on 23 March, 
and finally, allow field engineers to move in and blow up, once and for all, the bridge 
across the Cuito River. However, all attempts to displace the FAPLA-Cuban presence 
from the last postage stamp of land of the east bank of the Cuito River had failed. By 
the end of March, with 800 Cuban troops now dug in around Cuito Cuanavale, the 
SADF was finally convinced that it was impossible to destroy the Angolan bridgehead 
from the east without a massive increase in South African forces and the loss of 
hundreds of South African lives (23). According to Fred Bridgland "Tumpo ... was the 
only clear defeat the SADF suffered in the War for Africa" (Geldenhuys, 1995:221-222, 
Bridgland, 1990:324-334). 
In terms of the "war" as interpreted by the international press, South Africa was 
defeated and the Cubans victorious. However, the "Battle of Cuito Cuanavale" only 
really became a battle when referred to in a speech by Castro in July 1988 and was, 
in retrospect, a political creation (24). General Geldenhuys is adamant the SADF did 
not attack Cuito Cuanavale and stated: "How the Angolans, at such a late stage as 
April 1988, could still think or claim that we wanted to attack Cuito Cuanavale is 
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puzzling. It was practically impossible." The SADF would have had to cross the Cuito 
River which would have been futile as they lacked the wading capability of the Soviet 
tanks. According to Geldenhuys, "If we had wanted to reach Cuito Cuanavale during 
those last few weeks, we would have had to have positioned a sufficiently strong force 
west of the river before the time" (Geldenhuys, 1995:224-227, Embleton, 1994:3). 
5.7.1 Who Won the Battle of Cuito Cuanavale: (25) 
From the point of view of the South African military the war over Jamba 
represented, beyond any doubt, a combined SADF and UNITA victory (26). The SADF 
and UNITA sought to destroy the offensive against Jamba which they maintain they 
accomplished even before FAPLA could cross the Lomba River. The FAPLA offensive 
had been entirely driven west of the Cuito River with the exception of one isolated spot, 
Tumpo, east of the river. The offensive against Jamba had failed and, as far as SADF 
were concerned, the war in south eastern Angola had been decided (27) (Geldenhuys, 
1995:227). 
While it is patently clear to General Geldenhuys that his forces never even 
contemplated attacking Cuito Cuanavale, a conviction supported by Heitman, there 
nonetheless exist notable views to the contrary (28). Those holding the view that Squth 
Africa was defeated at Cuito Cuanavale include, among others, Hasu Patel, Rob 
Davies, Horace Campbell, David Birmingham, and Thomas Ohlson (29). According to 
Patel, "South Africa's defeat at Cuito Cuanavale in mid-1988 illuminated the fact that 
there were limits to its regional hegemonic ambitions." According to Campbell, the 
SADF failed to take Cuito Cuanavale in "major ground battles" in January, February 
and March. Campbell further asserts that "by the end of March [1988] the South 
African siege was over and the South Africans themselves were trapped and under 
seige" (Geldenhuys, 1995:227-229, Heitman, 1990:295-298, Patel, 1992:268, 
Campbell, 1989:12-13). 
A less severe and more balanced account of the South African defeat is 
provided by Thomas Ohlson. Ohlson argues, due to the likelihood of incurring heavy 
casualties in a conventional attack on Cuito, Pretoria opted for a lengthy artillery battle 
instead. Cuito defences held resulting in a military deadlock which increasingly turned 
into a strategic disadvantage for Pretoria. In a move to regain the initiative UNITA, 
supported by the SADF, launched an attack on the north of Guano Cubango and Bie 
and Mexico provinces in March 1988. Two important South African tactical objectives 
were not achieved: firstly; Cuito Cuanavale did not fall and secondly; SADF-UNITA 
forces did not take the towns of Cuemba and Luena further to the north. The SADF's 
reputation for invincibility was left in tatters and UNITA was not strengthened as had 
been hoped but, on the contrary, were inflicted with heavy losses due to an ill-advised 
switch of tactics. Ohlson also comments that South African vulnerabilities were 
revealed throughout its lengthy intervention in Angola (30). David Birmingham likewise 
argues a number of points similar to those argued by Thomas Ohlson (31) (Ohlson, 
1989: 183-185). 
Exhibit 5.A: 
Overview of Losses in Fighting, September 1987 - April 1988: 
(Adapted from Jannie Geldenhuys, A General's Story, 1995) 
LOSSES: #s LOSSES: #s 
CUBAN-FAPLA SOUTH AFRICAN 
FORCES DEFENCE FORCE 
Tanks 94 Tanks 3 
Armoured troop and 100 Ratels infantry fighting 5 
combat vehicles vehicles 
BM21/BM14 MRLs 34 Casspirs 3 
030/M-46 Quns 9 Rinkhals 1 
TMM mobile bridges 7 Wit hings 1 
Logistical vehicles 389 Kwevoel 1 
(last five are vehicles) 
Artillery, rocket and 15 radars 5 
missile systems 
23-mm anti-aircraft guns 22 Mirage F1 fighter 2 
aircraft 
MiG-31/23 combat aircraft 9 Bosbok light 1 
reconnaissance aircraft 
Helicopters 9 
5.8 Political and Diplomatic Dimension: 
International Negotiations, January - March 1988: 
In early January the Angolans proposed firm dates for negotiations with Cuban 
participation. Angola was, furthermore, willing to discuss total Cuban withdrawal. 
Mbinda and General Ndalu notified Castro's adviser, Jorge Risquet, at which point the 
nature of the negotiations was to change forever (32). This agreement in principle to 
total Cuban withdrawal, which came months before the height in fighting at Cuito 
Cuanavale and Techipa-Calueque, signalled that the Angolans and Cubans accepted 
the parameters of a settlement based on linkage. The USA negotiating team travelled 
from Luanda to Zaire, at the end of January, to meet with Savimbi in what proved to be 
their most productive meeting in years. Pik Botha was invited to meet with Crocker in 
Europe and South African Ambassador Piet Koornhof was put on notice of the 
possibility of "proximity talks," if the MPLA were to provide a concrete proposal, in what 
was the first move to reengage the South Africans (Crocker, 1993:373-375). 
Next, at the beginning of February, Gorbachev announced a much-improved 
schedule for Soviet troop withdrawal from Afghanistan. The decision to deal with the 
"bleeding wound" next door, Gorbachev said, could lead to an early Afghanistan accord 
that would have "the most profound impact on other regional conflicts" (Crocker, 
1993:375). He posed the question, "Which conflict will be settled next? It is certain 
that more is to follow." Saluting Gorbachev's speech, Schultz urged his counterpart to 
help persuade the Angolans to move on both Cuban withdrawal and political 
reconciliation with UNITA. This would effectively put pressure on Pretoria to disengage 
from the Namibia-Angola conflicts. Shevardnadze expressed pleasure that the Cubans 
were now at the table (33). 
Pik Botha agreed to a meeting in Geneva, 14 March 1988, and in view of this a 
preceding meeting was organised, 9-11 March, in Luanda with the MPLA and Cubans. 
In the conference room of the South African mission in Geneva Pik Botha was handed 
a bluntly worded letter from Schultz conveying that the cost of failing to resolve the 
Angolan and Namibian conflicts could be very high for South Africa. Moscow and 
Havana had large investments in Angola. Botha was told, in the absence of a 
settlement, the Soviets and Cubans were not "desperate" for a deal but did appear 
open to discussing a deal. The Americans would be seeing the Soviets again in one 
week to further test their position. He was told that proximity talks would seem to be 
the logical next step. Pik Botha recognised the Soviets as critical and volunteered that 
the USA would necessarily play the leading role in testing them. Furthermore, if 
Gorbachev was serious about seeking political solutions then Botha was of the view 
that maybe something could be worked out. It is worth noting that these diplomatic 
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developments were occurring before all Cuban reinforcements had arrived, before the 
fighting peaked, and before Castro announced to the world that he had altered the 
correlation of forces (Crocker, 1993:381-384). 
In the Angolan negotiations South Africa and Cuba were emerging as the central 
players. The Cubans appeared to have a coherent game plan whereas the South 
Africans clearly did not. The impetus for cooperation on the part of the Angolans and 
Cubans seemed to come about in early March 1988. Cuban officials displayed an 
intensity and sense of mission which implied that someone important was watching 
every move at home. Indeed, it gradually became clear that it was Castro, rather than 
Gorbachev, driving the Communist train in Angola. Castro clearly wanted to get to the 
negotiating table as soon as possible (Crocker, 1993:379). The Soviet position was, 
however, less apparent. 
There was a meeting with Anatoliy Adamishin, Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister, 
at the US State Department, 21 March, which fell short of American expectations. He 
offered no specific ideas for advancing the process and no concrete support in terms 
of the negotiations. He did, however, reveal his intention to visit Havana and Luanda 
and, as well, spoke of the need to maintain "regular" contact with the Americans. 
Adamishin seemed pleased with this modest step forward. 
Shortly thereafter, 28 March, Neil van Heerden and Derek Auret arrived in 
Washington for three days of consultations expressing appreciation to be in 
Washington immediately after the departure of the Soviets. The van Heerden mission 
became a turning point in South African foreign policy. In discussing Soviet motives 
and reviewing the prospect for USA-Soviet cooperation it became apparent there were 
some emerging areas of agreement. It was explained that Cuba and the Soviet Union 
would consider supporting Cuban withdrawal only in the context of Resolution 435. 
Moscow and Havana had become linkage advocates because, from their perspective, 
having Resolution 435 implemented by Pretoria could be presented as their 
"accomplishment" (Crocker, 1993:386-387). 
It was further explained to the South African delegation that Moscow was 
unwilling to sell out the MPLA and would prefer that it survive. However, it had also 
grasped the reality of South Africa's staying power. While there was little direct 
pressure on Moscow there were growing incentives. A settlement would ease the 
USSR's financial burden as well as the political burden in terms of East-West relations. 
Gorbachev wanted to achieve deals with Reagan as insurance with any future 
administration. Obviously, UNITA's continued survival was of central importance to 
Pretoria and, since there would be no internal cease-fire, UNITA would not be restricted 
in any way by Resolution 435 or an agreement for Cuban withdrawal. 
A negotiated settlement was sold to the South African visitors as a win-win 
situation for the SADF as Cuban withdrawal would come as the direct result of South 
African foreign policies since 1975. Essentially, Pretoria would be decolonising Angola 
and ridding the region of its only serious adversary. South Africa then made the 
momentous decision to meet the Cubans and Angolans. A bilateral USA-USSR 
meeting was promptly organised on the eve of the first round of tripartite talks to take 
place between Angola, Cuba and South Africa (Crocker, 1993:388-391 ). It now 
appeared the Soviets as well as the South Africans wer,e interested in seeking a 
regional settlement. 
5.9 Strategic and Tactical Dimension: 
The Last Battles, April - June 1988: 
Operation Packer officially ended 30 April 1988 with the departure of Colonel 
Paul Fouche and the demobilisation of the Citizen Force units which had served in the 
82-Brigade. The new phase, appropriately named Operation Displace (see Map, 
Appendix Ten), consisted of approximately 1 000 troops compared with the 3 000 
SADF personnel which were in south eastern Angola at the height of the fighting (34). 
Their task was to support the sappers still laying mine fields along the eastern banks 
of the Cuito and Cuanavale Rivers where it was thought FAPLA might attempt to cross 
(35). The South African sappers laid mainly Armscor R2M1 anti-personnel and No.8 
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anti-tank mines but also used Soviet mines either captured during battles or dug out 
from FAPLA mine fields (Bridgland, 1990:333, Geldenhuys, 1995:222). 
5.9.1 The Final Battle, 26 June 1988: 
As previously stated, in Sections 5.1.1 and 5.5, Castro's gamble involved a 
major deployment of conventional combat power commencing in mid November 1987. 
With the current negotiations likely to result in troop withdrawals it was thought the 
Cubans would logically desire to try to change the impression created by the FAPLA 
defeat at the Battle of Lomba River. A success or victory of some sort would allow the 
FAPLA alliance to negotiate from a position of strength. According to General 
Geldenhuys "a threatening posture in the south west would support this strategy and, 
as a bonus, draw the limelight away from the south east." Hence, as the Cuban 
deployment continued to escalate the South Africans became increasingly concerned 
(Geldenhuys, 1995:237-240, Heitman, 1990:297). 
As the situation deteriorated throughout April and May 1988 South African 
concerns proved valid. Over this time both FAPLA and Cuban elements began to 
interfere with the SADF's operations against SWAPO. While pursuing a SWAPO 
group, 18 April, the SADF clashed with the Cubans south of Xangongo. A major was 
killed in the fighting and the body of a medical orderly was later found in a shallow 
grave. The final day of the London Meeting, 4 May, another clash took place with the 
Cubans attacking elements of 101 Battalion as they conducted operations against 
SWAPO south of Humbe. The SADF lost six soldiers and four Casspirs. One man was 
taken prisoner and was to later resurface in a Cuban hospital. A few days later there 
was another clash between the Cubans and elements of 101 Battalion. Meanwhile the 
international peace negotiations advanced unabated despite the growing tension on 
the battlefield (36) (Heitman, 1990:298, Geldenhuys, 1995:242, Bridgland, 1990:342). 
The South Africans decided they would now have to respond to the escalating 
Cuban activity in addition to the presence of 200 to 300 SWAPO insurgents at Techipa. 
Prior to launching an attack, Commandant Jan Haugaard, headquartered at Ruacana, . 
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commenced two reconnaissance operations with troops from 32 Battalion (37). Team 
One confirmed there was a strong military force at Techipa which consisted not only of 
SWAPO. A conventional attack was soon ruled out due to the nature of the Cuban 
force found at Techipa. Team Two likewise confirmed the presence of Cuban 
conventional forces with tanks. Any remaining thoughts of using 32 Battalion or even 
61 Mechanized Battalion to attack Techipa were now dismissed. The South Africans 
were, at any rate, not enthusiastic to start something which might derail the 
negotiations and, furthermore, were still unclear about the intentions of the Cuban 
force. Hence, it was decided to harass them to draw a reaction so as to improve the 
SADF's intelligence before deciding to act (Geldenhuys, 1995:243, Heitman, 1990:298-
301, Bridgland, 1990:343-347). 
The available intelligence soon suggested the Cubans intended to advance 
southward. Given the vast disparity in strength between the South African and Cuban 
forces, Colonel Delport decided on an artillery strike to disrupt the Cuban force before 
it could move out to attack (38). Just before last light, Sunday 26 June, a number of 
meteorological balloons carrying tin foil were sent up into the air from north of 
Calueque. The reflections of the tin foil on the Cuban radar made it appear as if an air 
attack was under way (39). In winter it becomes dark so quickly that flying sorties are 
no longer possible after 18:00. The SADF thus had one hour in which to identify 
targets which they did extremely well. The Cubans launched six SA-6 ground to air 
missiles at the balloons. This enabled the SADF's radar operators, artillery observation 
officers and reconnaissance regiment to observe the launchings from Techipa and to 
plot their positions. The SADF attacked these targets for four hours after darkness fell. 
As their first strike destroyed the Cuban artillery command post the South Africans were 
able to continue shooting without fear of counter-bombardment. General Geldenhuys 
describes this as "one of the most brilliant operations of our military history" (40) 
(Heitman, 1990:302-305, Geldenhuys, 1995:245-248, Bridgland, 1990:355-361 ). 
5.9.2 The Air Attack on Calueque, 27 June 1988: 
Despite their heavy losses of the previous day the Cubans non~theless 
commenced their advance on Calueque, 27 June. They were confronted by the 61 
Mechanized Battalion and withdrew (41 ). The same day four MiG-23s dropped three 
bombs each on Calueque. Five minutes after the first attack three more MiGs bombed 
Calueque. Most of the MiGs aimed for the dam wall and scored several hits which 
seriously damaged the bridge running over it. Another MiG veered off from the rest and 
attacked the water pipeline to Ovambo. One of its bombs damaged the line and 
another, which missed the target, exploded between a Buffel and an Eland-90 
armoured car. The stray bomb killed eleven troops on a supply mission to Calueque 
from 8 SAi (Eighth South African Infantry Battalion). According to Bridgland, it was the 
SADF's worst single loss in the entire war and, according to Heitman, it raised many 
questions as to its purpose. Nevertheless, the successful air attack enabled the 
Cubans to claim a victory although it was not as impressive a victory as they had 
planned. The fighting of 26 and 27 June effectively marked the end of South African 
involvement in the Angolan conflict (Heitman, 1990:306-307, Geldenhuys, 1995:248-
249, Bridgland, 1990:361-364). 
5.1 O Political and Diplomatic Dimension: 
International Negotiations; May - December 1988: 
The commencement of the first round of tripartite negotiations, 2 May in London, 
was the beginning of an eight month marathon. The twelve Angolan/South 
African/Cuban meetings would culminate in the historic signing, 22 December, of The 
Bilateral Agreement between Angola and Cuba for the Termination of the Cuban 
Military Contingent and The Tripartite Agreement between Angola, Cuba, and South 
Africa (see Text, Appendices Four and Five). As portrayed by Chester Crocker, since 
tt)e motivation in 1975 for initial SADF intervention was removed, so ended South 
African involvement in the Angolan conflict. There were, however, a variety of other 
internal and domestic factors which need to be taken into account so as to explain 
South Africa's departure from Angola as are discussed in the next section (Section 
5.12). 
Exhibit 5.8: 
Overview of the Negotiations, 1988: 
(Adapted from Chester Crocker, High Noon in Southern Africa, 1993) 
Round One: early May London 
Round Two: mid June Cairo 
Round Three: mid July New York City 
The New York 
Principles 
Round Four: late July Cape Verde 
Round Five: early August Geneva 
The Geneva Protocol 
Round Six: late August Brazzaville 
Round Seven: early September Brazzaville 
Round Eight: late September Brazzaville 
Round Nine: October New York City 
Round Ten: November Geneva 
Round Eleven: early December Brazzaville 
Round Twelve: December Brazzaville 
The Brazzaville 
Protocol 
(Mini) Round Thirteen: late December U.N. Headquarters 
New York City 
Bilateral Agreement 
Tripartite Agreement 
5.11 The Importance of South Africa's Internal Milieux: Decision-Making Structures, 
Personalities and Organisations: 
5. 11. 1 Introduction: 
As stated in Section 1.5.4 of Chapter One, the events surrounding the final end 
period ( 1987-1988) are both more complex and less clearly definable than those of the 
previous time periods addressed in Chapter Three (1975-1977) and Chapter Four 
(1978-1986). In conclusion to this Chapter the two paradigms (or bodies of literature) 
are considered to be of equal utility in explaining the departure of all major external 
actors and the end of South African involvement in Angola. 
5.11.2 Arguments in Favour of Sub-National/Unit Level Causation: 
5.11.2. 1 Internal Causation Within South Africa: 
According to Rob Davies (1989), the accord phase of regional relations was 
followed by a phase of escalating aggression and destabilization against neighbouring 
states. Then suddenly, at the beginning of the second quarter of 1988, there was a 
notable de-escalation which Davies judges to have been the result of South Africa's 
increasing military costs. Indeed, the 1988 resolution of the conflict cannot be fully 
understood without considering South Africa's domestic concerns. The impact of the 
following pressures, in all likelihood, influenced the South African leadership to scale 
back their involvement in Angola: the rising costs of the conflict; a declining security 
situation within South Africa's borders; the increasing influence of the ANC and other 
banned liberation movements; the declaration of a state of emergency in the mid 
1980s, and finally; the resultant economic crisis exacerbated by the sanctions 
campaign which was gaining momentum internationally. 
An increasing burden was placed on the South African state - economically, 
militarily and also in terms of eroding support among the National Party's white 
electorate due to the growing number of white casualties. There was the impact of 
growing polarization in white South African society on the NP leadership, as the 
Conservative Party (CP) gained electoral support and the political spectrum shifted to 
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the right. The white electorate was sensitive to and began to question the increasing 
number of casualties, the cost of the Angolan war effort as well as the burden wrought 
by Namibian occupation on a weak recessionary economy feeling the pressure of 
international sanctions (42). 
Militarily, South African vulnerabilities were being revealed (43). For example, 
as earlier stated, by 1987 the Angolans had something which they lacked in their 1985 
offensive. In 1985 the SAAF was able to attack Angolan vehicles and helicopters 
virtually without opposition. This could no longer be the case as it had been in their 
failed offensive against Savimbi's main base at Jamba because Angola now had the 
capability to provide air cover for assaults by its airborne and ground forces. South 
Africa responded to the growing Angolan encroachment of its previously unchallenged 
air superiority by upgrading the aging Mirage Ill ground-attack aircraft with new 
weapons and Israeli avionics (Jaster, 1988:99-100). 
5.11.2.2 Internal Causation Within Cuba and the Soviet Union: 
The Soviet Union, commencing in the late 1980s, began unburdening itself of 
the commitments of imperial overreach and other third world obligations acquired 
under Brezhnev. However, one must ask why the Soviet Union's reassessment came 
about. In Cuba, for example, the Angolan intervention was more onerous in percentage 
terms than the US engagement in Vietnam ever was. Furthermore, Cuba was no longer 
receiving its hard currency payments from Angola and the Angolan entanglement was 
increasingly unpopular among the Cuban people (see Section 5.2). The Soviet 
Union's changing priorities, likewise, did not arise out of a vacuum but were, at least 
partially, the product of internal dynamics not considered by theorists such as Waltz. 
Due to internal social and economic pressures the Soviet Union's global 
priorities were shifting. The backdrop to Soviet reform and "glasnost" on the 
international stage was a situation of worsening domestic economic deterioration. The 
African empire accumulated under Brezhnev was an increasingly costly burden for a 
regime suffering internal decline. The Soviet Union could neither afford to underwrite 
socialist economies within the Eastern Bloc nor support liberation movements across 
the globe. In effect, the reorganisation of priorities was a product of necessity. The 
heavy financial cost of supporting socialist regimes in the third world was increasingly 
occurring at the expense of critically needed domestic economic restructuring. Such 
support was diverting scarce resources from other more important priorities 
(MacFarlane, 1990:20). 
In addition, there were also power struggles occurring with the Soviet state which 
inevitably affected Soviet decision-making structures. By late 1987 and early 1988, 
Soviet diplomatic, academic and media elites were increasingly candid in distancing 
themselves from policy commitments driven by Communist Party hardliners and the 
armed forces. Soviet "realists" came to view Angola as an unmitigated military disaster 
in which no amount of Soviet military hardware or advisers would ever bring about an 
MPLA victory. Previously, the military and intelligence bureaucracy, and especially the 
Communist Party, had long played a role in formulating African policy. However, with 
the accelerating changes, the Soviet foreign policy machinery came to be taken over 
by Shevardnadze and his "new thinkers" who gradually accommodated themselves to 
the American sponsored settlement (44). 
5. 12 The Importance of the Global Order: 
5.12. 1 Introduction: 
On could argue, as Harry Stephan does, that South Africa was peripheral and, 
as such, was the national equivalent of a puppet controlled by the decisions and 
actions of the major global powers (45). According to this point of view, South African 
foreign policy was defensive and reactive in nature. Therefore, upon the departure of 
all major foreign influences, Pretoria perceived it to be safe for the SADF to entirely 
withdraw as well since the threat to South Africa's vital security interests no longer 
existed. However, as demonstrated above; in Section 5.11, this view although valid 
is uni-dimensional and does not consider other important forms of causation. 
Crocker, like Stephan, regards South Africa's departure as a logical result of the 
end of Soviet and Cuban involvement. While we have demonstrated in the previous 
section that this does not tell the entire story, there are nonetheless system level 
factors which need to· be taken into account as well so as to achieve a better 
understanding of South Africa's participation in the American sponsored negotiations 
and eventual departure. 
5.12.2 Arguments in Favour of International/System Level Causation: 
South African intervention in and departure from Angola is undoubtedly at least 
partially explained by system level factors. Comments made by P.W. Botha, Magnus 
Malan, Pik Botha and General Geldenhuys clearly indicate that South Africa was 
involved in Angola due to South Africa's perceived security interests. Pik Botha, for 
example, declared in November 1987 that South Africa would remain in Angola for as 
long as the Cubans and Soviets did and for as long as Pretoria's security required it 
There is ample evidence to support this perspective (see Section 5.4 of this chapter, 
for instance). 
General Geldenhuys, likewise, outlined South Africa's national interests the 
defence of which motivated their involvement: "There were MK camps in northern 
Angola. They would probably have been transferred to the south east of Angola if 
Cuban-MP LA forces controlled it. That would bring them right up to the area where the 
borders of Zambia, Zimbabwe and Botswana converge, which had been used as an 
infiltration route to South Africa. South Africa had interests in common with UNITA. It 
was no secret. The Minister of Defence stated this in parliament on more than one 
occasion. South Africa thus became involved. We undertook to supply armaments and 
troops which would put UNITA in a more equable [sic] position vis-a-vis the advancing 
forces of the FAPLA alliance" (Geldenhuys, 1995:210-211 ). 
Robert Jaster further cites the same argument. He describes how General 
Geldenhuys reiterated the reason why South Africa desired to prevent UNITA's defeat 
by asserting that if the "Russian and Cuban supported Angolan forces" were to gain 
control over the area now "dominated .by UNITA," then SWAPO would be able to 
"activate" Namibia's Caprivi and Kavango areas and the ANC would have greater 
freedom to inti ltrate South Africa ( 46) ( Jaster, 1988: 101 ). 
Furthermore, one of the most important global developments, in explaining the 
end of external intervention in Angola was the convergence of Soviet and American 
interests for the first time since the Second World War. It was, in all likelihood, 
fortunate for the fate of regional conflicts such as Angola that Soviet and American 
priorities were beginning to complement rather than contradict each other in 1988, and 
therefore, rendered a regional peace process feasible (47) (Crocker, 1993:409-410). 
In the beginning, according to Chester Crocker, Moscow's long-standing dislike 
of the American sponsored negotiations was based on the assumption that the Soviet 
Union was engaged in a global, zero-sum game. Since the USA had organised the 
settlement it must therefore be bad with such patent obstructionism an axiom of Soviet 
policy. Moscow's continuing insecurity about its superpower status required Soviet 
officials to counter every American effort in the spirit of cold war politics. 
However, another trend was developing. As part of an overall reassessment of 
Soviet global interests Moscow was gradually reappraising its African policies. 
According to Crocker, two distinct processes coincided: firstly; the gradual 
transformation of superpower relations including an agreement in principle to explore 
the resolution of other regional conflicts (those conflicts beyond Europe in which both 
the USA and USSR had acquired a stake) and secondly; the ripening of the Southern 
African regional peace process itself. In May 1988 when the path finally seemed clear, 
and the disparate parties prepared to cooperate, the priorities of the two superpower 
nations were no longer mutually incompatible (48). Furthermore, there was great 
incentive, on both sides, to achieve a peace settlement before time ran out with the 
upcoming US presidential election. 
As well, according to David Birmingham, by 1988 there was a divergence 
between American and South African interests. In an election year the Republicans 
wanted to be viewed as the peace-makers in Africa. Under pressure from the black 
American lobby, the Reagan Administration wanted to publicly distance itself from 
South Africa. The USA also wanted to see the war end because Cuba would then be 
obliged to withdraw from its high profile internationalist role. Cuba's liberation ideology 
would then assume a lower profile in the world (Birmingham, 1992:105-106) 
The first visible indication of this reassessment, of the Soviet Union's power and 
position in the global community, occurred under Gorbachev commencing in early 
1986. It accelerated in 1987 due to a variety of factors: the cycle of war in 
Afghanistan; the priorities of the American-Soviet bilateral relationship, and; the 
feverish pace of summit diplomacy in the final eighteen months of Reagan's 
Presidency. In his speech of 8 February 1988, referred to in Section 5.8, Gorbachev 
heralded a major shift in policy by signalling explicitly that an Afghan settlement could 
open the way to a more constructive approach in other regional conflicts. One must, 
however, also seek to know what internal sub-national factors were involved in bringing 
about these outward manifestations as discussed in Section 5.11.2.2. 
ENDNOTES FOR CHAPTER FIVE: 
(1) More specifically what SADF intelligence perceived was that FAPLA was preparing 
for a major two-pronged offensive aimed at Tempue, Cangamba and Gago-Coutino 
from the north, and at Mavinga and Lupire from the west (Heitman, 1990:20). 
(2) The MPLA's failure to capture Mavinga caused jubilation in the Reagan 
Administration but received a comparatively muted response in South Africa (Crocker, 
1993:360). 
This comparatively muted response was perhaps due to the playing field having been 
substantially levelled since 1985. This resulted in a record number of SADF casualties. 
Equally serious was the loss of some of South Africa's irreplaceable Mirage aircraft. 
Although Pretoria had overcome to some extent the western arms embargo, via the 
development of a local industry, the SAAF's French fighter planes could not be 
replicated. Angola, on the other hand, was better able to replace aircraft destroyed in 
battle (Birmingham, 1992:106-107, Jaster, 1988:101). 
(3) There are different accounts regarding the number of South African troops involved 
in this engagement. A more accurate figure may be 3 000. 
(4) General Jannie Geldenhuys explains the military rationale thus: "In the longer term 
we had to leave the situation arranged in such a manner that UNITA itself could take 
care of its defence in the event of another "annual offensive." That is what we wanted 
to do. No more, no less. This is classic doctrine. After a successful battle, one 
consolidates; you secure the captured area and clear it up to a determined "line of 
exploitation;" you take the necessary precautions to deal with a possible 
counteroffensive, and if you leave the area, other forces take over from you to take care 
of its defence" (Geldenhuys, 1995:217). 
(5) With wry humour General Geldenhuys states: "The offensives against .Savimbi 
followed a pattern. There was an annual attempt to drive him out of his base area at 
Jamba with the ultimate aim of destroying him completely. It failed every year" 
(Geldenhuys, 1995:204-205). 
With regard to the annual attempt to destroy UNITA militarily, General Geldenhuys 
states: "It is general knowledge that Crocker became frustrated from time to time. 
Every time he thought the MPLA would be prepared seriously to talk peace concerning 
South West and the Cubans the Soviet-supported hardliners in the MPLA wanted just 
one more chance to destroy Savimbi militarily. Only then, they said, would they be 
prepared to talk. And the next year, after another unsuccessful effort, they came with 
the same story. And so it went on" (Geldenhuys, 1995:205). 
(6) The destruction of the Cuito Cuanavale Airfield was a significant loss for Soviet, 
Cuban and Angolan pilots. It meant they henceforth had to operate from Menongue 
and consequently could not cause much damage in the Cuito area (Geldenhuys, 
1995:218). 
(7) South Africa's G-5s, and later G-6s, were a decisive factor throughout the 
campaign. 
(8) Castro and the Cuban military were utterly disdainful of Soviet strategic planning. 
The Cubans believed the Angolan Government and their Soviet ally had no strategy. 
Soviet-led FAPLA offensives bore little relation to local conditions in Angola. While 
Angolan military planners treated every hill and village as a significant target, Soviet 
planners favoured tactically complex ground advances which took FAPLA units 
hundreds of kilometres beyond their rear support bases. The nature of the Angolan 
war was that of a low-intensity bush war spread over areas in which high-value targets 
were scarce. The key military resources were reliable people and the capacity for rapid 
manoeuvre but the art of surprise and mobility was as alien to Soviet planners as the 
concept of logistics was to the Angolans (Crocker, 1993:356). 
(9) General Geldenhuys outlines South Africa's national interests the defence of which 
motivated their involvement: "There were MK camps in northern Angola. They would 
probably have been transferred to the south east of Angola if Cuban-MPLA forces 
controlled it. That would bring them right up to the area where the borders of Zambia, 
Zimbabwe and Botswana converge, which had been used as an infiltration route to 
South Africa. South Africa had interests in common with UNITA. It was no secret. The 
Minister of Defence stated this in parliament on more than one occasion. South Africa 
thus became involved. We undertook to supply armaments and troops which would put 
UNITA in a more equable [sic] position vis-a-vis the advancing forces of the FAPLA 
alliance" (Geldenhuys, 1995:210-211 ). 
Robert Jaster cites the same argument. He describes how General Geldenhuys 
reiterated the reason why South Africa desired to prevent UNITA's defeat by asserting 
that if the "Russian and Cuban supported Angolan forces" were to gain control over the 
area now "dominated by UNITA," then SWAPO would be able to "activate" Namibia's 
Caprivi and Kavango areas and the ANC would have greater freedom to infiltrate South 
Africa (Jaster, 1988: 101 ). 
(10) The controversial and much debated subject regarding whether the SADF aimed 
to attack Cuito Cuanavale will be discussed in greater detail. 
(11) It was, as previously stated in Section 5.1.1, far too late for Cuban reinforcements 
to have any opportunity of reversing FAPLA's failed military situation. According to 
Heitman "By the time sufficient elements of the 50th Division were ashore and ready 
to deploy, the South Africans and UNITA had driven FAPLA across the Cuito River. 
Even deploying a Cuban tank company to the east bank had not helped to prevent the 
collapse; it had been quickly chewed up by the South Africans when it counter-
attacked them to give FAPLA a breathing space" (Heitman, 1990:295). 
(12) General Ochoa Sanchez was appalled by the military situation that he was 
presented with in Angola. He complained he had been sent to a lost war and that he 
would be given the blame for it (Heitman, 1990:295). 
(13) Cuba could equalize, at least temporarily, the military scales in Angola. Due to its 
limited strategic role Cuba was not, however, capable of dominating the Southern 
African military balance (Crocker, 1993:367-368). 
(14) General Geldenhuys caustically states, "In the south east [referring to Cuito 
Cuanavale] they [the Cubans] had used propaganda to instill fear and to threaten us 
out of the war. For public consumption they depicted their manoeuvres as a brilliant 
strategic move which ended the war and forced negotiations" (Geldenhuys, 1995:250). 
(15) Embleton, perhaps inaccurately, maintains the first attack in what became known 
as "The Battle of Cuito Cuanavale" took place 25 February 1988, the second on 29 
February, and the third 23 March 1988. Specifically with regard to this sort of 
categorisation, Geldenhuys states: "Commentators analysing the campaign in these 
three "duty roster shifts" could come to false conclusions" (Geldenhuys, 1995:210). 
( 16) Very detailed and thorough accounts of the campaign of 1987 -88 are provided by 
Helmoed-Romer Heitman's War in Angola: The Final South African Phase and by Fred 
Bridgland's The War for Africa. Both works were published in 1990. 
(17) The SADF press release of 20 February 1988 reiterated the content of their earlier 
announcement to the press of 5 December 1987. 
(18) The Citizen Force, 82 Brigade, was to be replaced 30 April 1988 with a small 
combat force (Geldenhuys, 1995:222). 
(19) The aim of the SADF's attack was to destroy the bridge across the Cuito River. 
(20) While the SADF force was on a slight slope coming up from the Dala River their 
Oliphant tanks encountered a "warning" minefield of a very sophisticated defence 
system organised by Cuban General Ochoa Sanchez's top field commander, General 
Cintra Frias, in the Tumpo Triangle and Cuito Cuanavale area (Bridgland, 1990:327). 
(21) According to Commandant Lauw, "The artillery barrage had not let up at all and 
with the unexpected exertions the tanks had been guzzling fuel faster than expected. 
I asked for permission to break off the attack and Colonel Fouche granted it" 
(Bridgland, 1990:329). 
(22) According to Geldenhuys, "In the south east it was the Cuban-FAPLA forces who 
were on the offensive. But they turned this around. The UNITA-RSA forces crushed 
the offensive and cleared the area up to the Cuito River. But the Cubans 
propagandistically presented the mopping-up operation as if it were a pucka [sic] 
offensive per se which they had gloriously repelled. They pretended that this facet was 
what the whole war had been all about. In this way they camouflaged their total failure 
in not accomplishing their mission" (Geldenhuys, 1995:249), 
Geldenhuys further cites Crocker describing the same situation as follows: "The 
Soviets and Angolans had laboured strenuously to smash UNITA, and had instead 
been thoroughly defeated. How, then, did the fighting at Cuito become a heroic Cuban 
legend? By proclaiming to a credulous world that the town of Cuito Cuanavale - a town 
under MPLA control since 1976 - was the ''prize" over which the entire campaign was 
fought, and then by crowing when you have managed not to lose it" 
(Geldenhuys, 1995:250). 
(23) As is well known Pretoria was extremely sensitive about South African casualties. 
As long as strategic gains could be made at a very low cost of life the SADF could 
continue to fight for UNITA. Any military effort which would entail a high death toll was 
regarded as prohibitive (Bridgland, 1990:331, Embleton, 1994:8-9). 
(24) What became known as "The Battle for Cuito Cuanavale" is a subject of ongoing 
controversy. The debate over the military events of this time will not be resolved in the 
context of the current discussion nor is it the intent of this dissertation to do so. In fact, 
the "real" version of events surrounding Cuito Cuanavale could constitute an interesting 
subject for another dissertation or some such research endeavour. 
(25) According to Bridgland the problem with asking who won the war, which is 
inevitably asked by anyone interested in the region, is that it may be altogether the 
wrong question. Bridgland suggests a more appropriate question might be: "What new 
opportunities did the war, and the consequent New York Accords, create for all the 
different belligerents?" (Bridgland, 1990:373). 
(26) As earlier stated, the Soviet orchestrated FAPLA offensive had been forced to 
retreat close to 200 kilometres back to their launching point at Cuito Cuanavale. 
General Geldenhuys maintains that anyone claiming to speak with authority but gives 
a different judgement does so with ulterior motives (Geldenhuys, 1995:227). 
(27) According to Jannie Geldenhuys the Cubans protested about their "victory" both 
too much and for too long: "I had a talk once with overseas generals and one of them 
remarked that it was very clear that the Marxist alliance had lost because the Cubans 
were nagging too long and too loud that they had won. "To quote Shakespeare," he 
said, it is a matter of "methinks the lady doth protest too much"" (Geldenhuys, 
1995:229). 
(28) The author of this dissertation could continue with other similar accounts but, due 
· to limitations of time and space, suffice it to say there are many committed to the view 
that South Africa suffered failure at Cuito Cuanavale. 
(29) The argument of General Geldenhuys, that it was never the aim of South Africa to 
capture Cuito Cuanavale and that they merely wanted to clear the eastern bank, is 
described by Embleton as "limited" (Embleton, 1994: 17). This subject could also 
constitute the focus of another dissertation or some such research endeavour. 
(30) Ohlson cites military realities in Southern Angola as the single most important 
factor compelling the South Africans to the negotiating table in May 1988. Throughout 
the course of South Africa's lengthy intervention in Angola, facing an immense Soviet 
and Cuban military commitment, South African vulnerabilities were revealed. The 
threshold of increasing costs in terms of their sensitivity to white casualties, inability to 
effectively recruit from other racial groups and inability to replace aging weapons and 
equipment lost in battle as well as the loss of air superiority constituted too heavy a 
burden to bear for the South African state independently and without crucial American 
support (Ohlson, 1989:183-185). 
Rob Davies makes a similar argument on this point. As cited in Endnote 23 of Chapter 
Two, Davies states: "Pretoria's changed stance in the region was the product, 
fundamentally, of reverses on all the main fronts of regional destabilization ... But the 
most decisive of these was that suffered by the SADF at Cuito Cuanavale. A Cuban 
publication has aptly described Cuito Cuanavale as "South Africa's Waterloo:" It 
smashed the myth of SADF invincibility and revealed important windows of 
vulnerability" (Davies, 1989: 172). 
(31) While there are some inconsistencies in David Birmingham's account his 
conclusion is nonetheless clear: South Africa attacked Cuito Cuanavale and failed in 
this endeavour. 
David Birmingham argues, just as the Angolan attack on Mavinga failed in 1987, the 
South African attack on Cuito Cuanavale failed to achieve its objectives in 1988. 
UNITA was not strengthened as had been hoped but suffered heavy casualties due to 
an ill-advised switch of tactics. Furthermore, the SADF assault on Cuito Cuanavale led 
to closer cooperation between the MPLA Government and both SWAPO and the ANC 
which tracked down and attacked UNITA positions. The invasion demonstrated that 
FAPLA could match the almost legendary power of South Africa. Within South Africa 
the SADF was considered to have failed and to have incurred serious losses in both 
life and equipment. Birmingham also argues that part of the SADF's expeditionary 
force was cut off inside Angola while retreating from the southern perimeter of Cuito 
Cuanavale (Birmingham, 1992: 107). 
(32) Chester Cracker's book, High Noon in Southern Africa; Making Peace in a Rough 
Neighbourhood, is the most extensive account of the diplomatic talks which culminated 
in the final negotiated settlement for all parties to depart from Angola. As a result, this 
chapter is heavily reliant on and indebted to the narrative provided by Crocker. Given 
the subject matter involved this reliance on Crocker was unavoidable. 
(33) However, basic differences still existed between Washington and Moscow on 
Southern Africa. While the Soviets were aware of the extent of the quagmire in Angola, 
they faced no pressure or pain comparable to that wrought by their Afghanistan crisis 
which is referred to as the Soviet Vietnam. Furthermore, by early 1988 a more efficient 
procedure was needed to produce political decisions. The Cubans, Angolans, and 
Soviets were suspicious of the American shuttle procedure surmising that the American 
negotiators were filtering the parties' views and sharing them selectively as it suited 
them. They wanted to know Pretoria's "real" views (Crocker, 1993:375-376). 
(34) General Geldenhuys describes how, at this stage, SADF levels were reduced to 
1 500 and less so as to keep the occupied area safe with UNITA (Geldenhuys, 
1995:222). 
(35) An even heavier programme of laying mines by the SADF and UNITA was begun 
in mid April. The pattern of the mine field was roughly horseshoe in shape: beginning 
south of the Tumpo River; stretching· eastward north of the Chambinga; turning 
northward along the eastern edge of the Chambinga High Ground, and; turning 
westward once again between the Dala and Cuatir Rivers. The intent of this mine field 
was to prevent FAPLA from pushing eastward again as the SADF reduced its presence 
in 1988 and trained UNITA in the use of captured Soviet weaponry 
(Bridgland, 1990:332-333). 
(36) Meanwhile, according to Geldenhuys, "the negotiations of 3-4 May 1988 were not 
the end of the international political wrestling. It was the beginning of increased 
propaganda and diplomatic activity behind the scenes, in addition to military posturing" 
(Geldenhuys, 1995:242). 
(37) Worried that the Cuban force might move on either Calueque or Ruacana the 
decision was soon made to deploy additional troops for their protection. Task Force 
Zulu was formed and put under the command of Colonel Mieg Delport. It consisted of 
a 32 Battalion Battle Group, three companies of 101 Battalion, 61 Mechanized Battle 
Group, a battery of Valkyrie 127-mm MRLs, a battery of 155-mm G-5s, a troop of G-2s 
and a troop of 120-mm mortars. 
Then 8 June General Geldenhuys announced that elements of the Citizen Force were 
being called up for service in SWA/Namibia. The call-up was being done to provide 
sufficient force levels in the event of an attack into SWA/Namibia but was also meant 
to send a message to the Cubans (Geldenhuys, 1995:244-245, Heitman, 1990:302, 
Bridgland, 1990:348-349). 
(38) Once permission for the operation was granted 26 June was chosen as D-Day. 
At this time the South African delegation had just departed from Cairo (Geldenhuys, 
1995:247). 
(39) At the time the balloons were sent up the SAAF Impalas executed mock 
manoeuvres so as to make the "air attack" appear more realistic. 
(40) Detailed accounts of this entire episode, April - June 1988, can be found as 
follows: Heitman, 1990:298-306, Geldenhuys, 1995:237-248, Bridgland, 1990:341-361. 
( 41) After half an hour of fighting the Cubans withdrew and the SADF also then 
disengaged. The Cubans retreated to Techipa and never resumed their advance , 
(Geldenhuys, 1995:248, Bridgland, 1990:360-361 ). 
( 42) With regard to the sensitivity of the white South African electorate to casualties, 
Embleton states: "One can see a distinctive pattern emerging, one in which the cost of 
military gain was limited most severely by the political and other costs of casualties. 
So long as the strategic gains could be made at a very low cost of life, the SADF could 
continue to fight for UN ITA" (Embleton, 1994:9). 
(43) This is argued by Rob Davies, Thomas Ohlson and others as highlighted in 
Section 5.7.1 and in Endnotes 30 and 31 of this chapter. 
( 44) Although the "new thinkers" gradually acquired greater control over the foreign 
policy machinery affecting African issues, on Gorbachev and Shevardnadze's scale of 
priorities, improved American-Soviet relations came first. This goal, to some extent, 
was reliant upon the removal of tensions provoked by ideological confrontation and 
military rivalry in the developing world. Regional conflicts in the third world or proxy 
wars acted as a microcosm for superpower rivalry. The Soviets sought to replace this 
strategy, based on military competition, with one which did not result in a loss of 
superpower status. According to Chester Crocker, "a strategy based on unilateral 
ideological goals and military means would need to be replaced by one stressing 
universal goals and political-diplomatic means." Accordingly, the role of a responsible 
permanent member of the Security Council represented a more modern and acceptable 
form. of superpowerdom. Essentially, Moscow was preparing to exchange its role as 
a declining military dinosaur for one more in keeping with its actual resources and 
domestic situation (Crocker, 1993:409-411 ). 
(45) Dr. Harry Stephan was recently awarded his Doctorate at U.C.L.A. in the United 
States and is currently resident in Somerset West, Republic of South Africa. He may 
be contacted via the Department of Political Studies at the University of Cape Town. 
(Various Meetings, August - October 1994, Cape Town, Republic of South Africa). 
(46) For further discussion on this subject refer to Geldenhuys, 1995:210-211. 
(47) Barber and Barratt argue that no doubt due to lessening superpower rivalry and 
enhanced cooperation, the President of Congo and other African leaders were willing 
to play a supporting role in the American sponsored negotiations. 
(48) However, according to David Birmingham, the priorities of the US and South Africa 
were becoming increasingly incompatible. Birmingham believes that South Africa still 
desired to maintain instability in Angola because this would serve to distract the world's 
attention from the increasingly repressive tactics being exercised by the apartheid 
regime to control the black majority within its own borders. South Africa also remained 
steadfast in its desire to undermine the military bases operated by SWAPO and the 
ANC (Birmingham, 1992: 105-107). 
CHAPTER VI: 
CONCLUDING REMARKS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTU,RE 
RESEARCH 
6.1 Concluding Remarks: 
As stated in Section 1.1, the research strategy employed is inductive logic 
rather than hypothetical deductive due to the large amount of historical and factual 
detail which is involved. Therefore, the conclusions were not provided at the beginning 
along with the introduction and methodology but at the end of the pertinent chapters 
after having evaluated the chosen paradigms against the quite considerable historical 
detail. The data was analysed according to the "research-then-theory" strategy. Given 
the extensive historical detail and broad subject matter, this decision was in all 
likelihood the most appropriate choice to have made. 
Nonetheless, the preparation of this dissertation, revolving around a quite 
broad and long ranging subject as it does, was not easily executed, Indeed, the awthor 
envies those Masters students with the good judgement to select a more readily 
definable and specific subject matter. Furthermore, writing on the topic chosen was 
fraught with danger. This is due to the inherent "politicalisation" of apartheid-era South 
African policies toward the region and the myriad responses they have generated in 
South Africa itself, the region and among interested foreign observers. Therefore, the 
author of this work had to walk a fine line, certainly giving credit where credit was due, 
but also seeking as far as possible, given constraints of time and space, to provide due 
consideration to competing perspectives. 
No theory of international relations is omnipotent or in all ways perfect. Each 
and every theory has both strengths and weaknes.ses and none are beyond reproach. 
In the case of the study at hand, this ·~vas demonstrated in the finding that the two 
paradigms (or bodies of literature) chosen were of equal but distinct utility. In Chapter 
Three, system level nee-realist theory was most useful; in Chapter Four, unit level 
theories focusing on South Africa's domestic variable offered the best explanation, and 
finally; in Chapter Five, both paradigms were deemed to be of equal usefulness in 
explaining the end of South African involvement and the departure of all the major 
external actors from Angola. As stated, each has both strengths and weaknesses. 
6.2 Recommendations for Future Research: 
6.2.1 Nee-realist Structural Theory Research Agenda: 
(A) Greater research into the combination of and inter-relationship between different 
levels-of-analysis especially as applied by theorists concerned with sub-national, 
domestic phenomena. 
(B) Greater examination of the critical weaknesses of Kenneth Waltz's Theory of 
International Politics which were modestly investigated in Section 2.4.4 of Chapter 
Two. 
(C) Exploration of the fuller implications of the tactical dimension of Barry Buzan's 
strategic sector vis-a-vis South African military intervention in Angola. 
(0) In addition, a more thorough and comprehensive critical review of the history of 
international relations theory focussing on more recent "post modernist" theoretical 
developments. 
6.2.2 South African-Angolan Military Research Agenda: 
(A) Above all, a thorough and systematic investigation of the "real" events surrounding 
the "phenomenon" of Cuito Cuanavale in 1987-1988. 
(B) An attempt to achieve the full story regarding promises made, implicit or otherwise, 
to South Africa by then Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. This would include the 
extent of CIA activity in Angola prior to the passage of the Clark Amendment and, by 
implication, the role played by external powers in the FNLA's ill-fated march on Luanda 
immediately prior to Angolan independence. 
(C) In the interest of the new South African nation, post 1994 election, an economic 
analysis of the total cost to the state of South Africa's lengthy Angolan entanglement 
in "real" terms and in today's monetary value. 
(D) From the point of view of the United Nations, International Red Cross, and perhaps 
other humanitarian organisations, detailed tactical knowledge of the location of 
landmines should be sought from the former external actors in Angola. This, to some 
extent, is being accomplished with the United Nations' controversial decision to grant 
the lucrative contract, for clearing mines in Mozambique and Angola, to a South African 
firm. 
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APPENDIX 1 
The Alvor Agreement 
From Ministry of Mass Communication 1975 
Angola - The Independence Agreement 
The Portuguese State and the Angolan National Liberation Movements - The 
National Angolan Liberation Front (F.N.L.A.), the People's Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.) and the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (U.N.I.T.A.) - having met at Alvor, in the Algarve, 
from 10 to 15 January 1975, to negotiate the procedure and the calendar of 
the access of Angola to independence, having agreed to the following: 
Chapter I 
On the Independence of Angola 
Article 1 . The Portuguese State recognizes the Liberation Movements 
- National Angolan Liberation Front (F.N.L.A.), the People's Movement for 
the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.) and the National Union for the Total 
Independence of Angola (U.N.I.T.A) as the sole legitimate representative of 
the people of Angola. 
Article 2. The Portuguese State solemnly restates its recognition of 
the right of the people of Angola to independence. 
Article 3. Angola forms one indivisible unit, within its present 
geographical and political boundaries, and in this context Cabinda is an 
unalienable component of the Angolan territory. 
Article 4. The independence and full sovereignty of Angola shall be 
solemnly proclaimed on 11 November 1975 in Angola by the President of 
the Portuguese Republic or by a specially appointed representative of the 
President. 
Article 5. Until independence is proclaimed, the power shall be 
wielded by the High Commissioner and by a Transitional Government, which 
shall take office on 31 January 1975. 
Article 6. The Portuguese State and the three Liberation Movements 
formally affirm, under this agreement, a general cease fire, already being 
observed de factor by their armed forces throughout Angolan territory. 
After this date, any use of force other than as decided by the rightful 
authorities to prevent internal acts of violence or acts of aggression from 
outside the country shall be considered to be illicit. 
Article 7. After the cease fire the armed forces of the F.N.L.A., the 
M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. shall take up positions in the regions and places 
where they are at present stationed until such time as the provisions laid 
down in chapter IV of this agreement shall be put into practice. 
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Article 8 The Portuguese State undertakes to transfer progressively, 
no later than the term of the transitional period, all the powers it enjoys and 
wields in Angola to the Angolan organs of sovereignty. 
Article 9 With the conclusion of the Agreement, an amnesty is held 
to be granted to cover all the effects of the patriotic acts performed in the 
course of the national liberation struggle in Angola which would have been 
considered to be liable to punishment under legislation in force at the time of 
their performance. 
Article 10 The independent State of Angola shall exert its sovereignty 
fully and freely, both internally and on the international plane. 
Chapter II 
On the High Commissioner 
Article 11 . During the transitional period the President of the Republic 
and the Portuguese Government shall be represented in Angola by the High 
Commissioner, who shall defend the interests of the Portuguese Republic. 
Article 12. The High Commissioner in Angola shall be appointed and 
released from office by the President of the Portuguese Republic by whom 
he shall be sworn in and to whom he is politically responsible. 
Article 13. It is for the High Commissioner to: 
(a) Represent the President of the Republic, ensuring and 
guaranteeing, in full agreement with the Transitional Government, the 
observance of the law; 
(b) Safeguard and guarantee the physical security of Angolan 
territory, in close co-operation with the Transitional Government; 
(c) Ensure the fulfillment of this Agreement and of such others as 
may come to be made between the Liberation Movements and the 
Portuguese State; 
(d) Guarantee and promote the process of decolonization of Angola; 
(e) Ratify all acts which concern, or refer to, the Portuguese State; 
(f) Attend the meetings of the Council of Ministers, when he thinks 
fit, where he may participate in their discussions but without the right to 
vote; 
(g) Sign, approve and have published the decree-laws and the 
decrees drafted by the Transitional Government; 
(h) Ensure, together with the Presidential Committee, the direction of 
the National Defence Committee, and to direct the foreign policy of Angola 
during the transitional period, aided in this by the Presidential Committee. 
Page Three 
Chapter Ill 
On the Transitional Government 
Article 14. The Transitional Government is chaired and directed by the 
Presidential Committee. 
Article 15. The Presidential Committee comprises three members, one 
from each liberation movement, and its main task is to direct and co-ordinate 
the Transitional Government. 
Article 16. Whenever it thinks fit, the Presidential Committee may 
consult the High Commissioner on matters concerning the work of the 
Government. 
Article 17. The decisions of the Transitional Government shall be 
taken by a majority of two-thirds; the members of the Presidential Committee 
shall chair it in turn. 
Article 18. The Transitional Government shall comprise the following 
Ministries: the Interior, Information, Labour and Social Security, Economic 
Affairs, Planning and Finance, Justice, Transports and Communications, 
Health and Social Affairs, Public Works, Housing and Town-Planning, 
Education and Culture, Agriculture, Natural Resources. 
Article 19. The following Offices of Secretaries of State are hereby 
instituted: 
(a) Two in the Ministry of the Interior, 
(b) Two in the Ministry of Information, 
(c) Two in the Ministry of Labour and Social Security, 
(d) Three in the Ministry of Economic Affairs, to be known 
respectively as the Secretary of State for Trade and Tourism, the Secretary 
of State for Industry and Power and the Secretary of State for Fisheries. 
Article 20. The Ministers of the Transitional Government shall be 
appointed in the same proportion by the National Angolan Liberation Front 
(F.N.L.A.), the People's Movement for the Liberation of Angola (M.P.L.A.) 
and the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (U.N.I.T.A.), 
and by the President of the Republic and shall be sworn in by the High 
Commissioner. 
Article 21. Bearing in mind the transitional nature of the Government, 
the distribution of the Ministries shall be as follows: 
(a) The President of the Portuguese Republic shall appoint the 
Ministers of Economic Affairs, of Public Works, Housing and Town-Planning 
and of Transports and Communications; 
(b) The F.N.L.A. shall appoint the Ministers of his Interior, of Health 
and Social Affairs and of Agriculture; 
(c) The M.P.L.A. shall appoint the Ministers of Information, of 
Planning and Finance and of Justice; 
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{d} The U.N.I.T.A. shall appoint the Ministers of Labour and Social 
Security, of Education and Culture and of Natural Resources. 
Article 22. The Offices of the Secretaries of State provided for in this 
Agreement shall be distributed as follows: 
{a} The F.N.L.A. shall appoint one Secretary of State for information, 
one Secretary of State for Trade and Tourism; 
{b} The M.P.L.A. shall appoint a Secretary of State for the Interior, a 
Secretary of State for Labour and Social Security and a Secretary of Industry 
and Power, 
{c} The U.N.I.T.A. shall appoint one Secretary of State for the 
Interior, one Secretary of State for information and the Secretary of State for 
Fisheries. 
Article 23. The Transitional Government can create new posts for 
Secretaries and Under-Secretaries of State as long as it respects the rule of 
political heterogeneity in their distribution. 
Article 24. Duties of the Transitional Government: 
{a} Oversee and cooperate in the leading of the decolonizing process 
until total independence. 
{b} Supervise the whole public administration; ensure its normal 
functioning and promote the accession of Angolan citizens to responsible 
positions. 
{c} Conduct internal politics; 
{d} Prepare and guarantee the holding of general elections for the 
Constituent Assembly of Angola; 
{e} Perform through decree-laws the legislative function and draft 
decrees, regulatory decrees and instructions for the proper implementation of 
the laws; 
{f} Guarantee, in co-operation with the High Commissioner, the 
safety of persons and property; 
{g} Carry out the judicial reorganization of Angola: 
{h} Define economic, financial and monetary policy and create the 
structures needed to ensure the rapid development of the economy of 
Angola; 
{i} Guarantee and safeguard individual or collective rights and 
freedoms. 
Article 25. The Presidential Committee and the Ministers are jointly 
responsible for the acts of the Government. 
Article 26. The Transitional Government may not be dismissed on the 
initiative of the High Commissioner; any change in its composition shall be 
effected by agreement between the High Commissioner and the liberation 
movements. 
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Article 27. The High Commissioner and the Presidential Committee 
shall seek to solve all the difficulties arising from the work of the 
Government in a spirit of friendship and through reciprocal consultations. 
Chapter IV 
On the National Defence Committee 
Article 28. A National Defence Committee is hereby set up, composed 
as follows: 
The Higher Commissioner, 
The Presidential Committee, 
A Unified General Staff. 
Article 29. The High Commissioner shall inform the National Defence 
Committee of all matters concerning national defence, both internally and 
abroad, so as to: 
(a) Define and carry out the military policy arising from this 
Agreement; 
(b) Ensure and safeguard the present frontiers of Angola; 
(c) Guarantee peace and security and public law and order; 
(d) Promote the safety of persons and property. 
Article 30. The decisions of the National Defence Committee shall be 
taken by a simple majority; the High Commissioner, who will chair the 
Committee, shall have a vote. 
Article 31. A unified General Staff is hereby set up, which shall 
comprise the commanders of the three branches of the Portuguese Armed 
Forces in Angola and three commanding officers of the Liberation 
movements. 
The unified General Staff shall be placed under the direct authority of 
the High Commissioner. 
Article 32. Armed forces belonging to the three liberation movements 
shall be integr~ted to the same total number with the Portuguese forces in 
the mixed military forces, on the following numerical basis: 
8000 men belonging to the F.N.L.A. 
8000 men belonging to the M.P.L.A. 
8000 men belonging to the U.N.I.T.A. 
24,000 men belonging to the Portuguese Armed Forces. 
Article 33. The national Defence Committee shall effect the 
progressive integration of the armed forces in the mixed military forces 
specified in the previous article; in principle the following calendar should be 
respected; 
Between February and May, inclusive, and per month a total of 500 
men from each of the liberation movements will be integrated and 1 500 men 
of the Portuguese Armed Forces. 
Between June and September, inclusive, and per month, a total of 
1500 men from each of the liberation movements will be integrated and 
4500 men of the Portuguese Armed Forces. 
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Article 34. Such Portuguese Armed Forces contingents as exceed the 
quotas laid down in art. 32 shall be evacuated from Angola by 30 April 1975. 
Article 35. The evacuation of the contingent of the Portuguese Armed 
Forces integrated in the mixed military forces shall begin after 1 October 
1975 and shall be completed by 29 February 1976. 
Article 36. The National Defence Committee shall organize mixed 
police forces to maintain public, law and order. 
Article 37. The unified police command shall have three members, one 
from each of the liberation movements, and leadership shall be put in 
commission, the chair being taken by each member in turn. The force shall 
be placed under the authority and supervision of the National Defence 
Committee. 
Chapter V 
On Refugees and Displaced Persons 
Article 38. Immediately after the swearing-in of the Transitional 
Government, mixed equal-representation committees shall be set up, on 
nominations by the High Commissioner and by the Transitional Government, 
to plan and prepare the structures, means and procedure necessary to deal 
with the Angolan refugees. 
The work of these committees will be supervised by the Ministry of 
Health and Social Affairs. 
Article 39. Those persons housed in the Peace Villages may return to 
their own villages and homes. 
The mixed equal-representation committees shall propose to the High 
Commissioner and to the Transitional Government social, economic and 
other measures to assure a speedy return to normal ways of life of displaced 
persons and the reintegration of the various forms of activity in the 
economic life of the country. 
Chapter VI 
On General Elections for the Constituent Assembly of Angola 
Article 40. The transitional Government shall organize general 
elections for a Constituent Assembly within not more than 9 months from 
the date of its installation, that is 31 January 175. 
Article 41. Candidates to the Constituent Assembly shall be put 
forward exclusively by the liberation movements - F.N.L.A., M.P.L.A. and 
U.N.I.T.A. - as the sole legitimate representatives of the people of Angola. 
Article 42. Once the Transitional Government is installed, a Central 
Committee shall be instituted, with equal representation of the liberation 
movements, to draft the Basic Law and to prepare the elections to the 
Constituent Assembly. 
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Article 43. When the Basic Law has been approved by the Presidential 
Committee, the Central Committee shall: 
(a) Draft the Electoral Law; 
(b) Organize lists of voters; 
(c) Register the lists of candidates for election to the Constituent 
Assembly put forward by the liberation movements. 
Article 44. The Basic Law shall remain in force until the Constitution 
of Angola comes into force, but it may not run counter to the term of this 
Agreement. 
Chapter VII 
On Angolan Nationality 
Article 45. The Portuguese State and the three liberation movements -
F.N.L.A., M.P.L.A. and U.N.1.T.A. undertake to co-operate to eliminate all 
the consequences of colonialism. On this topic, the F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. 
and the U.N.I.T.A. stress their policy of non-discrimination, according to 
which the quality of Angolan citizenship is definable by birth in Angola or by 
domicile therein, always provided that those domiciled in Angola identify 
themselves with the aspirations of the Angolan Nation through a conscious 
choice. 
Article 46. The F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. hereby 
undertake to consider as Angolan citizens all individuals born in Angola, 
provided that they do not declare, on the terms and within the time-limits to 
be laid down, that they wish to maintain their present nationality or to 
choose another one. 
Article 47. Individuals not born in Angola but settled there may seek 
Angolan nationality in accordance with such rules governing Angolan 
nationality as come to be laid down in the Basic Law. 
Article 48. A mixed committee with equal representation will study 
special agreements to regulate the forms of concession of Angolan 
citizenship to Portuguese citizens domiciled in Angola, and the status of 
Portuguese citizens resident in Angola and of Angolan citizens resident in 
Portugal. 
Chapter VIII 
On Economic and Financial Topics 
Article 49. The Portuguese State undertakes to regularize with the 
State of Angola the situation arising from the existence of property 
belonging to the latter outside Angolan territory, so as to· facilitate the 
transfer of such property or the equivalent value, to the territory and 
ownership of Angola. 
Article 50. The F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. declare 
themselves ready to accept the responsibility arising from the financial 
undertakings assumed by the Portuguese State on behalf of, and relating to, 
Angola, always provided that they have been assumed in the real interest of 
the people of Angola. 
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Article 51. A special mixed equal-representation committee, composed 
of experts appointed by the Provisional Government of the Portuguese 
Republic and by the Transitional Government of the State of Angola, shall list 
the property mentioned in art. 49 and the credits referred to in art. 50, shall 
effect such acts of valuation as it thinks fit and shall put before the two 
Governments such solutions as it holds to be just. 
Article 52. The Portuguese State undertakes to provide the Committee 
specified in the previous article with all the information and data at its 
disposition and which the Committee may need in order to reach 
well-thought-out conclusions and to propose equitable solutions within the 
principles of truth, respect of the legitimate rights of each party and the cost 
loyal co-operation 
Article 53. The Portuguese State will aid the State of Angola in setting 
up a Central Issue Bank. The Portuguese State undertakes to transfer to the 
State of Angola the powers, the assets and the debits of the Angolan 
Department of the Bank of Angola, on conditions to be agreed in the mixed 
committee for financial topics. This committee will also consider all questions 
related to the Portugal Department of the same bank, proposing just 
solutions to the extent that they concern and affect Angola. 
Article 54. The F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the U.N.I.T.A. undertake to 
respect the property and the legitimate interests of the Portuguese citizens 
domiciled in Angola. 
Chapter IX 
On Co-Operation Between Angola and Portugal 
Article 55. The Portuguese Government on the one hand, and the 
liberation movements on the other, agree to set up between Portugal and 
Angola links of constructive, lasting co-operation in all fields, specifically in 
the cultural, technical, scientific, economic, commercial, monetary, financial 
and military spheres, on the basis of independence, equality, freedom, 
mutual respect and reciprocity of interests. 
Chapter X 
On Mixed Committees 
Article 56. Technical mixed equal-representation committees will be 
set up by the High Commissioner, in agreement with the Presidential 
Committee, to research and propose solutions for problems arising from 
decolonization and to lay down the foundations of active co-operation 
between Portugal and Angola, especially in the following spheres: 
(a) Cultural, technical and scientific; 
(b) Economic and commercial; 
(c) Monetary and financial; 
(d) Military; 
(e) The acquisition of Angolan nationality by Portuguese citizens. 
Article 5 7. The committee mentioned in the previous article shall carry 
out their work and negotiations in a climate of constructive co-operation and 
loyal spirit of compromise. Their conclusions shall be put as quickly as 
possible before the High Commissioner and the Presidential Committee for 





Article 58. Any questions arising as to the interpretation and 
application of this Agreement which cannot be solved on the items of art. 27 
above shall be settled by negotiations between the Portuguese Government 
and the liberation movements. 
Article 59. The Portuguese State, the F.N.L.A., the M.P.L.A. and the 
U.N.I. T.A., true to the social and political ideals repeatedly stated by their 
leaders, reaffirm their respect for the principles enshrined in the Charter of 
the United Nations and in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and 
also actively repudiate all forms of social discrimination, especially apartheid. 
Article 60. The present agreement shall come into force immediately 
after it has been approved by the President of the Portuguese Republic. 
The delegations of the Portuguese Government, the F.N.L.A., the 
M.P.L.A., and the U.N.I.T.A. stress the climate of perfect co-operation and 
cordiality in which the negotiations took place and feel great satisfaction at 
reaching this Agreement, which will meet the just aspirations of the Angolan 
people and of which the Portuguese people are rightly proud; henceforth 
they will be linked by ties of profound friendship and common desire for 
constructive co-operation for the progress of Angola, of Portugal, of Africa 
and of the world as a whole. 
Signed at Alvor, on 15 January 1975, in four copies in Portuguese. 
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APPENDIX 2 
The Geneva Protocol, 5 August 1988 
Delegations representing the Governments of the people's Republic of 
Angola I Republic of Cuba, and the Republic of South Africa, meeting in 
Geneva, Switzerland, 2 - 5 August 1988, with the mediation of Dr. Chester 
A. Crocker, Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs, United States of 
America, have agreed as follows: 
1 . Each side agrees to recommend to the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations that 1 November 1988 be established as the date for 
implementation of UNSCR 435/78. 
2. Each side agrees to the establishment of a target date for signature of 
the tripartite agreement among Angola, South Africa, and Cuba not 
later than 10 September 1988. 
3. Each side agrees that a schedule acceptable to all parties for the 
redeployment toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of 
Cuban troops from Angola must be established by Angola and Cuba, 
who will request on-site verification by the Security Council of the 
United Nations. The parties accept 1 September 1988 as the target 
date for reaching agreement on that schedule and all related matters. 
4. The complete withdrawal of South African forces from Angola shall 
begin not later than 10 August 1988 and be completed not later than 1 
September 1988. 
5. The parties undertake to adopt the necessary measures of restraint in 
order to maintain the existing de facto cessation of hostilities. South 
Africa stated its willingness to convey this commitment in writing to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations. Angola and Cuba shall urge 
SWAPO to proceed likewise as a step prior to the ceasefire 
contemplated in resolution 435/78 which will be established prior to 1 
November 1988. Angola and Cuba shall use their good offices so that, 
once the total withdrawal of South African troops from Angola is 
completed, and within the context also of the cessation of hostilities in 
Namibia, SW APO' s forces will be deployed to the north of the 16th 
parallel. The Parties deemed it appropriate that, during the period before 
1 November 1988, a representative of the United Nations 
Secretary-General be present in Luanda to take cognizance of any 
disputes relative to the cessation of hostilities and agreed that the 
combined military committee contemplated in paragraph 9 can be an 
appropriate venue for reviewing complaints of this nature that may arise 
6. As of 10 August 1988, no Cuban troops will deploy or be south of the 
line Chitado - Ruacana - Calueque - Naulila - Cuamato - N'Giva. Cuba 
furthermore stated that upon completion of the withdrawal of the South 
African troops from Angola not later than 1 September 1988 and the 
restoration by the People's Republic of Angola of its sovereignty over 
its international boundaries, the Cuban troops will not take part in 
offensive operations in the territory that lies east of meridian 17 and 
south of parallel 15 degrees, 30 minutes, provided that they are not 
subject to harrassment. 
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7. Following the complete withd.rawal of South African forces from 
Angola, the Government of Angola shall guarantee measures for the 
provision of water and power supply to Namibia. 
8. With a view toward minimizing the risk of battlefield incidents and 
facilitating exchange of technical information related to implementation 
of the agreements reached, direct communications shall be established 
not later than 20 August 1988 between the respective military 
commanders at appropriate headquarters along- the Angola/Namibia 
border. 
9. Each side recognizes that the period from 1 September 1988, by which 
time South African forces will have completed their withdrawal from 
Angola, and the date established for implementation of UNSCR 435, is 
a period of particular sensitivity, for which specific guidelines for 
military activities are presently lacking. In the interest of maintaining the 
ceasefire and maximizing the conditions for the orderly introduction of 
UNTAG, the sides agree to establish a combined military committee .to 
develop additional practical measures to build confidence and reduce 
the risk of unintended incidents. They invite United States membership . 
on the committee. 
10. Each side will act in accordance with the Governors Island principles, 
including paragraph E (non-interference in the internal affairs of states) 
and paragraph G (the acceptance of the responsibility of states not to 
allow their territory to be used for acts of war, aggression, or violence 
against other states). 
FOR THE GOVERN-
MENT OF THE PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF 
ANGOLA: 
Geneva, 5 August 1988 
FOR THE GOVERN-
MENT OF THE REPUB-







BILATERAL AGREEMENT, 22 DECEMBER 1988 
Following is the unofficial US translation of the original Portuguese and Spanish texts of the 
agreement, with annex. 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENTS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
OF ANGOLA AND THE REPUBLIC OF CUBA FOR THE TERMINATION OF THE 
INTERNATIONALIST MISSION OF THE CUBAN MILITARY CONTINGENT 
The Government of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of 
Cuba, hereinafter designated as the Parties, 
Considering, 
That the implementation of Resolution 435 of the Security Council of the 
United Nations for the independence of Namibia shall commence on the 1st 
of April, 
That the question of the independence of Namibia and the safeguarding of 
the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the People's 
Republic of Angola are closely interrelated with each other and with peace 
and security in the region of southwestern Africa, 
That on the date of signature of this agreement a tripartite agreement among 
the Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba 
and the Republic of South Africa shall be signed, containing the essential 
elements for the achievement of peace in the region of southwestern Africa, 
That acceptance of and strict compliance with the foregoing will bring to an 
end the reasons which compelled the Government of the People's Republic 
of Angola to request, in the legitimate exercise of its rights under Article 51 
of the United Nations Charter, the deployment to Angolan territory of a 
Cuban internationalist military contingent to guarantee, in cooperation with 
the FAPLA (the Angolan Government army), its territorial integrity and 
sovereignty in view of the invasion and occupation of part of its territory, 
Noting, 
2 
The agreements signed by the Governments of the People's Republic of 
Angola and the Republic of Cuba on 4 · February 1982 and 19 March 1984, 
the platform of the Government of the People's Republic of Angola approved 
in November 1984, and the Protocol of Brazzaville signed by the 
Governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and 
the Republic of South Africa on December 13, 1988, 
Taking into account, 
That conditions now exist which make possible the repatriation of the Cuban· 
military contingent currently in Angolan territory and the successful 
accomplishment of their internationalist mission, 
The parties agree as follows: 
Anicle I 
To commence the redeployment by stages to the 15th and 13th parallels and 
the total withdrawal to Cuba of the 50,000 men who constitute the Cuban 
troops contingent stationed in the People's Republic of Angola, in 
accordance with the pace and timeframe established in the attached 
calendar, which is an integral part of this agreement. The total withdrawal 
shall be completed by the 1st of July, 1991 . 
Article 2 
The Governments of the People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of 
Cuba reserve the right to modify or alter their obligations deriving from 
Article 1 of this Agreement in the event that flagrant violations of the 
Tripartite Agreement are verified. 
Article 3 
The Parties, through the Secretary General of the United Nations 
Organisation, hereby request · that the Security Council verify the 
redeployment and phased and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the 




This agreement shall enter into force upon signature of the tripartite 
agreement among the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba and 
the Republic of South Africa. 
Signed on 22 December 1988, at the Headquarters of the United Nations 
Organisation, in two copies, in the Portuguese and Spanish languages, each 
· being equally authentic. 
FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC 
OF ANGOLA 
AFONSO VAN DUNEM 




Annex on Troop Withdrawal Schedule 
Calendar 
In compliance with Article 1 of the agreement between the Government of 
the Republic of Cuba and the Government of the People's Republic of Angola 
for the termination of the mission of the Cuban internationalist military 
contingent stationed in Angolan territory, the parties establish the following 
calendar for the withdrawal: 
Time Frames 
Prior to the first of April, 1989 
(date of the beginning of implementation 
of Resolution 435) 3,000 men 
Total duration of the calendar 
Starting from the 1st of April, 1989 
Redeployment to the north: 
to the 1 5th parallel 
to the 13th parallel 
Total men to be withdrawn: 
by 1 November 1989 
by 1 April 1990 
by July 1991 
27 months 
by 1 August 1989 
by 31 October 1989 
25,000 men (50%) 
38,000 (76%); 12,000 men remaining 
50,000 (100%) 
Taking as its base a Cuban force of 50,000 men. 
APPENDIX 5 
TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT, 22 DECEMBER 1988 
AGREEMENT AMONG THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA, THE 
REPUBLIC OF CUBA, AND THE REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA 
The governments of the People's Republic of Angola, the Republic of Cuba, 
and the Republic of South Africa, hereinafter designated as "the Parties", 
Taking into account the "Principles for a Peaceful Settlement in 
Southwestern Africa," approved by the Parties on 20 July 1988, and the 
subsequent negotiations with respect to the implementation of these 
Principles, each of which is indispensable to a comprehensive settlement, 
Considering the acceptance by the Parties of the implementation of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 435 (1978), adopted on 29 September 
1978, hereinafter designated as "UNSCR 435/78", 
Considering the conclusion of the bilateral agreement between the People's 
Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba providing for the redeployment 
toward the North and the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from 
the territory of the People's Republic of Angola, 
Recognising the role of the United Nations security Council in implementing 
UNSCR 435/78 and in supporting the implementation of the present 
agreement, 
Affirming the sovereignty, sovereign equality, and independence of all states 
of southwestern Africa, 
Affirming the principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of states, 
Affirming the principle of abstention from the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of states, 
Reaffirming the right of the peoples of the southwestern region of Africa to 
self-determination, independence, and equality of rights, and of states of 
southwestern Africa to peace, development, and social progress, 
Urging African and international cooperation for the settlement of the 
problems of the development of the southwestern region of Africa, 
Expressing their appreciation for the mediating role of the Government of the 
United States of America, 
Desiring to contribute to the establishment of peace and security in 
southwestern Africa, 
Agree to the provisions set forth below. 
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1. The Parties shall immediately request the Secretary-General of the 
United Nations to seek authority from the Security Council to 
commence implementation of UNSCR 435/78 on 1 April 1989. 
2. All military forces of the Republic of South Africa shall depart Namibia 
in accordance with UNSCR 435/78. 
3. Consistent with the provisions of UNSCR 435/78, the Republic of South 
Africa and People's Republic for Angola shall cooperate with the 
Secretary-General t ensure the independence of Namibia through free 
and fair elections and shall abstain from any action that could prevent 
the execution of UNSCR 435/78. The Parties shall respect the 
territorial integrity and inviolability of borders of Namibia and shall 
ensure that their territories are not used by any state, organisation, or 
person in connection with acts of war, aggression, or violence against 
the territorial integrity or inviolability of borders of Namibia or any other 
action which could prevent the execution of UNSCR 435/78. 
4. The People's Republic of Angola and the Republic of Cuba shall 
implement the bilateral agreement, signed on the date of signature of 
this agreement, providing for the redeployment toward the North and 
the staged and total withdrawal of Cuban troops from the territory of 
the People's Republic of Angola, and the arrangements made with the 
Security Council of the United Nations for the on-site verification of that 
withdrawal. 
5. Consistent with their obligations under the Charter of the United 
. Nations, the Parties shall refrain from the threat or use of force, and 
shall ensure that their respective territories are not used by any state, 
organisation, or person in connection with any acts of war, aggression, 
or violence, against the territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, or 
independence of any state of southwestern Africa. 
6. The Parties shall respect the principle of non-interference in the internal 
affairs of the states of southwestern Africa. 
7. The Parties shall comply in good faith with all obligations undertaken in 
this agreement and shall resolve through negotiation and in a spirit of 
cooperation any disputes with respect to the interpretation or 
implementation thereof. 
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8. This agreement shall enter into force upon signature. 
Signed at New York in triplicate in the Portuguese, Spanish and English 
languages, each language being equally authentic, this 22nd day of 
December 1988. 
FOR THE PEOPLE'S 
REPUBLIC OF ANGOLA 
AFONSO VAN DUNEM 




FOR THE REPUBLIC OF 
SOUTH AFRICA 




~ SOUTH WEST AFRICA 
Map 6.2 Military situation, mid-November 1975 (Economist, November 
22, 1975) 






, 47 llrlgode ,,,,· Mavinga .......... ....._ ______ , 
South-Eastern Angola: 
The Two Fapla Offensives 




r '"'"\ Tactical Group 1 f Catalo
5 





I ' \ , ....... 
\, , ... , 
... ., ,, 
" \ ... , .... 
,, 
..... / P Claahol14Septernber 
Moduler: 
47 Brigade 
Tactlcal Oroup 1 
&September 
(Combat Oroup C) 
The Fapla Offensive to the L<Jmba ----··-
,::::-



























SCALE O km 10 
........ , 
' ', 
i' .... ....... __ _ -----------( .... ,, 
'1.. .. 
<'~ ~'!. .... , ,--......... r, ___ ,.',:., ___ .... , __ ..,...,,_: __ .,~"' 
Cuiio 
... - - - - ' C'u,,o ,' ---~ ---~_., _______ ..., ____ .... 



























) ,,_ <( _. 
a.. 
<( 
u. Alie 11pled crossing 
~~--···~ bl 21 Brigade ' ..-. . • 9/1( September
 .... - ..... -- . ,,,, -... Cle, 1hes ol 9 and _____ .,,. - ' ,' ::: "Combat Group B 
















,..'" .~· ... i / .... > ~ . / 
.J ~· '•;•I t__,.• 
( 
Cabinda 
., .,·-·-·-- .............. -·-·9'\ ZAIRE 
·, 
\. 
' r·-·, ·,. . "'-·--·---·~ 
\ ! j 
\_., . .r·-. ..1 \. 
I 




Map 6.1 South African operational sector 
. ' ' \ 
ZAMBIA 
9. Appendix 9 Map, SA Operational Sector ............... A23 
,, _,,,,.----- __ ., 




' > ... ~. 
Batlallon of 
C'1.Httir 








Combat Group C 
t) 14 November 
(:, Combat Group A 
14 November 
Combal Group A feint 
~) 
Combat Group 8 
15November 
k"toe of 9 November 
9 November 
, ..... , 
I ' '_, 
Combal G,o 1p B 
8 Novent • 
("• J Troop (G-6) 
·' 9 November 
Moduler: 
The South African Counter-Offensive 
· ... ~· 






























Culto Cuanavale •, . \ .. , 
I ,_, __ 
/----~--"' o.,/ ,,,.- .... --, 







' ' I 
I 
I 









/ , , 
I 
I 





J <,-""., __ _ 
~ 
0 21 Brigade 
__ ....._ ___ _ 














The Fighting East of Cuito Cuanavale 
2 4 6 8 
I C!-- a Battery 
,-'. 















































' I I 
I 
I 
' I I 


























• ', ,,._, __ , 
/,,-'----__.,,.~ 













' ,. -, 
Dr_J 














<,-"., ___ - - ............. _.,,.,,,,,.--- ..... 
,/-,,_ ---, 
I --------, __ -- _.,, 
,-"'"' 
-----
' I .... 








' ' I 
I 
Regiment Mooi River 
c.:_-.... - _ _, ..... -, c:, 
\ ,,, ~ 




,., .. '--~ 
32 Ballalion 
Assembly Area 





' ... ,, 
Regimen! President Sleyn 




Regiment Groot Kai 


































: ;·. ,r,, 
..•. ·, ~ .(' ' ! : 
. ~. ; ' ' . , 

































"""" >< ·-"C 
c 
a, 
c. 
c. 
<( 
M 
"""" 
